941 F.3d 1183
9th Cir.2019Background
- In June 2015 Jazzmin Dailey transported T.B. from Arizona to Las Vegas intending that T.B., a juvenile, engage in prostitution; Dailey admitted buying clothing, renting a hotel room, instructing T.B., and that T.B. was a minor.
- Dailey pleaded guilty to a single count under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3); the plea agreement warned she "may be required to register as a sex offender" and contained an appellate-waiver clause.
- The PSR listed SORNA registration as a mandatory condition; at sentencing the district court varied downward to probation (three years) and imposed a SORNA registration condition in the written judgment.
- Dailey was required to register in Arizona and appealed, arguing (1) her Travel Act conviction is not a SORNA "sex offense," (2) she lacked adequate pre-sentencing notice of the registration requirement, (3) the court impermissibly delegated judicial power by leaving registration details to probation/state officials, and (4) the appellate waiver is unenforceable because the sentence is illegal.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed waiver de novo and addressed the merits (statutory interpretation of SORNA, notice/plain-error, and impermissible delegation) and dismissed the appeal after concluding the sentence was lawful and the waiver enforceable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Dailey's Travel Act conviction qualifies as a SORNA "sex offense" | Travel Act lacks a victim-age element; under a categorical approach her conviction is not a sex offense requiring registration | Dailey admitted transporting a juvenile and facilitating prostitution; SORNA's residual clause covers conduct that is "by its nature a sex offense against a minor" so non-categorical inquiry applies | Held: Travel Act conviction (given Dailey's admissions) is a SORNA sex offense under the non-categorical residual clause; registration required |
| Whether SORNA's residual clause must be interpreted categorically or non-categorically (and whether agency SMART guidance controls) | Argues SMART guidelines require the categorical approach and merit deference | Government: statutory text/structure supports non-categorical approach; Byun precedent supports non-categorical reading | Held: Statutory text and structure unambiguously support a non-categorical approach; agency guidelines do not control here |
| Whether Dailey received adequate pre-sentencing notice of the SORNA registration condition | Claims insufficient notice before imposition; plain-error review applies | Plea agreement, plea colloquy, and PSR put Dailey on notice that registration was possible/mandatory | Held: No plain error; record gave adequate notice and registration was mandatory given facts |
| Whether the court unconstitutionally delegated Article III sentencing power by deferring details of registration to probation/state officials | Argues district court left the substantive determination to probation/state officials | Court argued it mandated compliance ("must comply") and only delegated ministerial implementation details | Held: No improper delegation; the court imposed the condition and only delegated ministerial implementation steps |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (interpreting SORNA residual clause and applying a non‑categorical approach regarding victim age)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agency interpretations may displace prior judicial constructions in certain circumstances)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (materials permissible in the non‑categorical/modified categorical inquiry)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (discussion of the categorical approach to predicate offenses)
- United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2005) (permitting courts to impose mandatory probation conditions while leaving ministerial implementation to probation officers)
- United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2004) (notice requirements for non‑listed supervised‑release conditions)
- Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) (Rule 32 notice requirement for departures)
- United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (review of allegedly unlawful supervised‑release conditions)
- United States v. Bibler, 495 F.3d 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (limits on enforceability of appellate waivers)
- United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (plain‑error standard for forfeited claims)