14 F.4th 961
9th Cir.2021Background:
- Defendant Jose Lizarraras-Chacon pleaded guilty under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement and was sentenced in 2013 to 210 months’ imprisonment (within a 210–262 mo. Guidelines range) after the government filed a § 851 information alleging a 2010 Oregon drug conviction triggered a 20-year statutory mandatory minimum.
- The sentence reflected a binding plea bargain; the district court accepted the recommended 210-month term.
- Defendant moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after Guideline Amendment 782 lowered base offense levels; the district court denied relief in 2017 and again in 2020.
- On the second motion Defendant argued intervening developments—(1) this Court’s decision in United States v. Valencia-Mendoza (re-evaluating whether a prior state conviction qualifies as a “felony drug offense”) and (2) the First Step Act’s modification of mandatory-minimum predicates and penalties—meant the 20-year minimum no longer properly reflected the seriousness of his conduct.
- The district court found Defendant eligible for a reduction but stated it would not consider those intervening legal developments within its § 3553(a) analysis; the Ninth Circuit held that was error and remanded for the district court to consider such developments and any other relevant § 3553(a) factors.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intervening legislative or judicial changes to mandatory minimums are relevant to the § 3553(a) factors at step two of a § 3582(c)(2) motion | Lizarraras: Valencia-Mendoza and the First Step Act change the applicable predicate and statutory minimums and thus are relevant to § 3553(a) (seriousness, nature of offense, just punishment) | Government/district court: Changes to mandatory minimums do not fit within § 3553(a) analysis for § 3582(c)(2) reductions | Court: Such intervening developments are relevant and may be considered under § 3553(a) at step two |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by declining to consider those developments | Lizarraras: District court refused to consider a cognizable § 3553(a) argument and thus misapplied the law | Government: Alternatively argues court did consider and rejected the argument on the merits | Court: District court’s order was at least ambiguous and indicates a misunderstanding of Dillon step two; this constituted an abuse of discretion requiring remand |
| Appropriate remedy when district court excludes intervening-law considerations | Lizarraras: Remand for reconsideration applying full § 3553(a) analysis including intervening law and rehabilitation evidence | Government: Opposed relief on discretion grounds; argued prior precedent limited consideration | Court: Reversed and remanded for the district court to consider the fullest information, including intervening legal developments, and then decide whether a reduction is warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (explaining the two-step § 3582(c)(2) framework and that step two requires consideration of § 3553(a) factors)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (post-sentencing rehabilitation and subsequent information may be considered at resentencing)
- Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (discussing the goals of § 3582(c)(2) and similarity of sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act)
- United States v. Valencia-Mendoza, 912 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir.) (reconsideration of whether a prior state conviction counts as a "felony drug offense" for federal enhancements)
- United States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir.) (standard of review for discretionary § 3582(c)(2) denials)
- United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir.) (explaining the broader discretion at step two of § 3582(c)(2) beyond guideline substitution)
- United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9th Cir.) (overview of § 3553(a)’s sentencing objectives)