United States v. Jarreous Blewitt
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24018
6th Cir.2013Background
- In 2005 Cornelius and Jarreous Blewett were sentenced to 10 years under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act’s crack-cocaine mandatory minimums (prior convictions doubled the 5‑year floor to 10 years); their quantities were 19.65g and 26.92g of crack.
- The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the crack thresholds triggering the 5‑ and 10‑year mandatory minimums (from 5/50 g to 28/280 g), narrowing the powder/crack disparity.
- The Blewetts moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for sentence reductions after the Sentencing Commission lowered the crack guidelines (Amendment 750) and made guideline changes retroactive.
- The district court denied relief; the Sixth Circuit majority held the Fair Sentencing Act’s statutory minimum changes do not apply to defendants sentenced before the Act and § 3582(c)(2) does not convert a nonretroactive congressional change into retroactive relief.
- The court relied on the general saving statute presumption against retroactivity, Supreme Court guidance in Dorsey, the Sentencing Commission’s interpretation, and separation-of-powers/administrative-deference principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blewett) | Defendant's Argument (Gov't/Majority) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Fair Sentencing Act’s reduced statutory mandatory minimums apply to defendants already sentenced before the Act | The Act’s purpose and the Sentencing Commission’s retroactivity of guideline changes support applying the new minimums to previously sentenced defendants | The 1871 saving statute presumes reductions in criminal penalties are not retroactive absent clear congressional intent; the Act contains no such clear statement | No — the Act’s statutory minimum changes do not apply to defendants sentenced before its effective date |
| Whether § 3582(c)(2) permits relief by treating Commission guideline reductions as a vehicle to apply new statutory minimums retroactively | A § 3582(c)(2) proceeding based on Amendment 750 reduces guideline ranges and thus authorizes courts to apply the new statutory minimums | § 3582(c)(2) only covers guideline reductions made by the Commission under § 994(o); Congress — not the Commission — changed the statutory minimums, so § 3582(c)(2) cannot convert congressional, nonretroactive statutory changes into retroactive relief | No — § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize converting a congressional statutory-change nonretroactivity into retroactive application |
| Whether the Sentencing Commission’s decision to make guideline changes retroactive implies authority to make statutory minimums retroactive | The Commission’s retroactivity choice and Congress’s delegation suggest the Commission should determine retroactivity scope, including statutory interactions | The Commission itself disavowed making statutory changes retroactive; Congress changed statutory penalties (Article I function), and § 3582(c)(2) is limited to Commission-driven guideline reductions | The Commission’s retroactivity of guidelines does not render statutory minimums retroactive; Commission statements support that view |
| Whether Eighth Amendment or equal‑protection principles require retroactive relief | Disproportionate racial impact and evolving standards of decency make continued imprisonment under old minimums cruel/unreasonable and irrationally disparate | Existing precedent rejects facial Eighth/Equal Protection challenges to the crack/powder ratio; remedial, forward-looking change does not itself prove unconstitutional intent or cruel‑and‑unusual punishment for previously lawful sentences | No — court rejects Eighth and equal‑protection grounds to compel retroactivity; constitutional claims fail in this procedural posture |
Key Cases Cited
- Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (held Fair Sentencing Act applies to offenders sentenced after its effective date and laid out interpretive factors for retroactivity)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (§ 3582(c)(2) provides a narrow, discretionary sentence‑modification mechanism tied to Commission amendments)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upheld constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and limits of delegation)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (Article III jurisdictional limits and mootness principles)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (finality principles in criminal justice and limits on retroactivity)
- Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) (recognizing government interest in finality of sentences)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Eighth Amendment proportionality principle and upholding severe mandatory sentences)
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection requires proof of discriminatory purpose, not just disproportionate impact)
- Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (discriminatory purpose requires more than awareness of disparate impact)
- Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (mandatory minimums create sentencing "cliffs")