United States v. Lorenzo Aguirre-Miron, 988 F.3d 683

Aguirre‑Miron pleaded guilty to five child‑pornography counts: three productions (18 U.S.C. § 2251), one receipt (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)), and one possession (18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)).
The PSR grouped receipt and possession but left the three production counts separate, yielding four groups for Guidelines calculations.
A five‑level pattern enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) was applied to the receipt/possession group based on the conduct underlying the production counts, producing a combined offense level that was effectively life under the Guidelines; the District Court gave a one‑level downward variance and imposed 360 months’ imprisonment.
Aguirre‑Miron appealed, arguing the production counts should have been grouped with receipt/possession under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c); he did not object at sentencing, so the claim is reviewed for plain error.
The Third Circuit held the District Court plainly erred by failing to group the production counts with the receipt/possession counts because the production counts embodied conduct that served as a specific offense characteristic triggering grouping under § 3D1.2(c).
The court found the error was clear under the Guidelines and binding precedent, that it affected Aguirre‑Miron’s substantial rights (presumed where sentence was set under an incorrect Guidelines range), and exercised discretion to correct the error—vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing.

Issue	Aguirre‑Miron’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether the production counts had to be grouped with the receipt and possession counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c)	Production counts must be grouped because they embodied the conduct used as a specific offense characteristic (pattern enhancement) for receipt/possession	Ketcham inapplicable; grouping not required because enhancement derives from conduct (not the counts) and harms differ; if grouping required, only two production counts need group	Court: Grouping was required under § 3D1.2(c); District Court plainly erred, the error was clear and affected substantial rights, and the court will correct the error by vacating and remanding for resentencing

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (establishes plain‑error test)
Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018) (clarifies plain‑error prongs and discretionary relief)
Molina‑Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (presumption that an incorrect Guidelines range affects substantial rights)
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (error must be clear under current law)
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006) (district court’s duty to calculate Guidelines sentence)
United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 1996) (grouping required when conduct supporting pattern enhancement applies)
United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2013) (error clear in light of plain Guidelines language)
United States v. Flores‑Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc) (plain‑error review standard cited)
United States v. Payano, 930 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting correcting sentencing errors on remand is less burdensome)