United States v. Moreno-Aguilar
198 F. Supp. 3d 548
D. Maryland2016Background
- Fourteen-defendant RICO murder conspiracy (MS-13); two defendants (Moreno-Aguilar and Ortiz-Orellana) charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” (Counts Nine and Ten).
- Count Nine predicates § 924(c) on VICAR murder (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)) and Maryland murder statutes/common law; Count Ten predicates on a murder as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
- Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the underlying murder statutes do not qualify as “crimes of violence” after Johnson (2015) invalidated the ACCA residual clause.
- The legal question focuses on whether murder qualifies under § 924(c)(3)’s force clause (§ 924(c)(3)(A)) or residual clause (§ 924(c)(3)(B)).
- The court applies the categorical approach (Taylor/Descamps) to compare statutory elements to the generic offense and examines statutory language, Supreme Court precedents (Johnson, Castleman), and circuit/district authority.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether murder qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | Government: murder has as an element the use (direct or indirect) of physical force and thus fits the force clause | Defendants: Maryland statute includes poisoning; poisoning may not constitute "use of physical force" and so the statute is broader than the generic violent-offense element | Held: Murder (including Maryland statutory and § 1111/common-law formulations) is a crime of violence under the force clause; poisoning counts as a use of force (Castleman) and does not defeat categorical fit |
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) is void for vagueness after Johnson (2015) | Government: § 924(c)(3)(B) is narrower than the ACCA residual clause and does not suffer the same fatal vagueness; it focuses on risk that force may be used in the course of the offense | Defendants: By analogy to Johnson, the residual formulation is vague and therefore unconstitutional | Held: § 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague when properly construed; it is narrower than the ACCA residual clause and permits a principled application |
| Whether Johnson (ACCA residual-clause holding) controls § 924(c) analysis | Defendants: Johnson swept broadly and undermines analogous residual-language in § 924(c) | Government/Court: Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause because of its particular textual features; § 924(c)(3)(A) is untouched and § 924(c)(3)(B) differs materially | Held: Johnson does not negate the force-clause analysis; it does not compel invalidation of § 924(c)(3)(B) given textual differences |
| Proper method of analysis (categorical approach scope) | Defendants: focus on most-innocent conduct under the statute; if that conduct falls outside the generic offense, offense cannot qualify | Government/Court: apply Taylor/Descamps categorical approach; but recognize Castleman and statutory text show murder necessarily involves physical force | Held: Categorical approach governs; under that approach murder statutes here match the generic element of use of physical force |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting "physical force" in ACCA context as violent force)
- Castleman v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (indirect uses of force, including poisoning, can constitute "use of physical force")
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limits when to use the categorical approach and modified categorical approach)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (crimes involving the use of physical force against another)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (categorization under ACCA and analogies to enumerated offenses)
- Taylor v. United States, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) materially narrower than ACCA residual clause and not void for vagueness)