United States v. Michael Moore
578 F. App'x 550
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- In 2000 Moore pleaded guilty in Tennessee to four counts of burglary under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402 (Class D felonies) for entering businesses/storage trailers and stealing property.
- In 2012 a federal jury convicted Moore of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a stolen firearm; he does not challenge those convictions.
- The Presentence Report treated Moore as an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) based on the four 2000 burglaries (and an earlier aggravated burglary), increasing his Guidelines range from ~100–125 months to 235–293 months; the district court imposed 235 months.
- Moore challenged using the § 39-14-402 convictions as ACCA predicates, arguing that Tennessee’s burglary statute (and specifically subsection (a)(3)) does not categorically qualify as a “violent felony.”
- The Sixth Circuit found § 39-14-402 divisible, limited consideration to Shepard-approved documents (state-court judgments), concluded Moore pleaded to a Class D subsection (a)(1)–(3) (not (a)(4)), and held that subsection (a)(3) qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. § 39-14-402 is divisible and thus amenable to the modified-categorical approach | § 39-14-402 is divisible; conviction could rest on non-violent subsection (a)(4) | Government: statute divisible but state judgments show Moore pleaded to Class D subsection (a)(1)–(3) | Divisible; state judgments are Shepard documents showing Moore pleaded to Class D subsection (a)(1)–(3) |
| Whether Shepard documents may be used to identify the specific subsection of conviction | Moore relied on affidavits/indictments but they are not Shepard-authorized | Government relied on state-court judgments as proper Shepard documents | Only state-court judgments qualify under Shepard; indictments/affidavits are insufficient here |
| Whether conviction under § 39-14-402(a)(3) is a "violent felony" under the ACCA | (Moore) Subsection (a)(3) does not categorically present the serious risk of physical injury required by the ACCA | (Gov’t) Subsection (a)(3) poses the same risk as generic burglary and fits the residual clause | Subsection (a)(3) qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause; sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (established the categorical approach for prior-conviction analysis)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents courts may consult in modified-categorical inquiry)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (explains residual-clause risk-comparison method)
- Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (applies risk-comparison test to determine violent felonies under residual clause)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explains divisibility and limits of modified-categorical approach)
- United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (discusses ACCA/categorical approach in this circuit)
- United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010) (applies categorical/modified-categorical analysis)
- United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2014) (frames three-prong ACCA analysis and two-step test)
- United States v. Vanhook, 640 F.3d 706 (6th Cir. 2011) (characterizes burglary-related conduct as presenting a risk of injury)