United States v. Guadalupe Torres-Jaime
821 F.3d 577
5th Cir.2016Background
- In 2014 Torres-Jaime pleaded guilty to illegal re‑entry; the PSR applied a 16‑level § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement based on a 2013 Georgia aggravated assault conviction, yielding a Guidelines range of 46–57 months; the district court overruled the objection, downwardly departed, and sentenced to 32 months.
- The enhancement applies if the prior conviction is an enumerated "crime of violence," which includes "aggravated assault," or any offense with an element of use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force.
- Georgia aggravated assault (Ga. Code § 16‑5‑21(a)(2) as numbered at the time) requires simple assault plus one of several aggravating alternatives, including use of a deadly weapon or an object likely to cause serious bodily injury.
- Simple assault (Ga. Code § 16‑5‑20(a)) has two alternatives: (1) attempt to commit a violent injury; or (2) commit an act placing another in reasonable apprehension of imminent violent injury. The indictment described repeatedly ramming a vehicle into the victims’ car.
- The court used the "common‑sense" (generic‑meaning) approach for enumerated offenses, examined Shepard‑approved charging documents, concluded the indictment tracked the attempt/intent‑to‑injure alternative, and held the Georgia aggravated assault conviction is a § 2L1.2 crime of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Georgia aggravated assault conviction under Ga. Code § 16‑5‑21(a)(2) is an enumerated "aggravated assault" crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) | Torres‑Jaime: Georgia law (particularly the apprehension alternative) lacks a specific intent to injure and thus can be broader than the generic meaning of aggravated assault, so it should not qualify | Government: The indictment and charging language track an assault with a deadly instrument likely to cause serious bodily injury and thus fall within the generic meaning of aggravated assault | Court: Affirmed — the indictment narrows the conviction to the attempt/intent‑to‑injure alternative and, in any event, any statutory differences are minor; conviction qualifies as a § 2L1.2 enumerated crime of violence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cisneros‑Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 2008) (standard of review: de novo for Guidelines interpretation; clear‑error for facts)
- United States v. Mungia‑Portillo, 484 F.3d 813 (5th Cir. 2007) (use of treatises and statutes to determine generic meaning)
- United States v. Fierro‑Reyna, 466 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2006) (compare statute elements to generic offense; focus on convicted subdivision)
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Ramirez, 477 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2007) (consider least culpable means where Shepard documents do not narrow a divisible statute)
- United States v. Moreno‑Florean, 542 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2008) (method for applying common‑sense approach to enumerated offenses)
- United States v. Esparza‑Perez, 681 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding Arkansas statute fell outside generic aggravated assault; framing the common‑sense test)
- United States v. Hernandez‑Rodriguez, 788 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2015) (aggravated battery statute broader where mens rea differences exclude it from generic aggravated assault)
- United States v. Sanchez‑Ruedas, 452 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing mens rea differences that are minor and do not remove a statute from the generic definition)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits on documents court may consult to identify the specific statutory basis for a prior conviction)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (elements‑based categorical approach to prior convictions)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (warns against turning elements inquiry into evidence‑based one)