United States v. Hudson
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 8516
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- On Jan. 13, 2014 Hudson fired multiple shots at point-blank range during an altercation; police later found 35 rounds of 9mm and other ammunition in the residence and charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (possession of ammunition by a felon).
- Indictment included ACCA notice alleging five prior Massachusetts convictions that could serve as predicates for armed career criminal status under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
- At sentencing the district court identified three qualifying predicates (including a 1997 larceny-from-a-person conviction that relied on the ACCA residual clause) and imposed 216 months’ imprisonment plus 5 years supervised release.
- After sentencing, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA residual clause in Johnson v. United States (Johnson II), prompting challenge to the predicate analysis and Guideline calculation.
- On appeal Hudson contested that (1) his Massachusetts conviction for possession with intent to distribute a Class B substance did not qualify as a “serious drug offense,” and (2) his Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (ADW) conviction did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
- The government conceded the sentencing Guidelines (career-offender-related residual clause) calculation was erroneous after Johnson II; the First Circuit affirmed ACCA predicate findings for the two contested priors but vacated and remanded for resentencing to correct the GSR.
Issues
| Issue | Hudson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether possession with intent to distribute (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C §32A(a)) is a “serious drug offense” under §924(e)(2)(A)(ii). | Because the Massachusetts statute exposes some defendants only to a ≤2.5-year district-court maximum, the conviction does not have a uniform 10+ year maximum required by ACCA. | Circuit precedent treats a §32A(a) conviction as qualifying regardless of whether it was prosecuted in district or superior court. | Affirmed: conviction qualifies as a serious drug offense (Moore controlling). |
| Whether Massachusetts ADW (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265 §15B(b)) qualifies under ACCA’s force clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force). | ADW can be an attempted or threatened battery and Massachusetts battery can be a slight touching; so ADW may lack the violent-force element. | ADW includes an additional dangerous-weapon element that supplies the violent-force required; prior circuit precedent supports qualification. | Affirmed: ADW meets the physical-force requirement (Am and Whindleton controlling). |
| Whether ADW’s mens rea suffices for ACCA (i.e., excludes recklessness and requires intent). | Fish and related authority suggest some Massachusetts assault statutes permit reckless mental states, so ADW might be too lax. | Massachusetts law (Porro, Melton, Domingue, Musgrave) requires intent for ADW (attempted or threatened battery), so mens rea is sufficient. | Affirmed: ADW requires intent and thus satisfies ACCA mens rea requirement. |
| Whether Johnson II error in applying the career-offender/residual-clause definition to the Guidelines warrants resentencing despite other predicate holdings. | Hudson argued the incorrect Guidelines calculation affected substantial rights; need resentencing. | Government conceded Guideline/CHC calculations relying on the now-invalid residual clause were erroneous but argued substantial rights were not necessarily affected. | Vacated and remanded for resentencing: court accepted government concessions that BOL and CHC must be recalculated (resulting GSR 151–188 months) and found no clear indication the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the Guidelines error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines “physical force” as violent force in ACCA context)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Moore, 286 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002) (Mass. §32A(a) possession with intent is a qualifying serious drug offense)
- United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2009) (Mass. ADW can qualify under ACCA force clause)
- United States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2015) (reaffirmed ADW can be a violent felony despite simple-assault distinctions)
- United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (analyzes mens rea for Massachusetts assault statutes; distinguished ABDW from ADW)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (holding that an incorrect Guidelines range will often show a reasonable probability of a different sentence)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for determining whether prior state offenses qualify under federal definitions)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (mens rea analysis for "use" of force informing later categorical inquiries)