969 F.3d 829
8th Cir.2020Background:
- On Sept. 6, 2016 Jaime Patton was abducted from his vehicle, driven to ATMs where multiple withdrawal attempts occurred, and later found shot to death; surveillance, bank records, and cellphone data tied Howard Ross and Raynal King to the events.
- Sanders (King’s girlfriend) testified Ross had blood on his pants, wore a blue/green hoodie, admitted shooting a man, and Ross’s phone contained photos of him with a Springfield .45; ballistics matched casings to that model.
- Police recovered Patton’s debit card and Jeep keys in Sanders’s apartment and personal items from King’s car; King initially denied involvement but admitted when confronted with video, blaming an unnamed man.
- A grand jury charged both defendants with conspiracy to kidnap, aiding and abetting kidnapping resulting in death, §924(c)/§924(j) firearm-caused death counts, carjacking resulting in death, and felon-in-possession; a jury convicted both on all counts.
- The district court sentenced both to concurrent life terms on kidnapping/carjacking counts and consecutive life terms under §924(c); defendants appealed multiple issues including whether kidnapping/carjacking qualify as crimes of violence under §924(c).
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it held kidnapping resulting in death and carjacking resulting in death qualify as crimes of violence for §924(c) purposes and rejected challenges to sufficiency of evidence, admission of a text message, refusal to give certain jury instructions, duress defense, and proportionality of sentences.
Issues:
| Issue | Government's Argument | Ross/King's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether kidnapping resulting in death is a "crime of violence" under §924(c) (force clause) | Kidnapping resulting in death necessarily involves use of physical force (death requires force; causal link; mens rea higher than negligence) | Kidnapping can be committed by "inveiglement"/decoy without force; a coincidental or negligent death does not satisfy the force clause | Kidnapping resulting in death has as an element the use of force and is a crime of violence; §924(j) conviction sustained |
| Whether carjacking (with "intimidation") is a crime of violence under §924(c) | Carjacking (even without death) involves threatened use of force; therefore carjacking resulting in death fits the force clause | "Intimidation" need not imply threatened physical force | Carjacking is a crime of violence under §924(c); §924(j) conviction sustained |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Ross participated and that victim was transported in interstate commerce (kidnapping jurisdiction) | Surveillance, bank records, cellphone/tower data, Sanders’s ID and admissions, text messages, and ATM images support transport and Ross’s presence | Ross argued no proof he was in vehicle during interstate travel | Sufficient evidence supported convictions; interstate transport satisfied by movement across state lines and need not show each defendant knew of interstate travel |
| Admissibility of Ross’s Sept. 4 text message (Rule 404(b)) | Message was inextricably intertwined and contextually relevant to conspiracy to rob/kidnap, so admissible under Rule 401 | Message was prior bad-act evidence offered to show character and should be excluded under Rule 404(b) | District court did not abuse discretion; message admissible as contextual evidence of agreement/conspiracy |
| Denial of King’s requested duress instruction | Evidence did not show an imminent, coercive threat or no reasonable legal alternative; King’s statements were inconsistent and opportunities to flee existed | King claimed an unnamed armed man forced him to participate and requested duress instruction | No reasonable juror could find duress by preponderance; instruction properly denied |
| Eighth Amendment / substantive reasonableness of life sentences (consecutive §924(c) life terms) | Crimes were extremely grave; consecutive life terms not grossly disproportionate; sentencing discretion reasonable | Defendants argued combined mandatory minimums produced grossly disproportionate punishment and King was less culpable | Life terms not grossly disproportionate; district court did not abuse discretion in imposing concurrent and consecutive life sentences |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical approach and use of modified categorical approach)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (divisible statutes and elements vs. means)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (definition of "force" as capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (physical injury requires use of force; indirect application of force qualifies)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (statutory language "results" requires but-for causation)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (ordinary meaning of "use of physical force" implies more than negligence)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (recklessness can satisfy the force clause in certain contexts)
- Estell v. United States, 924 F.3d 1291 (8th Cir.) (carjacking involves at least threatened force)
- Peeples v. United States, 879 F.3d 282 (8th Cir.) (kidnapping resulting in death implicates force element)
- Fogg v. United States, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir.) (recklessness can satisfy the force clause when conduct is volitional)