HUGHES v. UNITED STATES
No. 17-155
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
June 4, 2018
584 U. S. ____ (2018)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus
NOTE: Whеre it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
HUGHES v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-155. Argued March 27, 2018—Decided June 4, 2018
In Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522, this Court considered whether a prisoner who had been sentenced under a plea agreement authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could have his sentence reduced under
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorizes the United States Sentencing Commission to establish, and retroactively amend, Sentencing Guidelines. Though the Guidelines are only advisory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, a district court must
This case concerns the issue whether a defendant may seek relief under
After petitioner Erik Hughes was indicted on drug and gun charges, he and the Government negotiated a Type-C plea agreement, which stipulated that Hughes would receive a sentence of 180 months but did not refer to a particular Guidelines range. Hughes pleaded guilty. At his sentencing hearing, the District Court accepted the agreement and sentenced him to 180 months. In so doing, it calculated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and determined that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors the court was required to consider. Less than two months later, the Sentencing Commission аdopted, and made retroactive, an amendment that had the effect of reducing Hughes’ sentencing range to 151 to 188 months. The District Court denied Hughes’ motion for a reduced sentence under
Held:
1. A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant‘s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. Pp. 7-14.
(a) A principal purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to promote sentencing uniformity. But in the aftermath of Freeman, a defendant‘s eligibility for a reduced sentence under
(b) A district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” a Guidelines range for purposes of
A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant‘s Guidelines range is the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. The Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, but the Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant‘s Guidelines range. So in the usual case the court‘s acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are “based on” the defendant‘s Guidelines range. Since the Guidelines are a district court‘s starting point, when the Commission lowers the range, the defendant will be eligible for relief under
This interpretation furthers
(c) The Government‘s counterarguments—that allowing defendants with Type-C agreements to seek reduced sentences under
2. Hughes is eligible for relief under
849 F. 3d 1008, reversed and remanded.
KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–155
ERIK LINDSEY HUGHES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2018]
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The proper construction of federal sentencing statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure can present close questions of statutory and textual interpretation when implementing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
No single interpretation or rationale in Freeman commanded a majority of the Court. The courts of appeals then confronted the question of what principle or principles considered in Freeman controlled when an opinion by four Justices and a concurring opinion by a single Justice had allowed a majority of this Court to agree on the judgment in Freeman but not on one interpretation or rule that courts could follow in later cases when similar questions arose under the same statute and Rule.
For guidance courts turned to this Court‘s opinion in Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977). Some courts interpreted Marks as directing them to follow the “narrowest” opinion in Freeman that was necessary for the judgment in that case; and, accordingly, they adopted the reasoning of the opinion concurring in the judgment by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 665 F. 3d 344, 348 (CA1 2011); United States v. Thompson, 682 F. 3d 285, 290 (CA3 2012); United States v. Brown, 653 F. 3d 337, 340, n. 1 (CA4 2011); United States v. Benitez, 822 F. 3d 807, 811 (CA5 2016); United States v. Smith, 658 F. 3d 608, 611 (CA6 2011); United States v. Dixon, 687 F. 3d 356, 359 (CA7 2012); United States v. Browne, 698 F. 3d 1042, 1045 (CA8 2012); United States v. Graham, 704 F. 3d 1275, 1277–1278 (CA10 2013).
In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits held that no opinion in Freeman provided a controlling rule because the reasoning in the concurrence was not a “logical subset” of the reasoning in the plurality. United States v. Davis, 825 F. 3d 1014, 1021-1022 (CA9 2016) (en banc); United States v. Epps, 707 F. 3d 337, 350 (CADC 2013). Those courts have adopted the plurality‘s opinion as the most persuasive interpretation of
To resolve these differences over the proper application of Marks and the proper
The third question is directed to the underlying statutory issue in this case, the substantive, sentencing issue the Court discussed in the three opinions issued in Freeman. That question is: “Whether, as the four-Justice plurality in Freeman concluded, a defendant who enters into a
Taking instruction from the cases decided in the wake of Freeman and the systemic concerns that have arisen in some Circuits, and considering as well the arguments of the parties as to question three, a majority of the Court in the instant case now can resolve the sentenсing issue on its merits. So it will be unnecessary to consider questions one and two despite the extensive briefing and careful argument the parties presented to the Court concerning the proper application of Marks. The opinion that follows resolves the sentencing issue in this case; and, as well, it should give the necessary guidance to federal district courts and to the courts of appeals with respect to plea agreements of the kind presented here and in Freeman.
With that explanation, the Court now turns to the circumstances of this case and the sentencing issue it presents.
I
A
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission establishes Sentencing Guidelines based on the seriousness of a defendant‘s offense and his criminal history. Dillon v. United States, 560 U. S. 817, 820 (2010). In combination, these two factors yield a range of potential sentences for a district court to choose from in sentencing a particular defendant. “The Sentencing Guidelines provide the framework for the tens of thousands of federal sentencing proceedings that occur each year.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ____, ____ (2016) (slip op., at 2).
After this Court‘s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 (2005), the Guidelines are advisory only. But a district court still “must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” Id., at 264; see also
The Act requires the Commission to review and revise the Guidelines from time to time.
If an amendment applies retroactively, the Act authorizes district courts to reduce the sentences of prisoners who were sentenced based on a Guidelines range that would have been lower had the amendment been in place when they were sentenced.
“[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sen-tencing Commission pursuant to
28 U. S. C. §994(o) , . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”
B
The controlling issue here is whether a defendant may seek relief under
In a Type-C agreement the Government and a defendant “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply,” and “such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.”
In deciding whether to accept an agreement that includes a specific sentence, the district court must consider the Sentencing Guidelines. The court may not accept the agreement unless the court is satisfied that “(1) the agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2)(A) the agreed sentence is outside the applicable guideline range for justifiable reasons; and (B) those reasons are set forth with specificity.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §6B1.2(c) (Nov. 2016) (USSG).
“[T]he decision whether to accept the agreement will often be deferred until the sentencing hearing,” which means that “the decision whether to accept the plea agreement will often be made at the same time that the defendant is sentenced.” United States v. Hyde, 520 U. S. 670, 678 (1997).
C
1
In 2013 petitioner Erik Hughes was indicted on drug and gun charges for his participation in a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. About four months later, the Government and Hughes negotiated a Type-C plea agreement. Hughes agreed to plead guilty to two of the four charges (conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and being a felon in possession of a gun); and in exchange the Government agreed to dismiss the other two
Hughes entered his guilty plea in December 2013. The District Court accepted the plea at that time, but it deferred consideration of the plea agreement (and hence thе stipulated 180-month sentence) until sentencing.
Three months later, at the sentencing hearing, the District Court accepted the agreement and sentenced Hughes to 180 months in prison. The court stated that it had “considered the plea agreement [and] the sentencing guidelines, particularly the provisions of [§3553(a)],” and that it would “accept and approve the binding plea agreement.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a–33a. The court calcu-lated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months in prison and heard statements from Hughes’ daughter, mother, and Hughes himself. Id., at 37a–43a. When it imposed the agreed 180-month sentence the court reiterated that it was “a reasonable sentence in this case compatible with the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines but in accordance with the mandatory matters the Court is required to consider in ultimately determining a sentence.” Id., at 44a, 47a.
2
Less than two months later after the District Court sentenced Hughes, the Sentencing Commission adopted amendment 782 to the Guidelines. USSG App. C, Amdt. 782 (Supp. Nov. 2012–Nov. 2016). The amendment reduced the base offense level by two levels for most drug offenses. The Commission later made amendment 782 retroactive for defendants who, like Hughes, already had been sentenced under the higher offense levels. Amdt. 788. Under the revised Guidelines, Hughes’ sentencing range is 151 to 188 months—about three to four years lower than the range in effect when he was sentenced.
Hughes filed a motion for a reduced sentence under
II
A principal purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines is to promote “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Molina-Martinez, 578 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted; emphasis deleted). Yet in the aftermath of Freeman, a defendant‘s eligibility for a reduced sentence under
In addition this Court‘s precedents since Freeman have further confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions. In Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. 530 (2013), for example, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of amended Guidelines that increase a defendant‘s sentencing range. Id., at 544. The Court reasoned that, Booker notwithstanding, the Guidelines remain “the lodestone of sentencing.” 569 U. S., at 544. And in Molina-Martinez, the Court held that in the ordinary case a defendant suffers prejudice from a Guidelines error because of “the systemic function of the selected Guidelines range.” 578 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 10).
“The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the Guidelines.” Peugh, supra, at 541. In this context clarity and consistency are essential. To resolve the uncertainty that resulted from this Court‘s divided decision in Freeman, the Court now holds that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant‘s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement.
A
As already mentioned,
In the typical sentencing case there will be no question that the defendant‘s Guidelines range was a basis for his sentenсe. The Sentencing Reform Act requires a district court to calculate and consider a defendant‘s Guidelines range in every case.
A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant‘s Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. Although in a Type-C agreement the Government and a defendant may agree to a specific sentence, that bargain is contingent on the district court accepting the agreement and its stipulated sentence. Freeman, 564 U. S., at 529-530. The Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant‘s Guidelines range. USSG §6B1.2(c). So in the usual case the court‘s acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are “based on” the defendant‘s Guidelines range.
To be sure, the Guidelines are advisory only, and so not every sentence will bе consistent with the relevant Guidelines range. See Koons v. United States, post, at 5 (defendants’ Guidelines ranges “clearly did not” form a basis of the ultimate sentences). For example, in Koons the Court today holds that five defendants’ sentences were not “based on” subsequently lowered Guidelines ranges because in that case the Guidelines and the record make clear that the sentencing judge “discarded” their sentencing ranges “in favor of mandatory minimums and substantial-assistance factors.” Post, at 5-6; see also Molina-Martinez, supra, at ____ (slip op., at 11) (“The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range“).
If the Guidelines range was not “a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement,” Freeman, supra, at 530, then the defendant‘s sentence was not based on that sentencing range, and relief under
This interpretation furthers
Two cases decided after Freeman now reinforce this proposition. See Molina-Martinez, 578 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 9–11); Peugh, 569 U. S., at 541-544. These cases confirm that the Guidelines remain a basis for almost all federal sentences. In Peugh, the Court recognized that “[e]ven after Booker rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, district courts have in the vast majority of cases imposed either within-Guidelines sentences or sentences that depart downward from the Guidelines on the Government‘s motion.” Id., at 543. And in Molina-Martinez, the Court explained that “[t]he Commission‘s statistics demonstrate the real and pervasive effect the Guidelines have on sentencing.” 578 U. S., at ____ (slip op., at 10). In short, experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR‘s concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of
B
In response, the Government largely recycles arguments that a majority of this Court rejected in Freeman. For example, the Government contends that allowing defendants who enter Type-C agreements to seek reduced sentences under
The Government also contends that allowing courts to reduce the sentences of defendants like Hughes would be inconsistent with the Commission‘s policy statement in USSG §1B1.10, which provides that when a district court modifies a sentence under
This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, the Government‘s interpretation of §1B1.10 depends on an artificial distinction between a court‘s decision to accept a Type-C agreement and its decision
Second, the Commission‘s policy statement “seeks to isolate whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant‘s sentence.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 530. Accordingly, relief under
C
In this case the District Court accepted Hughes’ Type-C agreement after concluding that a 180-month sentence was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. The court then calculated Hughes’ sentencing range and imposed a sentence that the court deemed “compatible” with the Guidelines. Id., at 36a, 47a. Thus, the sentencing range was a basis for the sentence that the District Court imposed. That range has “subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” so Hughes is eligible for relief under
*
*
*
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–155
ERIK LINDSEY HUGHES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2018]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
In Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522 (2011), this Court confronted the same question it definitively resolves today: whether criminal defendants who enter into plea agreements under
The plurality of four Justices in Freeman concluded that defendants who plead guilty pursuant to a so-called “Type-C agreement” may be eligible for a sentence reduction under
Parting ways with all eight of my colleagues, I concurred only in the judgment. Id., at 534-544. I held the view that sentences imposed under Type-C agreements are typically “based on” the agreements themselves, not on the Guidelines. Id., at 535-536. “In the (C) agreement context,” I explained, “it is the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of imprisonment to which the defendant is sentenced.” Id., at 535. But, in my view, that general rule was not absolute. Rejecting the categorical rule adopted by the dissent, I instead concluded that some Type-C sentences were “based on” the Guidelines and thus eligible for sentencing reductions under
I continue to believe that my Freeman concurrence sets forth the most convincing interpretation of
The integrity and legitimacy of our criminal justice system depend upon consistency, predictability, and evenhandedness. Regrettably, the divided decisions in Freeman, and my concurrence in particular, have done little to foster those foundational principles. Quite the opposite, my individual views, which “[n]o other Justice . . . shares,” have contributed to ongoing discord among the lower courts, sown confusion among litigants, and left “the governing rule uncertain.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332, 354 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3–27 (arguing that the Freeman concurrence leads to unpredictable and inconsistent results).
I therefore join the majority in full because doing so helps to ensure clarity and stability in the law and promotes “uniformity in sentencing imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct.” Molina-Martinez v. United Statеs, 578 U. S. ____, ____ (2016) (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted; emphasis deleted). Today‘s majority opinion charts a clear path forward: It mitigates the inconsistencies and disparities occasioned
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 17–155
ERIK LINDSEY HUGHES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[June 4, 2018]
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
Seven years ago, four Justices took the position that a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment specified in a binding plea agreement may have been sentenced “based on” a Sentencing Guidelines range, simply because the district court must consider the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement. Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522, 529–530 (2011) (plurality opinion). That view has since garnered more votes, but has not gotten any more persuasive.
A defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction following a retroactive Guidelines amendment if he was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”
If a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a Type-C agreement specifying a particular term of imprisonment, the district court may sentence him only to that term. See
As the Court points out, a district court considering whether to accept a Type-C agreement must consult the Guidelines, as the District Court did here. Ante, at 5; see App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a–36a. But “when detеrmining the sentence to impose,” the district court may base its decision on “one thing and one thing only—the plea agreement.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 545 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting). The Court characterizes this distinction as “artificial,” arguing that the district court‘s ultimate imposition of a sentence often has as much to do with its Guidelines calculation as anything else. Ante, at 13; see ante, at 10-11. But that is not so: With a Type-C agreement, the sentence is set by the parties, not by a judge applying the Guidelines. Far from being “artificial,” that distinction is central to what makes a Type-C plea a Type-C plea. “In the (C) agreement context” it is “the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of imprisonment.” Freeman, 564 U.S., at 535 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). “To hold otherwise would be to contravene the very purpose of (C) agreements—to bind the district court and allow the Government and the defendant to determine what sentence he will receive.” Id., at 536.
That commonsense understаnding accords with our reading of the phrase “based upon” in the context of deciding when a cause of action is based upon particular con-duct. In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349 (1993), we considered a provision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 providing an exception to a foreign state‘s immunity when “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.”
More recently, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ____ (2015), we found that a cause of action was not “based upon” commercial activity when the activity established just one element of the action. The phrase “based upon,” we explained, instead looks to “the core of [the] suit” and what the claims “turn on.” Id., at ____ (slip op., at 7-8). Here the sentence that petitioner Hughes received “turned on” the agreement, not the Guidelines or anything else.
Finally, as five Members of this Court recognized in Freeman, “[a]llowing district courts later to reduce a term of imprisonment simply because the court itself considered the Guidelines in deciding whether to accept the agreement would transform
The Court justifies this result by arguing that its rule ensures that “those who commit crimes of similar severity under similar conditions receive similar sentences.” Ante, at 11. But that ignores the crucial way in which Type-C defendants are not similarly situated to other defendants. They entered into binding agreements—based on the unique facts of their cases and their negotiations with prosecutors—and received benefits (often quite significant ones) that other defendants do not. The fаcts of this case provide a striking illustration. In exchange for the certainty of a binding 180-month sentence, the Government not only dropped additional charges against Hughes, but also promised not to pursue a recidivist enhancement that would have imprisoned him for life.
The Court stresses that the question presented concerns only a Type-C defendant‘s eligibility under
The point is a very practical one: Hughes pleaded guilty and entered into a binding agreement because he otherwise was looking at life in prison. Although the District Court dutifully performed the required Guidelines calculations, Hughes‘s sentence was based on the agreement, not the Guidelines range. Hughes should not receive a windfall benefit because that range has been changed.
The Government may well be able to limit the frustrating effects of today‘s decision in the long run. Going forward, it presumably can add a provision to every Type-C agreement in which the defendant agrees to waive any right to seek a sentence reduction following future Guidelines amendments. See Brief for Petitioner 34-35 (referring to the possibility of such an “explicit waiver“). But that is no comfort when it comes to cases like this one, where the parties understood their choice of sentence to be binding.
I respectfully dissent.