United States v. Eduardo Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748

Eduardo Perez-Rodriguez, a Mexican national, was removed in June 2016, reentered 19 days later, was convicted of reentry/false personation, served ~140 days, and was removed again.
He later returned to the U.S., was indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, pleaded guilty, and had a Guidelines range of 8–14 months (offense level 10; CH category II) reflecting the prior reentry and a 2015 DUI.
The PSR noted he attended a probation-violation hearing but did not show a definitive probation violation; the district court stated he "apparently violated his probation."
The district court imposed an upward variance to 24 months (about 118% above the Guidelines midpoint), citing deterrence, public protection, and the defendant's pattern of reentry.
Perez-Rodriguez appealed, arguing (1) the court relied on facts outside the record (probation violation) and (2) the upward variance was substantively unreasonable and created unwarranted sentencing disparities.
The Sixth Circuit majority reversed and remanded for resentencing, concluding the variance was substantively unreasonable; Judge Murphy dissented.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court relied on facts outside the record (probation violation)	Perez: court impermissibly assumed he violated probation despite no record proof	Gov't: court reasonably inferred a violation from PSR and qualified language ("apparently")	Court: no abuse of discretion—inference reasonable and properly qualified
Whether the upward variance to 24 months was substantively reasonable	Perez: variance is disproportionate for a mine-run §1326 case, prior reentry and DUI were already accounted for in Guidelines, court overweighed deterrence and failed to address disparities	Gov't: need for specific/general deterrence and public protection justified an above-Guidelines sentence; statutory maximum supports severity	Court: reversed—case is in the mine-run; variance not sufficiently compelling given Guidelines, double-counting concerns, and failure to consider §3553(a)(6) disparities
Whether using the statutory maximum as a benchmark and failing to consider unwarranted disparities was proper	Perez: using the 0–120 month statutory maximum as a comparator and not addressing sentencing disparities was improper	Gov't: statutory penalty and deterrence rationale support higher sentence	Court: statutory maximum is an inappropriate barometer; district court failed to justify disparity and thus erred

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standards for procedural and substantive reasonableness; extent of variance requires compelling justification)
Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762 (2020) (distinguishes procedural and substantive reasonableness review)
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (district courts may vary based on policy disagreement with Guidelines; heartland vs. mine-run analysis)
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (made Guidelines advisory; explained sentencing discretion limits)
United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding variance where reentry combined with dangerous conduct created ongoing public-risk distinction)
United States v. Poynter, 495 F.3d 349 (6th Cir. 2007) (statutory maximum is a poor benchmark for reasonableness; extent-of-deviation review)
United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2019) (review of district court’s weight allocation among §3553(a) factors)
United States v. Ortega-Rogel, [citation="281 F. App'x 471"] (6th Cir. 2008) (similar substantial upward variance found substantively unreasonable)