United States v. Gregorio Gonzalez-Longoria
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14460
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Gonzalez-Longoria (a removed Mexican national) was convicted in 2008 of Texas assault offenses (a misdemeanor family-violence assault and a later felony Assault Causing Bodily Injury with a Prior Conviction of Family Violence) and was later deported; he reentered and pleaded guilty to illegal presence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
- At sentencing for § 1326, the district court applied an 8-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because his prior Texas felony was treated as an “aggravated felony” via 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which incorporates the § 16(b) definition of “crime of violence.”
- Gonzalez-Longoria objected that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States (which invalidated the ACCA residual clause); the district court overruled and imposed 27 months.
- A panel of this court initially agreed with Gonzalez-Longoria and vacated the sentence; the government obtained en banc rehearing.
- The en banc Fifth Circuit reviewed whether § 16(b), as incorporated by the Guidelines, is unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to Gonzalez-Longoria, and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is facially unconstitutionally vague post-Johnson | § 16(b) suffers the same defects as ACCA residual clause (categorical approach + imprecise risk standard) and therefore is void for vagueness | § 16(b) is materially clearer: it focuses on risk of physical force during commission and uses “substantial risk,” a common legal term not tied to confusing examples | Not facially vague — § 16(b) has a workable core and is distinguishable from the ACCA residual clause |
| Whether § 16(b) is vague as applied to Gonzalez-Longoria’s Texas conviction | The statute is too indeterminate to support the aggravated-felony enhancement | The Texas domestic-violence statute naturally involves a substantial risk that physical force will be used; prior caselaw straightforwardly applies § 16(b) to such offenses | Not vague as applied — the Texas offense fits § 16(b) and provided fair notice |
| Whether Guidelines (or a Guideline incorporating § 16(b)) are susceptible to vagueness challenges | (argued by concurrence) Guidelines or incorporated statutes may be immune from vagueness challenges because Guidelines do not fix sentences | Majority did not decide the general immunity question, resolving the case on merits; concurrence would bar such challenges | Majority: did not decide immunity; resolved merits against vagueness challenge |
| Whether Johnson compels invalidation of § 16(b) throughout federal law | § 16(b) is analogous to ACCA residual clause and should fall with Johnson | Johnson targeted a uniquely unworkable residual clause after prolonged confusion; § 16(b) differs in scope and judicial treatment | Johnson does not control; § 16(b) survives — circuit splits noted but en banc Fifth affirms validity |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct.) (invalidating ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct.) (§ 16(b) focuses on risk of use of physical force during commission)
- Sanchez-Espinal v. United States, 762 F.3d 425 (5th Cir.) (applying § 16(b) to a domestic-violence–related state offense)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.) (holding § 16(b) materially indistinguishable from ACCA residual clause in civil-removal context)
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir.) (upholding a materially similar definition in a related context; contrasted by other circuits)