United States v. Lamar Burns-Johnson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12877
4th Cir.2017Background
- Defendant Lamar Burns-Johnson pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and was classified as an Armed Career Criminal based on three prior North Carolina convictions for robbery with a dangerous weapon (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87).
- Classification under the ACCA imposed a mandatory minimum 15-year (180-month) sentence; district court applied the ACCA over Burns-Johnson’s objection.
- Burns-Johnson argued post-Johnson (2015) that North Carolina statutory armed robbery no longer qualifies as a “violent felony” because the ACCA’s residual clause is invalid and the offense does not categorically meet the ACCA’s force clause.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether N.C. § 14-87 is a categorical match to the ACCA’s force clause (use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another).
- North Carolina law defines statutory armed robbery as (1) unlawful taking or attempt, (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, (3) whereby life is endangered or threatened, and (4) intent to deprive the owner of property; “dangerous weapon” means an instrument likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether N.C. robbery with a dangerous weapon categorically qualifies as an ACCA “violent felony” under the force clause | Burns-Johnson: § 14-87 can encompass means (e.g., poison) that do not constitute "violent physical force," so it is not a categorical match | Government: § 14-87’s elements require use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon that endangers life, which is violent force | Held: § 14-87 categorically satisfies the ACCA force clause; conviction qualifies as a violent felony |
| Whether § 14-87 requires intentional use/threatened use of force (mens rea) sufficient for the ACCA | Burns-Johnson: statute lacks express mens rea for weapon use; could be satisfied by negligent/accidental conduct | Government: robbery is a general-intent crime; intentional taking by violence or intimidation necessarily entails volitional use or threatened use of force | Held: statute requires volitional conduct; accidental/reckless use is not a realistic basis for conviction under N.C. law |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defined “physical force” as violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (explained categorical approach for comparing state offenses to federal definitions)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (held indirect uses of force, like poison used to cause harm, qualify as ‘‘use of force’')
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (held “use of physical force” excludes merely negligent or accidental conduct)
- United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2016) (robbery as a general-intent crime entails volitional use of force and qualifies under ACCA force clause)