United States v. Grebinger, 20-907-cr (L)

Defendants Christopher Grebinger and Wilbur Randolph pleaded guilty to RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) and a related § 924(c) firearms count; both § 924(c) convictions were later vacated in light of United States v. Davis.
Both were resentenced on the remaining RICO count: Randolph to 120 months (down from an original aggregate 130 months) and Grebinger to 132 months; Grebinger’s judgment also included a $5,000 forfeiture.
Randolph’s resentencing increased the individual RICO term (from 70 to 120 months) because the district court had previously “backed into” the allocation of a 130-month total to account for a mandatory consecutive 60-month § 924(c) term.
The district court at resentencing considered Randolph’s violent conduct (including shooting an innocent bystander and later gang-related violence), his youth at the time, and post-offense rehabilitation when imposing an above-Guidelines variance.
Grebinger’s forfeiture was orally imposed at the original sentencing and included in the written judgment, but the forfeiture was not orally announced at the resentencing despite appearing in the new written judgment.
The Second Circuit affirmed both resentencings on substantive and procedural grounds as to sentencing, but vacated in part Grebinger’s judgment and remanded solely for reconsideration of the forfeiture issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural reasonableness of Randolph’s 120‑month RICO sentence	Randolph: district court failed to adequately explain increasing the RICO term from 70 to 120 months at resentencing	Government/District Court: sentence was explained as a rebalancing after vacatur of §924(c); court ‘‘backed into’’ individual counts to reach an appropriate total	Affirmed — no procedural error; court adequately explained rationale and relied on permissible considerations (including prior use of firearm)
Substantive reasonableness of Randolph’s above‑Guidelines sentence	Randolph: 120 months is shockingly high and insufficiently accounts for youth and rehabilitation	Government: district court balanced §3553(a) factors and reasonably weighed seriousness of violent conduct over mitigating factors	Affirmed — sentence not substantively unreasonable under deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review
Forfeiture in Grebinger’s judgment not orally announced at resentencing	Grebinger: forfeiture cannot stand because it was not announced in open court at resentencing	Government: concedes procedural error and requests limited remand to address forfeiture	Vacated in part and remanded — district court must afford opportunity to object and, if imposing forfeiture, orally announce it and enter an amended judgment

United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard and list of procedural‑error categories at sentencing)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (deferential review of substantive reasonableness of sentences)
Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (permissible for a sentencing court to consider a mandatory minimum on one count when imposing sentence on another count)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (basis for vacatur of certain §924(c) convictions)
United States v. Vasquez, 85 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding increased sentences on remaining counts after vacatur of a related §924(c) conviction)
United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (definition of sentences that are ‘‘shockingly high’’ or ‘‘shockingly low’’ under substantive‑reasonableness review)
United States v. DeMartino, 112 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1997) (oral pronouncement of sentence generally controls over written judgment)
United States v. Handakas, 329 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2003) (remand appropriate to allow district court to reconsider a provision omitted from the oral sentence)
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (plain‑error review applies where defendant did not object at sentencing)