United States v. Mario Estrella
758 F.3d 1239
11th Cir.2014Background
- Estrella, a removed noncitizen, pleaded guilty to illegal reentry (8 U.S.C. § 1326); at sentencing the PSR identified a 2004 Florida conviction under Fla. Stat. § 790.19 (throwing/projecting a missile at an occupied vehicle) as a prior conviction.
- The probation officer recommended a 16-level USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement treating the § 790.19 conviction as a "crime of violence."
- Estrella objected: he argued § 790.19 does not necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force "against the person of another," and the record of conviction did not establish force was directed at a person rather than property.
- The district court applied the 16-level enhancement; Estrella was sentenced to 26 months (below guideline range). He appealed the enhancement.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the Florida conviction met USSG § 2L1.2's elements-based definition of a "crime of violence," applying the categorical and, where required, the modified categorical approach.
Issues
| Issue | Estrella's Argument | Government/PSR Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether conviction under Fla. Stat. § 790.19 qualifies as a USSG § 2L1.2 "crime of violence" because it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another" | § 790.19 can be satisfied by directing force at property (e.g., an unoccupied building or a vehicle that happens to be occupied), so it does not necessarily have an element requiring force against a person; record doesn't show force was directed at a person | The statute targets "occupied" vehicles/structures and uses mens rea terms ("wantonly or maliciously") — therefore the conviction qualifies as involving force against a person and supports the enhancement | Reversed: § 790.19 (as applied to an occupied vehicle) does not categorically require force "against the person of another." The statute can punish property-directed conduct and, because the record doesn't establish which alternative mens rea/variant formed the conviction, the enhancement was improper. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (de novo review and categorical approach principles)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for predicate offenses)
- Donawa v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013) (conviction must necessarily include element to qualify)
- United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2014) (divisibility and divisibility analysis guidance)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (authorized documents for modified categorical approach)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (examining indictment/records to determine statutory phrase forming conviction)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (physical-force/force-quantum discussion)
- United States v. Alfaro, 408 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2005) (shooting at occupied structure does not necessarily target a person)
- United States v. Ford, 613 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2010) (discharging at occupied vehicle can require property-directed force; not categorically force against a person)
- United States v. Curtis, 645 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2011) (statute requiring knowledge vehicle is occupied may equate to force against occupant)
- United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 467 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing statutes that require direction of force at individuals)
- United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 676 F.3d 1017 (11th Cir. 2012) (modified categorical approach scope)
- United States v. Wilk, 464 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (binding nature of Guidelines commentary)