United States v. Frank Richardson
948 F.3d 733
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Frank Richardson planned and served as lookout for a series of armed electronics-store robberies in Detroit (Feb–May 2010); a gun was used in each robbery.
- In 2013 a jury convicted Richardson of five Hobbs Act aiding-and-abetting counts (18 U.S.C. §1951), five §924(c) counts (use/possession of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence), and one §922(g) count; the district court imposed a very lengthy aggregate sentence and the Sixth Circuit initially affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari twice, vacated Sixth Circuit judgments, and remanded: first to consider Johnson v. United States (2015) and later to consider the First Step Act (2018).
- On remand from Johnson the district court resentenced Richardson in September 2017 and reinstated the original sentence; the Sixth Circuit affirmed that resentencing in Richardson II, but the Supreme Court again vacated and remanded to consider the First Step Act.
- Key legal questions: (1) whether the §924(c) residual clause was invalidated by Johnson/Davis and if the elements clause supports Richardson’s §924(c) convictions for aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery; (2) the scope of the Sixth Circuit’s limited remand; and (3) whether the First Step Act §403’s amendment to §924(c) applies to Richardson, who was resentenced before the Act’s enactment.
Issues
| Issue | Richardson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of the 2016 remand (Johnson) | Remand was general; court may consider additional trial errors and sentencing arguments | Remand was limited to Johnson-related challenges to §924(c) | Remand was limited to Johnson-related claims; other trial/sentencing claims are outside remit and forfeited |
| Validity of §924(c) residual clause after Johnson/Davis | §924(c)’s residual clause is void for vagueness (similar to ACCA) | Even if residual clause invalid, §924(c)’s elements clause remains valid and can sustain conviction | After Davis the residual clause is invalid, but conviction may stand if predicate satisfies the elements clause |
| Whether aiding-and-abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under §924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause) | Aider-and-abettor conviction is different and does not categorically satisfy the elements clause | Aider-and-abettor is punishable as a principal; Hobbs Act robbery is a categorical crime of violence under the elements clause | Aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery satisfies the elements clause; conviction affirmed |
| Applicability of First Step Act §403 to Richardson (sentenced before Dec. 21, 2018) | §403 is a clarification of prior law (so applies); alternatively, a sentence is not "imposed" until appeals are final | §403 changes the law and expressly applies only where no sentence had yet been imposed as of enactment; Richardson was sentenced in 2017 | §403 does not apply—Congress limited applicability to offenses with no sentence imposed by enactment date; Richardson is ineligible |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (§924(c) residual clause invalidated; elements clause survives)
- Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (interpretation of "second or subsequent conviction" for §924(c) repeat-offender enhancement)
- United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 2017) (Hobbs Act robbery is a categorical crime of violence under §924(c)(3)(A))
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (prior Sixth Circuit decision upholding §924(c) residual clause before Davis)
- United States v. Wiseman, 932 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act subsection with identical applicability language does not apply when sentence was imposed before enactment)
- Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (2001) (a later judicial clarification can show conduct never met statutory elements)
- United States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997) (resentencing under a statutory amendment while appeal pending; addressed finality concerns)
- Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937) ("Final judgment in a criminal case means sentence; the sentence is the judgment")
- Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (new constitutional rules apply to cases pending on direct review)
- Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (statute abating prosecutions where Congress effectively substituted a right for a crime)
- Pierson v. United States, 925 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act provision inapplicable where sentence imposed before enactment)
Disposition: Affirmed in all respects: Richardson’s §924(c) convictions and his sentence were upheld, and he is ineligible for relief under the First Step Act §403.