United States v. Fredis Reyes-Contreras
910 F.3d 169
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendant Fredis Reyes-Contreras pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry after prior deportation; presentence report applied a 16‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because of a Missouri 2006 voluntary manslaughter conviction.
- The Missouri manslaughter statute had two alternatives: (1) killing under sudden passion (linked to second‑degree murder elements) and (2) knowingly assisting another in self‑murder (assisted suicide).
- The indictment alleged Reyes‑Contreras struck the victim with a baseball bat causing death; the guilty plea did not specify the statutory subdivision.
- Key legal questions concerned (a) whether the Missouri statute is divisible so the modified categorical approach applies, (b) whether the record (indictment/judgment) can identify which subdivision was the basis for conviction, and (c) whether assisted‑suicide liability or indirect causation counts as the “use of physical force” qualifying as a “crime of violence.”
- The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc concluded the statute is divisible, that the conviction rested on Subdivision (1) (generic manslaughter), and—alternatively—held that assisted suicide and indirect applications of force can satisfy the Guidelines’ force clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reyes‑Contreras) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri §565.023.1 is divisible so the modified categorical approach can identify a generic manslaughter conviction | The statute is indivisible and overbroad under Mathis because it criminalizes both generic manslaughter and assisting self‑murder | The statute is divisible; if narrowed to Subdivision (1) it matches generic manslaughter | Court: §565.023.1 is divisible; Subdivision (1) is the basis of the conviction and matches generic manslaughter (COV) |
| Whether the charging documents (indictment/judgment) may be used to determine which subdivision the guilty plea convicted | Indictment cannot be used to narrow the conviction when plea and charging document differ; doing so violates prior Fifth Circuit precedent (Bonilla, Neri‑Hernandes) | The indictment and judgment together permit a permissible Shepard‑type inquiry to identify the lesser included offense | Court: Overrules parts of Bonilla and Neri‑Hernandes; indictment and judgment here show conviction under Subdivision (1) |
| Whether the “use of physical force” requires direct/violent force (i.e., excludes indirect applications like handing poison or causing injury indirectly) | Use‑of‑force should require direct/violent application; indirect causation or non‑violent means may fall outside the force clause | Cites Supreme Court decisions (Castleman, Voisine) to argue indirect or reckless applications of force qualify; direct/indirect distinction invalid | Court: Abolishes the direct/indirect distinction; indirect applications and causing injury can satisfy the Guidelines’ force clause |
| Whether assisted suicide (Subdivision (2)) can satisfy the force clause or qualify as generic manslaughter | Assisting suicide may be prosecuted without proof of force and so cannot categorically be a COV; statutes can reach non‑forceful conduct | Even if not generic manslaughter, assisting suicide involves knowingly employing means substantially likely to cause death and thus satisfies the force clause; realistic‑probability check fails to show non‑forceful applications | Court: Alternatively holds Subdivision (2) satisfies the use‑of‑force requirement (and no realistic probability of non‑forceful application shown) |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (divisibility and categorical/modified categorical approach framework)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents usable to identify elements after a guilty plea)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for defining generic offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (distinguishes divisible statutes from indivisible ones; limits inquiry to Shepard documents)
- Castleman v. United States, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (holding indirect application of force can satisfy a statutory “use of force” requirement)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless conduct can constitute use of physical force)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (realistic‑probability test; focus on least conduct criminalized)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (realistic‑probability requirement for categorical approach)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (interpreting "physical force" as violent force for certain statutes)