38 F.4th 1083
D.C. Cir.2022Background
- Reynoso was convicted after a jury trial of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) and simple possession of methamphetamine and marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).
- Secret Service officers found a loaded Glock under the BMW driver’s floor mat during a traffic stop; Reynoso was the car’s primary driver and had been driving it for a week after the gun was placed there by Valle Rodriguez (per Rodriguez’s statement).
- Reynoso fled the scene, was later detained carrying cash, phones, keys, and a small amount of methamphetamine; the jury heard a stipulation that Reynoso had prior convictions for crimes punishable by more than one year.
- Prior convictions: a 2011 Virginia guilty plea to distribution/PWID counts (maximum sentences exceeding one year) and a February 2018 Maryland guilty plea for PWID marijuana and a gun-count tied to a disqualifying prior conviction.
- At trial the jury was not instructed on the Rehaif knowledge-of-status element because prevailing circuit law at the time required only knowledge of possession; after sentencing the Supreme Court decided Rehaif and later Greer clarified plain-error relief in that context.
Issues
| Issue | Reynoso's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Reynoso constructively possessed the gun | He lacked knowledge of the gun in the car; Rodriguez placed it there | Circumstantial evidence (driver status, gun under driver’s seat, bulge under mat, magazine found loaded) supports constructive possession | Conviction sustained; reasonable juror could find knowledge and dominion/control over the gun |
| Rehaif error: trial omitted knowledge-of-status element (felon status) | Omission required reversal or acquittal because jury never found he knew his prior convictions carried >1 year maximum | Any Rehaif error is not reversible plain error here; Reynoso stipulated to prior convictions and record shows he knew the convictions were punishable by >1 year | No plain error; Greer controls — defendant must show he would have presented evidence of ignorance of felon status and Reynoso failed to do so |
| Sixth Amendment/compulsory-process: denial of live testimony from Rodriguez | Reynoso was entitled to compel Rodriguez’s live testimony and absence prejudiced his defense | Reynoso waived the right when defense counsel agreed to a stipulation of Rodriguez’s statements instead of calling him live | Waiver valid; counsel’s tactical choice to accept stipulation forfeited objection to loss of live testimony |
| Batson challenge to prosecution’s peremptory strike of a Black juror | Strike was racially motivated; prosecutor’s demeanors-based reason pretextual | Prosecutor offered race-neutral, demeanor-based reasons; trial judge credited prosecutor’s observations | Batson challenge denied; district court did not clearly err in crediting prosecutor’s explanation |
Key Cases Cited
- Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2020) (knowledge-of-status is an element of § 922(g) offenses)
- Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090 (2021) (Rehaif errors ordinarily do not warrant plain-error relief absent a showing defendant would have presented evidence of ignorance of status)
- Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (four-prong plain-error framework for appellate review of forfeited errors)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence)
- Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (constructive possession requires knowledge and dominion/control)
- Cassell, 292 F.3d 788 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (possession requires both physical and mental elements)
- Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015) (actual possession requires physical control)
- Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (acquittal vs. retrial rule when evidence insufficient; Double Jeopardy implications)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibition on racially motivated peremptory strikes)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008) (trial-court demeanor determinations and Batson review)
- Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (distinguishing basic rights that cannot be waived from strategic decisions for counsel)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to counsel and allocation of trial decisions to counsel)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) (appellate discretion at the fourth prong of plain-error analysis)