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United States v. Antonio D. Stephens
424 F.3d 876
9th Cir.
2005
Check Treatment
Docket

*3 6, on December was indicted Stephens CLIFTON, Before: REINHARDT 2000, approxi- importing on one count WEINER, District Judges, and Circuit in viola- marijuana, mately 45.25 kilos of Judge.* 960, and one §§ 952 and of 21 U.S.C. marijuana in- possession count of WEINER, Judge. Senior District distribute, in of 21 U.S.C. violation tent 841(a)(1). count pled guilty He I. on June was sentenced the indictment and day impris- year to one and one appeals the Damon Antonio re- onment, years and three by the district imposed sentence re- A of his condition lease. re- of his upon revocation stated: lease supervised release Stephens was on lease. any from shall refrain The defendant entry following sentence part of his as substance. use of controlled marijua- unlawful importation guilty plea of a drag to one shall submit The defendant appeal is in this we confront na. The issue im- days of within dele- test improperly the district court whether periodic two at least prisonment and num- gated its determine thereafter, as directed drug tests manner sub- ber, timing, and frequency, officer. testing and treatment stance abuse * by designa- sitting Weiner, Pennsylvania, Senior District R. Charles The Honorable Judge for the tion. Eastern District He was also to “participate in a to a community corrections center where drug and alcohol abuse treatment and he is again subjected to urinalysis testing. counseling program, including urinalysis

testing, as directed the Probation Offi- III. cer,” “program as well as a of mental The district application court’s health directed proba- the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de tion officer.” novo. Nielsen, United States v. Stephens was released from custody on Cir.2004). A district court’s September 2001, to Community Cor- decision impose an available condition of Center, rections where he until resided supervised release is typically reviewed for November On 2001. December 6 and abuse of discretion. United States v. *4 14, 2001, again January 22, and on 2 and Johnson, 696, 998 F.2d Cir.1993); 697 2002, he samples submitted urine that test- Gallaher, 784, positive ed for cocaine. The of- (9th Cir.2001) (district 793 court has dis ficer referred relapse him for coun- group impose cretion to condition reasonably re seling. Stephens voluntarily entered lated to factors set out in 18 U.S.C. outpatient drug treatment program, how- 3553(a)).1 § ever he submitted a positive urine while the program. Stephens waived a hearing IV. agreed and to modify the conditions of his The statute governing the mandatory supervised release, agreeing to enter a supervised release, conditions of 18 U.S.C. residential program. modi- The § provides in part that: fication approved by on court The court order, shall also March as an explicit 2002. condition of supervised release, that the 15, 2003, On December Stephens’ proba- defendant refrain any unlawful use petition officer filed a of a controlled substance submit to for a warrant to arrest Stephens. The test within 15 days of release on alleged Stephens violated supervised release and 2 period- at least supervised his release submitting four (as ic drug tests thereafter determined dirty samples (cocaine), urine failed to sub- court) by the for use of a controlled mit samples urine occasions, on four other substance. The condition stated in the changed his notification, without residence preceding sentence be ameliorated report, failed to and failed to submit or suspended by the court provided monthly supervision report. He ar- 3563(a)(4). section rested on December 2003. added). (emphasis The sentencing guide- dismissed the allegations first two (regard- provision line governing mandatory condi- ing the urine samples) sentenced Ste- release, tions supervised U.S.S.G. to four phens months in custody and two 5D1.3(a)(4), § similarly requires that: years supervised release on the remaining allegations. The court reimposed the the defendant shall any refrain from un- special same conditions at issue. lawful use of a controlled substance and was released from custody on June submit to one drug test within 15 days 1. Where object the defendant fails to preserved illegality Stevens the issue of the condition, supervised release our review for release in the dis- conditions plain Rearden, error. United States v. trict court. (9th Cir.2003). Here, however, F.3d and con- person’s conduct two informed and at least

of release (as bringing about dition, deter- person thereafter aid the periodic court) condition, a con- for use of by the conduct and mined in his improvements stat- substance, the condition trolled of such supervision for the responsible ameliorated paragraph ed in this concerning the keep informed persons, indi- any by the court suspended or any conduct, compliance with condition and pre- if the defendant’s vidual defendant immediately probation, condition infor- reliable or other report sentence also, court); see report any violation risk of future a low indicates mation (authorizing 18 U.S.C. defendant.... by the abuse substance person or probationer arrest a officer to addition, added). In (emphasis Id. release, whom 5D1.3(d)(4) recommends U.S.S.G. probable cause believe officer has to believe if it has reason of his a condition violated add as drugs, an abuser of offender is release). “a special condition par- defendant to requiring condition of labor between division by the approved ticipate in a office, re and the district court for sub- Office Probation United States *5 treatment, and testing, drug drug garding may abuse, include program which stance release, has of other conditions the defen- whether determine testing to decisions, by subject of several been the drugs or use of to the reverted dant has circuits. of our sister this court and several alcohol.” along has, developed large, The law Complementing makes that, where principle given Congress has given it defendant of whether a the determination statutory authori- officers broad (or, condition, and how by a abide must a and to enforce ty to offenders supervise act specific condition involves when the of and conditions sentencing court’s terms times) many testing, how as such See, 18 probation. supervised release and condi subjected to the will defendant alia that inter (providing 3603 to the tion, delegate permissible it is proba- shall instruct probation officer of where officer details of supervised release person on tioner or the condition will be satisfied.2 court, keep when by the specified the conditions 8, (1st Cir.2004) (giving probation 10-11 drug testing include United F.3d involving 2. Cases 502, (7th Bonanno, 511 discretion to order unlimited F.3d States 146 officer v. Cir.1998) allowing delegation; which (drug testing improper order is an tests urinalysis "at timing of the defendants submit to determine probation officer proba- of the task). .. within the discretion random permissible administrative tests parameters of beyond the tion officer” involving treatment in- mental health Cases gave the statute and release 1073, Kent, F.3d v. 209 United States clude in the discretion probation officer too much Cir.2000) (court's if order 1079 order); Unit- management of the necessary” probation counseling "becomes 93, Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d ed v. may defendant whether determine officer (1st Cir.2003) (while not be- courts need 103 with Arti- participate, was inconsistent must scheduling as such come details involved judicial is a func- punishment III because cle tests, the re- Congress assigned the courts tion, the court guidelines state that and the stating sponsibility the maximum number of condition); v. United States may impose that range; performed or to set a to be Cir.2001) Peterson, (2nd (spe- 85 248 F.3d they may vest officers with not requiring condition cial unlimited number order an discretion "only Tulloch, counseling directed to if tests); offender 380 sexual v. and United States

881 Pruden, er,” impose courts on permitting United limitation 398 F.3d (3d questions Cir.2005), officer to determine 250 since our “[u]nder con such as manner which a defendant system stitutional right to ... impose restitution, pay will his whether punishment test- provided by judicial law is occur, States, ing will or to parte Ex determine the ultimate ..." United 242 U.S. tests, 27, 41-42, upon (1916). is based 37 S.Ct. 61 L.Ed. 129 “probation nonjudicial officer’s status as a The limitation is therefore of constitutional Kent, officer.” United States v. dimension, 209 F.3d deriving from Article Ill’s (8th Cir.2000). 1073, 1078 im- grant “The most power to the courts of over “cases Pruden, portant limitation is that a probation offi- and controversies.” at F.3d Melendez-Santana, cer not decide the nature or extent of 250 (citing at F.3d 101). punishment imposed upon probation- do so prohibits officer” would be an delegation judicial func- impermissible delegation judicial authority; tions); York, States v. 357 F.3d judge nothing if the district (1st however intended Cir.2004) (distinguishing Melendez-Santa- delegate than to more officer na where the district court had ordered that scheduling the details of selection and required” defendant “shall be to submit to program, delegation proper); such Unit periodic polygraph testing as a means to en- Allen, (1st ed States v. compliance sure awith sex offender counsel- Cir.2002) (sentence requiring that the defen ing program; probation deter- participate dant "shall in a of men duration, frequency, mine the "details” treatment, tal proba health as directed by the scope questioning; allowable courts are officer, until such time as the defendant is prohibited using non-judicial offi- program by released from the functions, support judicial cers to long as ” was not delegation; an unlawful sen judicial officer retains and exercises ulti- tencing order inclusion of the words "shall Pruden, responsibility); *6 mate United States v. participate” imposed mandatory counseling, 241, (3d Cir.2005) (order 398 F.3d 250 giving merely delegating while the administrative probation authority to decide whether Zinn, details); 1084, United States v. 321 F.3d or not participate defendant would have to (11th Cir.2003) (no plain 1092 error in the program mental improper). health was delegation court’s district to the involving Cases payments restitution in probation overseeing officer for defendant’s Johnson, 806, clude United States v. 48 F.3d treatment, including mental health adminis (4th 1995) (sentence requiring 808-09 Cir. de tering polygraph tests in aid administered pay fendant to restitution in such amounts probation play since officers a vital may and at by such times as be directed the effectuating role in the district court's sen probation Bureau of Prisons the offi and/or tence; partici order stated defendant "shall authorizing cer and also the directed); pate” Taylor, as v. monthly payment to increase the if he deter 1280, (11th Cir.2003) (order 338 F.3d 1284 more, capable paying mined defendant was participate program "ap in a mental health improper; setting statute forth the duties proved by the officer” was not so by officers was limited Article vague improperly delegated judicial that it III; not, however, general principle that does office; responsibility Guide prohibit using nonjudicial courts officers expressly permit lines the district court to functions, support judicial long as aas require a program approved by mental health judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate Office, the United States Probation responsibility); Gunning, United States v. 401 play a effectuating vital role in (9th Cir.2005) (setting F.3d 1145 courts, imposed restitution they sentences district act court, non-delegable Mandatory schedule is under appointing under the discretion of the 1996, Victims Restitution Act of are arm of the and between liaise 3664(f)(1)(A)), defendant; distinguishing statutory and Montano-Fi man Crabtree, "perform gueroa (9th any duty date to other v. 162 F.3d that the court (a) 1998) curiam) designate” interpreted (per (holding is to be Cir. broad that schedul (b) ly, although it ing payments is limited Article delegated). III fine could be v. will. United States legislative y. Cir.2001) (9th Gilbert, 266 F.3d that ordered Ste The district Samuels, 507 Negonsott v. U.S. (citing pro in a phens participate 122 L.Ed.2d 457 113 S.Ct. re supervised of his gram as a condition (1993)). “will has been legislative Where sentencing order Specifically, lease. terms, that reasonably plain expressed comply” with the that he “shall stated ordinarily regarded must language in a “participate he that special condition language of plain Id. If the conclusive.” abuse treatment and alcohol reasonably meaning renders its statute urinalysis including counseling program, further clear, investigate not the court will Offi by the Probation testing, as directed leads to unreason- “application unless its mental cer,” “program as a as well results.” United impracticable able proba as directed health treatment Daas, 1167, 1174 words, the court In other tion officer.” Cir.1999). whether question itself answered treatment, undergo would Stevens testing would program

whether treatment B. inclu order’s required. Congress’s inclusion in comply” imposed of the words “shall sion provision, release pro and treatment mandatory treatment paren testing requirement and merely delegating while urinalysis, gram by the provision, thetical “as determined arranging details the administrative court,” provision as its as well officer. No dis program the testing condition be “ameliorat subject given cretion court,” suspended by the is without ed or perform than officer, other question plain expression of its intent choosing ap tasks of the ministerial only that courts themselves determine facilitating Ste propriate tested dur whether the defendant will be Thus, was no phens’ there attendance. release, the maximum ing judicial power Article III re delegation of By using tests as well. number of decision of whether garding primary order,” Congress has re words “shall undergo treatment and Stephens would quired those *7 include program would that the treatment drug subjected to “at three be least” urinalysis. administered tests. The first must be days of At least fifteen release. within VI. mandated, are also two tests additional subordinate, statutory That leaves the judge’s left it to district Congress the district court erred issues of whether testing, require to even more discretion (1) in- failing specify the number that no specifically or to find (2) tests, drug as well as treatment at all. needed of non-treatment maximum number would Stephens to which be tests hold- agree with the First Circuit’s to submit. Tulloch, ings in Melendez-Santana statute, guide- with the together that the

A. line, clearly requires that not officer, statute, the maximum construing In non-treatment-program drug number of objective intent court’s ascertain the subject- may be tests which defendant enacting it and effect Congress give c. conditional minimum Congress eel. set the assigning responsi- while to the courts the hand, On the other Congress has not bility stating the maximum number of’ required that the courts micro-manage performed range tests be or to set a programs by treatment setting a permissible tests. maximum number of in-treatment tests. The district court’s or specifies Where district court that the der, incanting while most of the words of defendant shall participate in a drug treat- statute, failed to abide final its program, may ment it properly delegate to requirement that the court itself determine officer the responsibility for the maximum number of tests. It selecting program. treat- Stephens ordered that submit to the fif professionals then responsi- have the day drug teen test as well as “at least two bility design treatment, course of thereafter, periodic drug tests as directed including frequency of in-testing, officer.” Under the stat ensure that the treatment is effective. ute, it was for the district court to deter requirement 3563(b)(9), incorpo- number, mine the maximum not for the rated reference into that the probation officer Having to direct. deter specified court,” treatment be “by the number, mined that the court could have does not the district court itself left it to the officer to direct the specify the details of the treatment. As scheduling and other details of the test. we stated in the context of psychological But probation not be vested offender, treatment for a sex “the court with unlimited discretion to order cannot expected be to design particu- given very real consequences that larities of a program. treatment That the Where, here, follow therefrom. court allowed a therapist to do so does not probation officer can of his own accord mean the court delegated its authority to test, order a subjecting he is the defendant impose conditions of release.” United possibility pun further criminal Fellows, States v. 157 F.3d 1197 allowing ishment. Cir. While of 1998) (supervised ficer to determine release condition timing requir of tests is a permissible task, ing that administrative it is for the defendant all “follow other the court to many determine how lifestyle times require restrictions defendant may placed in jeopardy of imposed by ments therapist.” defendant’s being tested. improper delegation); see also Rearden, United States v. 349 F.3d 608 that,

We find while the district court (9th Cir.2003) minimum, (giving probation officer au itself determined the number of thority to select for sex tests to would *8 offender was not improper; that is what submit, to the court erred when it to failed do; probation they are state the mandated maximum of number non-treat- supervise to drug probation tests the offenders and to enforce a officer could impose. delegation This sentencing of the court’s court’s terms and conditions of statutory duty impermissible. probation);3 release and but government 3. argues While the empowered anything that Rearden officer is to do more arguably support could the sentencing notion that the than the court's decision enforce probation may officer drug testing. Congress decide the extent of the extent of As drug testing, nothing non-treatment clearly provided in Rear- has in the statutes den, imply can be read to that sentencing the Guidelines that it is the court’s pro- for the testing question is a Williams, program F.3d v. see United to Cir.2004) administering program (9th (limiting applica the the fessionals performance in the Rearden where determine properly tion of functions, defen requirement which condition involves treatment ordinary their drugs; district psychotropic take Stephens’ dant non-penological. entirely are finding specific explicit, must make participate that he sentence itself 3583(d)(2)); § under that as a program and drug cf. treatment Cir.1987) 176, 178-79 F.2d Duff, 831 to ensure he be tested program part in a pre- (holding that a Having deter- it. compliance with to order power had the Guidelines ease program drug treatment mined that the even drug testing to to submit defendant improper, it was not testing, would include imposed explicitly not court had when the Fellows, the permit to for the court under condition).4 such officer to select the professionals here, drug not does to the treatment Similarly the court allow im to responsibility “particularities [the] the shirk its to improperly determine merely of release the pose conditions treatment.” professionals treatment allowing drug provision drug testing vacate the treatment, where design the course to case to the district court and remand this required that the specifically court has the maximum it determine so that has testing. Congress include the defen- drug number of tests which testing done between opted to differentiate supervised re- submit while on dant must mandatory condition of aas shall not be The defendant lease.5 in the course testing done release and three beyond the any drug tests to take Only for treatment. special condition the district required by the statute unless must the district former case made such determination. court has of tests. specify the maximum PART; IN VACATED SENTENCE testing penologi is the Only in the former REMANDED. frequency cal in nature. tests, holding our dissent also criticizes we con- 5. The the number role decide sentencing only ground courts that the that it invites to hold strue Rearden ability "sky- details of to devise the officer has number of maximum made the testing, only after the court has high,” delegating in effect many” determi- and "how initial "whether” authority as exactly same here. nations. judges would that district court We doubt unprincipled It determinations. make ignores our resolution

4. The claims dissent that, given an offender with serious well be Duff, proba- binding precedent use, the district predilections toward tion officer number suffi- court will set maximum dis- testing ordered even never where high give probation officer flexi- ciently However, easily is distin- trict court. Duff ob- bility supervising the offender. The question of guished. case considered the judge may equally likely. A district verse power officer had whether the Congress has the discretion wish exercise (1982 Supp. § & III under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) negate specifically granted § (now 1985), repealed Pub.L. No. 98-473 an during supervised release of offend- 3603), Duff to to order codified at 18 history use. In either er no Here, testing. submit to non-treatment event, key is that under statute statute, entirely we different construe officer, specifically forth the sets *9 placing the penological decision of make judge obligation to determine of the district submitting to the tests. jeopardy of in drug offender tests. the number 1987) CLIFTON, Judge, concurring (quotation in Circuit marks omitted and altera- part dissenting part: and tion in original). We reasoned that urinalysis officer’s use of to de- majority has concluded that a con- termine whether the using defendant was victed defendant be to sub- illegal drugs was consistent with the condi- drug testing drug mit within treat- law, tion that obey the defendant made program imposed by the court as a probable it more that release, the defendant would condition of in which drug successfully complete case the number of tests need not be the probationary pe- I by agree riod, the court itself. with that and allowed the officer to holding part and concur with that of the stay informed as to the defendant’s con- decision. duct. Accordingly, pro- we held that the bation statute and the general order re- concluded, majority has also howev- garding compliance with the gave law er, permitted that a officer is not probation officer authority to determine the maximum number of drug testing that without further tests direction from defendant if the testing convicted is con- court. Id. at 178-79. specified ducted outside of a The same supported considerations that program, even where the holding present are in this Diiff explicitly testing specified ordered and Here, ordered, case. the district court majority a minimum number of tests. The release, conditions of that the holds the maximum number of non- convicted defendant “not commit another specified by tests must be federal, crime,” or local state “refrain the court itself. I disagree, for reasons of any unlawful use of a controlled sub- precedent policy. stance,” “submit to one test within 15 First, holding is inconsistent with days imprisonment of release from and at binding precedent, in the form of our deci- thereafter,” periodic drug least two Duff, sion United States v. 831 F.2d 176 “participate in a (9th Cir.1987). pro- held there that a We alcohol abuse treatment including urinaly- bation officer had the to require sis counseling as directed convicted defendant to submit to compli- officer.” To enforce

testing even when the district court had conditions, ance with those not ordered tests as condition of empowered officer was statute to supervised release. observed that the (3) district court methods, had ordered the defendant to use all suitable not incon- obey all laws and that sistent with the conditions specified required by were statute to all “use suit- court, probationer to aid a or a methods, able not inconsistent with the person is un- who imposed by conditions ... supervision, bring der his and to about bring improvements probation- about in [a improvements in his conduct and condi- conduct and “keep er’s] condition” and to tion; concerning

informed the conduct and con- (4) responsible the supervision dition of probationer each under [their] any probationer person super- or a supervision.” (quoting Id. at 178 vised release who is known to be within part of the Federal Proba- district; judicial Act, 3651-56, §§ 18 U.S.C. then in effect repealed effective November *10 statute, § U.S.C.] [18 con- different

(7) concerning the keep informed obligation the sets forth any specifically condition, compliance with duct, the num- ...; to determine judge the district probation condition (10) [*] [*] [*] perform any other duty that ber of statute drug tests.” The is relevant, however, fact of a different only if Duff § In other 3583. has been overruled may designate. the au- words, controlling unless is Duff added). (emphasis § 3603 18 U.S.C. pos- we held thority that supervised structure Although the pre- authority § that is sess under 3655— Duff, the changed since has release statute stripped from § 3603—was served under statute out- the current language of broad by the enactment probation officers officers con- lining the duties at- not even majority § The does 3583. authority that substantive veys the same Nor argument. an tempt to make such statute. predecessor existed under cited with easily, do as was could it so Duff previ- § 3603 with Compare 18 U.S.C. in years ago United just two approval version, as discussed 18 U.S.C. ous Rearden, 608, 619 349 F.3d 178; also at see Duff, in Cir.2003). Smith, F.Supp.2d States v. (D.Ala.1999) § 3603 (relying 18 U.S.C. on Nevertheless, majority that I infer have probation officers to hold that effectively concluded that has Duff and fre- the number power to determine when it enacted by Congress overruled tests). a offi- If quency 3583(d). §of That current version the sen- drug tests when cer can court to order requires the district statute testing as impose tencing court did supervised re- explicit an condition as release, as we held condition of lease, things, that a among other defen- Duff, surely in then days within 15 test dant submit after the require additional can 2 periodic least of release “and at explicitly imposed submission (as by the determined tests thereafter supervised re- requirement as a substance,” court) for use of controlled Thus, was ordered when lease. “may be condition which ameliorated from to refrain a condition of as language court.” That suspended substance unlawful use of controlled all part to the statute as was added drug tests to two or more and to submit and Law Crime Control of the Violent (in ordered within the one test addition to 103-322, Act of Pub.L. Enforcement impris- days after release the first 15 20414(c), effort strengthen onment), was author- by persons use on combat statute, Duff, to use we held ized refers to majority opinion The release. that de- to ensure any suitable means legislative duty give effect to the our Re- that condition. complied fendant with majori- If that at 882. will. Ante and deter- drug tests quiring additional say ty’s goal, highly improbable, it is tests, beyond the many mining how more least, intended that Congress minimum, power properly within proba- of a to curtail the statute officer. require appropriate tion officer to circumstances of ap- testing based cites with majority opinion Duff -- n , release, dismisses individual defendant at and then proval, ante authority we is the identified the observa- which at-n. Duff, ante “(as determined entirely parenthetical “[h]ere, we construe Duff. *11 court)” court to simply required satisfy unnecessary tests require- a minimum number of imposed by establish the majority opinion. It not intend to take tests. did Moreover, this decision creates a false away from a officer or restrict dichotomy drug testing between done ability delegate supervi- of the court to while the convicted defendant on super- officer, sory authority vised release is within a pro- employee judicial an of the who is branch gram drug testing done outside or appointed by and is see 18 completion after the of such a program. 3602(a). U.S.C. has not been su- Duff testing exactly is pur- same. The and it should control our deci- perseded, pose testing same, is exactly the sion here. one is no more penological than the other. Second, emerges the rule that from the Simply because a defendant completed has At decision this case makes little sense. does not mean that sentencing, the time of the district court is longer there is no reason to be concerned many in a position determine how about drug use. Most controlled sub- proper supervi- addictive, stances are and fighting addic- of an individual sion defendant. Nor long-term, life-time, tion is a often battle. expected should the district court be If the risk of being caught by a drug test monitor each defendant’s situation and de- helps person keep supervision during termine the needs drugs, off we do an enormous disservice period of the convicted super- defendant’s restricting ability of a That why vised release. is the court em- to order such a test. We do even ploys probation Today’s officers. decision greater disservice when limit pro- we simply sentencing invites courts ability bation officer’s order test- high maximum larg- number tests —the ing when the officer has actual reason to might est number of tests that suspect that a given lapsed defendant has sought by or officer—thus ef- back into drug use. This new limitation on fectively delegating to a probation ability officer’s exactly authority. majority the same testing surely Congress not what intend- opinion suggests that this would be “un- ed when it required courts to include principled,” ante at 884 n. I think a explicit super- as an condition of apt description more “prudent.” would be vised release. Why should the district judge expect to know more about the at defendant’s needs I respectfully dissent. the time of than the during will office the course of

release, which could begin many years la- comparably

ter? In the rare situation that

a district court determines a defendant use,

poses danger no future expressly

court is authorized to “amelio- suspend[ or drug testing pro-

rate[ ] ]” the provided

vision “as in ... [18 3563(a)(4) That nothing ].” to do propriety probability

with the that dis- generally high

trict courts will order

maximum nontreatment

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Antonio D. Stephens
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Sep 2, 2005
Citation: 424 F.3d 876
Docket Number: 04-50170
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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