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United States v. Poynter
495 F.3d 349
6th Cir.
2007
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*1 America, STATES UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, POYNTER, Avery Vinson Defendant-Appellant. 05-6508.

No. Appeals, Court States United Circuit. Sixth 4, 2007. April Argued: 26, 2007. July and Filed: Decided Gilbert, Coy, Gil- Jerry W.

ARGUED: Richmond, Gilbert, Kentucky, for bert & Grant, Assistant John Patrick Appellant. Lexington, Ken- Attorney, United Jerry BRIEF: ON Appellee. tucky, for Gilbert, Rich- Gilbert, & Coy, Gilbert W. Charles mond, Kentucky, Appellant. Jr., Wisdom, Assistant P. Appel- Kentucky, Lexington,

Attorney, lee. SUTTON, Circuit SILER and

Before: JORDAN, Judge.* District Judges; J., opinion SUTTON, delivered JORDAN, J., joined. D. court, in which 359-60), SILER, delivered (p. J. opinion. dissenting separate OPINION Judge.

SUTTON, Circuit old, pleaded years Poynter, 36 Avery interstate commerce traveling in guilty to in illicit sexual engaging purpose for the After calculat- two minors. conduct ‍​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍months ing 3553(a) factors, the considering the * Tennessee, designation. sitting by Jordan, Senior United R. Leon The Honorаble Judge Eastern District for the States District *2 imposed

district court a 720-month sen- The district court therefore increased (the maximum) tence statutory (includ- final Poynter’s offense level to 32 Poynter was a ing child sex adjustment offender. two-level acceptance for Unable conclude that this responsibility), variance re- see id. § sulted from a application 4B1.5(a)(l)(B)(ii), reasonable and increased his 3553, § we reverse. criminal history V, to category see id. 4B1.5(a)(2). § adjustments All of these

I. considered, Poynter was left guide- awith 4, 1989, May On lines Avery Poynter 188-235 months. pleaded guilty Kentucky state court to commit- At the sentencing hearing 18, August on ting four counts of sodomy in the second 2005, the district court heard testimony degree an eleven-year-old with male. The Poynter’s from victims and from the moth- Poynter sentenced to a 20-year term er of the second victim. The district court of imprisonment, but the State released acknowledged receiving a letter him parole on four years later after he Poynter’s parents, Poynter spoke on completed Kentucky’s sex offender treat- his own Poynter behalf. “apologize[d] to program ment in prison. victims, [his] as well as family”; [his] he

In October Poynter recognized that “this problem traveled has been Kentucky to for Tennessee to have for many years” [him] sex with a and that he had fourteen-year-old December, already male. In gone he “back into counseling with met the and, same counselors”; minor in Indiana after he welcomed “anything the two traveled Kentucky, again [the] Federal they has to [Government] had a offer”; sexual encounter. In April and he said that he did not “in- Poynter traveled to Indiana with tend” to “ever another hav[e] another victim.” JA fourteen-year-old male for 41-42. another sexual

foray. month, The next the two traveled In sentencing Poynter, the district court Florida the same purpose. acknowledged guidelines range of 188-

After police caught Poynter, he 235 months and the statutory maximum of pleaded guilty to four traveling counts of 720 months. 2423(b), §§ See 18 U.S.C. in interstate 2426(a). for the commerce purpose of The rеcognized that it must engaging illicit sexual conduct with a “impose a sentence ... is sufficient 2423(b). minor. § 18 U.S.C. Accounting greater but not than necessary to comply adjustments on his supervisory based purposes” of 18 U.S.C. control over victims, 3553(a)(2). § U.S.S.G. JA 46. It then analyzed the § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B), on his multiple § factors in exercising indepen- its conviction, counts of 3D1.4, § id. the dis- judgment dent about what an appropriate trict Poynter’s court set initial offense lev- sentence would be. Reflecting on the el at 28 and his history criminal category “seriousness offense,” see III, creating a guidelines range of 3553(a)(2)(A), § 97- the court that “[t]he said 121 months. Poynter Because was con- protection of children in our society de- victed of a sex crime and had previously highest serves the priority,” JA at least “sustain[ed] one sex con- offense observed that “used alcohol and viction,” the district court applied the drugs to seduce these victims” and mandatory minimums of the “Repeat and that he had “victimized multiple children,” Dangerous Sex Against Offender 3553(a)(1). Minors” see Reflecting on the sentencing guideline. 4B1.5(a). U.S.S.G. impose “just need to punishment” - himself, the Court needs I think law,” see control respect “to promote will control impose him.” Poyn- 3553(a)(2)(A), court focused . a life imposed court also The JA 52-53 did once “You history: criminal ter’s release. supervised term of time your lesson. not learn did You before.... *3 just punishment the I think that

And so II. up- ratcheted hаs been of this component 3553(a)(1). Consis- 46; § see JA wards.” Booker, 543 U.S. United States Since public the “protect need to the tent with (2005), 738, 621 220, 160 L.Ed.2d 125 S.Ct. 3553(a)(2)(C), crimes,” § see further from procedural distinguished have we only that “[t]he stated ‍​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍court the district See reasonableness. and substantive pro- are that [children] sure way I can be Webb, States v. custody.” be [Poynter] to is for tected Cir.2005). (6th the dis- questions one No JA47. procedural to the adherence trict court’s It review: 3553(a)(2)(D), post-Booker requirements of rehabilitation, §see

forAs range, guidelines the calculated properly partici- Poynter should that court said the advi- were guidelines that recognized those treatment sex offender in the federаl pate the factors considered sory thoroughly and would Poynter that doubted program but 3553(a). §in See United listed “high- crimes are sex because ever recover Cir.2006). also The court JA 49. ly recidivistic.” specific “the court also stated reason pro- The “statutory maximum” that the noted outside of a sentence” imposition sentencing “unwarranted against tected U.S.C. range, 3553(a)(6), guidelines 47; § see JA disparities,” 3553(c)(2) [Poynter] either § [Poyn- that is no restitution “[t]here that —“that re- prison or be from ever be released make that can victims pay to these can ter] it age that at such an 3553(a)(7). prison leased § whole,” see them that he will ever highly,unlikely be would (720 statutory maximum choosing In 52. again.” JA this оffense commit emphasized the court years), or 60 months of this reasonableness deterrence,” The substantive see “adequate the need that point matter —a is another crimes 3553(a)(2)(B), that sex explaining § contests only contests but Poynter not “for- recidivistic,” that “highly whether asking In some force. counseling,” with learned got [he] the lessons comports with reasonably many” and that too slip is that one “[o]ne § we face demands it “out- substantive great here is so the harm sets competing two tug of war between [Poynter’s] judgment in the Court’s weighs side, face sev one we On considerations. JA 48. The compliance.” ten-year dis second-guessing eral limitations guideline “aware of the it was аdded e th trial Unlike months,” court’s decision. trict out at 235 range top capping — defendant, the court, not see we did 3553(a)(4) “chosen had see —but testify at the family members or be- victims [it] statutory maximum trial hearing. And. unlike sentencing to chil- Poynter is unsafe that Mr. lieve[d] - have little judges court, most JA 52. “It aas offender. dren” While sentencing individuals. concluded, experience “that intention,” my face to individuals judges sentence trial prison released from not ever be he either transcripts for living, we review for a age face at prison such or released be transcripts. living. No one will unlikely he highly it would be ac- that we suggests of this he can’t All again. If commit this offense ever knowledge the trial courts’ comparative In trying account for these competing advantages ring-side perspective on considerations and in trying identify —its the sentencing hearing principled experience and its reasons for upholding some sen over others, time in sentencing other tences but not individuals— our circuit has ap plied give proportionality considerable principle deference to their based on least sentencing two of the decisions. See Rita v. United factors —the — States, , range, 3553(a)(4), U.S. 2456, 2469, — need to (2007) avoid (“The unwarranted sentencing 168 L.Ed.2d dis 3553(a)(6). parities, § judge to, “[T]he farther has greater access familiarity judge’s sentence with, departs from guide the individual ease and thе individual sentence,” lines said, we have “the more defendant before him Commission *4 compelling justification based on fac court.”); or the appeals Koon v. United tors in section must be.” States, 81, 98, 2035, 518 U.S. 116 S.Ct. 135 (internal 458 F.3d at 496 quotation marks (1996) (“District L.Ed.2d 392 courts have omitted). Many other circuits have done an institutional advantage over the same or something nearly the same. in making courts [sentencing] determina See 1285, United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d tions, especially they as many see so more (11th 1291 Cir.2006); United States v. Guidelines cases than appellate courts (10th Cage, 585, 451 F.3d Cir.2006); 594 do.”). Smith, United (1st v. 1, 445 F.3d 4 side, On the other one of principal Cir.2006); Duhon, United States v. 440 functions of the Sentencing Reform Act of (5th 711, F.3d Cir.2006); 715 United States 1984 was to eliminate “unwarranted sеn v. (8th Lazenby, 928, 439 F.3d 932 Cir. tencing] disparities among defendants 2006); United Moreland, States v. 437 with similar records who have been found 424, (4th F.3d 434 Cir.2006); United States guilty of similar conduct.” 18 Dean, U.S.C. (7th v. 725, 414 F.3d Cir.2005); 729 3553(a)(6). District court judges cannot United States v. 187, 454 King, F.3d cf. correct that problem (3d within their circuit or Cir.2006); 195 United States v. (so even within their own long as Simpson, 1177, two 430 F.3d 1187 n. 10 or more judges there), (D.C.Cir.2005). sit much less na tionwide, (and because “different judges We applied have this principle in sever others) can differ as to how best to recon al cases over year the last to down —both cile the disparate ends punishment.” ward and upward variances. Compare, Rita, 127 S.Ct. 2464. Reasonableness e.g., Kathman, United States v. review permits thus “appellate courts to 520, (6th Cir.2007) 526 (uрholding 61% minimize sentencing disparities between downward variance based assessment (and and among courts that defendant was “a law abiding fine among and courts of appeals),” Davis, 458 young merely man” who used “poor judg or, 495, F.3d at to use Booker, the words of ment” one evening and culpable was less to “iron out sentencing differences” among defendants) (internal similar quota trial judges, Booker, 263, 543 U.S. at 125 tion omitted); marks United States v. 738; see also United States v. Sri Cherry, (6th F.3d 487 Cir. ram, (7th Cir.2007) F.3d 2007) (upholding 43% downward variance (“[Booker] did not authorize because defendant had a “low risk for judges to pick any sentence within the had reoffending,” taken “extensive” efforts applicable statutory sentencing range thаt to rehabilitate himself was and not “a run- strikes fancy.”). their offender”); of-the-mill United States v. distinguish Cir.2007) again crime (6th 318, 333 Husein, F.3d —does True repeat sex offenders. as variance downward 99.91% (upholding children,” “Poynter is unsafe enough: “ex defendant’s light reasonable 48; many,” JA circumstances”); is one too slip Unit “[o]ne JA family traordinary (6th id.; recidivistic,” Wells, “highly F.3d his crime v. ed States himself, ... variance control Cir.2007) upward [Poynter] 14% can’t “[i]f (upholding actions” impose “egregious needs on defendant’s Court based But, violent escalating at this him,” 52-53. history “lengthy control will Collington, behavior”); same could be said generality, level of Cir.2006) (6th (up 805, 809-10 offenders. sex as rea variance downward holding 36% Sentencing importantly, No less peculiar defendant’s light of sonable in “Repeat promulgated Commission family circum unique history criminal Minors” Against Sex Offender Dangerous Fuson, 215 stances); United States problem to address precisely guideline Cir.2007) (uphold 468, 475 Fed.Appx. Designed offenders. recidivist sex than two rather probation ing sentence have previously who individuals deal with felon-in-pos imprisonment years’ convic- sex “at least one offense sustained *5 pos incidental arose charge session 4B1.5(a), have and who tion,” U.S.S.G. handgun); United antique an session involving activity “pattern a exhibited 552, Williams, Fed.Appx. 214 v. States conduct,” id. sexual prohibited Cir.2007) up 177% (6th (upholding 556 recommends 1.5(b), guideline § 4B sentencing range because variance ward for offenders who incarceration “lengthy “continuing defendant’s underrepresented minors and against sex offenses commit violence”), United for propensity to the continuing danger a present who (6th 904, Borho, 916 F.3d v. 485 background. cmt. Id. 4B1.5 public.” vari Cir.2007) downward (vacating 66% from this public protects guideline The nature “the extreme ance because a by calling for “continuing danger” com correspondingly deviation, without individu- for these incarceration” “lengthy a substan resulted justification, pelling bumps up the significantly als—one sentence”) (emphasis tively unreasonable offender who any sex range for sentencing Funk, F.3d 477 omitted); sex offense one least committed at has Cir.2007) (6th (vacating 43% 421, 431 before. court un vаriance when downward guide- of this criminal histo and of his defendant’s In view offense duly discounted (vacating following enhance- F.3d at 499-500 line, Poynter faced ry); crime, together because “most underlying variance 99.89% downward The ments. room to no histo- “leavfes] for criminal adjustments variance” extreme with other de and the distinctions” responsibility make reasoned ry, acceptance worthy defen “more other advisory fendant and like, called dants”). “Repeat months. The 97-121 range of Minors” Against Dangerous Sex Offender principle by proportionality this Gauged to 188-235 range increased cases, guideline in these of it application by our sentenced district court And the months. var- sentence, upward a 206% 60-year as a started What Poynter to 720 months. range, top iance from became years roughly 10 range of top-end ground primary The sustained. cannot be years roughly range of top-end wanted to the court for the variance —that 60-year sentence —all aas' ended committing this ever Poynter from prevent he had been convicted once before (7th as sex Goldberg, 673-74 Cir. 2007); offender and all of this even though Moreland, United States v. (4th increase in the advisory range rough- Cir.2006); F.3d United States ly Haack, years to 20 was meant account Cir. 2005). problem As utterly depraved of recidivism. Absent as some this crime is and explanation for as forever why Poynter’s scarring risk оf as must be to re- it, be by victimized repeat cidivism differs from not all that of sex of repeat other fenders offenders, deserve what sex amounts we to a life hard-pressed are to un- sentence; otherwise, Congress why Poynter, derstand would not apparently but statutory have set a years. of 0-60 offenders, needs what 2423(b), 2426(a). §§ See 18 U.S.C. amounts While to a life Poynter will sentence— there is yardstick no perfectly if) (or calibrated be 96 when he is released from to measure one crime and one criminal prison. from the next crime criminal, next The other aspects Poynter’s crimes there certainly measurable differences by the mentioned district court—his multi- between Poynter’s situatiоn and the situa ple conviction, counts his relationship of tion of offenders might who warrant victims, trust with the the fact that prior statutory maximum or something ap prevent treatment did not these crimes— proaching who, it. Consider those unlike may justify (even well an upward variance Poynter, flee the authorities and seek to variance) a significant upward they but obstruct conviction; own their those who not support 60-year sentence. In ex- do not accept responsibility their ac plaining why it sentenced at the tions; who employ those violence or use top of the statutory range, the district weapons to offense; commit the and those *6 court did rely not factors, thеse and it who stand convicted long of a prior list of did not explain why a years sentence of 60 sex offenses with children just rather than was “no greater than necessary” despite prior one conviction. United States v. Cf. the Sentencing Commission’s ‍​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍considered Bridgewater, 479 F.3d judgment to contrary judgment the —a Cir.2007) (affirming 10-year, statutory- government does not contend is generally maximum sentence for possessing child “unsound” repeat offenders, as to Rita, cf. in pornography part because defendant 127 S.Ct. at 2468. was culpable more and dangerous than the

By relying average on a problem common offender: to defendant took (recidivism) “photographs of sex offenders [himself] in molesting young in- girls who creasing Poynter’s were care” [his] sentence while by running and failing a home to for offer abused and meaningful neglected children; distinctions between he successfully the risk that concealed Poynter these posed to offenses public and his past criminal from and the “despite that others risk other sex posed offenders [his] continued proximity youth to public, to the the district court left us little church programs”; and his own son room “con distinguish to Poynter and demned” “questioned him and his other remorse sex Husein, offenders. See court). sincerity” a letter to the at 334 (affirming substantial variance and noting worthy that “more defendants than Neither agree can we with district Husein are difficult to imagine, short of court that its invocation 60-year (internal those found to be not guilty”) statutory by maximum itself answers quotation omitted); marks Davis, 3553(a)’s accord § concern about “avoiding] un- 458 F.3d at United States v. warranted sentence disparities.” 18 draw that courts should (“I thought Congress think 3553(a)(6); see JA 47 § U.S.C. offenders, but in among sex take[s] ... distinctions maximum statutory method is not the sole sentence also [avoiding unwarranted carceration care of protecting maxi- statutory prescribed Congress disparities].”). While disparity supervised Life-time risk of in this area. any public eliminates mum years, by Congress, above by sentences caused release —authorized . disparities 3583(k), diminish by to § does little recommended U.S.C maximum (or re- Commission, receive who U.S.S.G. individuals Sentencing to a ceive) below what amounts 5D1.2(b), adopted by the district § convicted individuals for most life court, option. Su see 50—remains repre- Poynter’s sentence crime. If of this the district permits release pervised 3553(a), § application of a reasonable sents “associating un from Poynter prohibit why any sen- to understand difficult it is children, 18 U.S.C. necessarily with” months, a near- tence between 188 youth 3563(b)(6), volunteering as § be reasonable not 45-year span, would ly engag leader, a teacher or becoming such district courts giving But well. as might any profession ing in other not does range of discretion sweeping chil with him in a of trust place position Booker, goal of to have seem been 3563(b)(5), residing drеn, and from id. the Sen- continuing goal of less the much center, school, day-care church or any near Booker, 543 U.S. See tencing Commission. 3563(b)(13), things. See among §id. goal basic (“Congress’ 3583(d). §id. to move Sentencing Act was passing the are for these All of considerations in the system direction in- in the first ponder 28 U.S.C. uniformity.”); increased a sen- impose for us to It is not stance. (One 991(b)(1)(B) of the Com- purpose only say It is for us tence. sen- unwarranted “avoid[] is to mission justifications offered among defendants disparities tencing meaningfully do not support guilty have been found records who similar repeat sex from other distinguish 994(f) condüct.”); id. criminal similar at 500. See offenders. Commission (instructing the Does the Su- issue: attempt That leaves one *7 particularly should guidelines Rita dispari- recent decision sentence Court’s preme “reduc[e] unwarranted 3553(a)(6). the us to abandon ties”); require U.S.C. see also 18 United ap- we have that principle proportionality courts, empowered Booker While would The answer in this case? plied and not the Sentenc- courts appellate not hand, “no,” one on the to be seem way to “avoid Commission, only the ing of reason- presumption the concerned Rita is for disparities” unwarranted sentences, within-guidelines for ableness dis- reasoned preserve courts appellate the principle, proportionality the attempting In amоng offenders. tinctions validity propor- the will consider Court “be[ing] sure worthy goal of satisfy the See next Term. during its tionality review from sex protected” are [children] that Yet, Gall, No. 06-7949. the offenses, not have available we thus do two time, said the Court the same at by the district adopted solution presumption the things upholding in permanent offender simply placing the tension are some that reasonableness sweeps that custody, solution (1) no there is review: proportionality net. Not with offenders within its repeat sex for unreasonableness” suggest “presumption year only does the outside-guidelines sentences, Rita, 127 consider in sentencing an individual. Id. (2) legitimacy of an at 2463-64. explained And it appellate presumption of guidelines’ reasonableness recommendations are based within-guidelines sentences “empirical” turns in on data reflecting the aggre- part on the “double determination” gate experiences of sentencing judges “both the sentencing judge and the Sen- across the country and input of di- tencing Commission ... reached the same verse members of the “law enforcement conclusion proper as to the sentence in the If, Id. at community.” 2464. given particular case,” id. at 2463. case, a sentencing court comes to a sub- (more stantially later) on that adverb dif- If, says, as Rita there is no presump- ferent conclusion from the Cоmmission tion of unreasonableness outside- about an appropriate sentencing range, it guidelines sentences, that suggests a dis- quite seems expect reasonable trict court has no less discretion to sen- court’s explanation to be commensurate tence within than to sen- with its variance from the Commission’s tence so, outside them. ifAnd that is grounded empirically expert advice why should a sentencing court have any about apply how to same greater duty to justify a within-guidelines factors to a given crime and given outside-guidelines sen- criminal. tence, much less to strengthen the expla- nation for its sentence the Second, further it is not proportionality review, sentence varies from guidelines’ congressional rec- but a directive, initially Likewise, ommendation? appellate if an requires district courts to treat the expla- presumption of reasonableness for within- they give nations for outside-guidelines guidelines sentences turns at least in part differently from the explana- alignment views the Sen- they tions give for within-guidelines sen- tencing Commission with the views of the tences. Congress requires While sentenc- sentencing court, why ing courts to give a statement of reasons give courts force to the Commission’s rec- sentences, for all it requires courts to give through ommendations proportionality re- “the specific reason for impositiоn aof view when no such “double determination” sentence different from” guidelines- exists, when in other words the sentencing sentence, recommended 18 U.S.C. judge chose not 3553(c)(2) follow added). Commis- (emphasis If it ap- sion’s advice? propriate to ask sentencing courts to give “specific reason” variances, but not These good questions, they but within-guidelines sentences, it is a modest not compel us to propor- abandon the additional step certainly an extra tionality First, —and principle. is not all *8 step that bewill useful to the Sentencing said, Rita and the rest of its reasoning Commission in formulating future recom- remains consistent with permitting courts mendations —to ask that “specific thоse engage to in some form proportionali- have reason[s]” more force the further the ty review. In upholding a presumption varies the recommended range. of reasonableness for within-guidelines sentences, the Court Third, also reasoned 3553(a) that two the provisions Congress directed the Sentencing Com- that Congress requires district courts to mission to develop sentencing (a)(4) recommen- and (a)(6) suggest that consider — — dations based the same courts must factor proportionality consid- that considerations district courts must erations outside-guidelines into sentences. 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). These are tence,” §id. sentencing judge (a)(4) says a Subsection courts that district the factors precisely Sentencing Commis- the consider” “shall “specific reason” giving in a will invoke certain how to sentence advice about sion’s rea- asking that this And a variance. types of for certain of criminals types when the forceful soning particularly fol- be not to chooses a court When crimes. large particularly a imposes district way to indicate advice, the best that low variance, proportionality principle the guidelines the considered the court that Congress that merely respects fact consid- merely say to so—“I is not these to consider directed Commission to show range” guidelines ered —but sen- recommending the factors same rеason” that “specific by giving is so that permit To it tencing ranges did. of the degree commensurate is vary factors to rely on these courts to' system re- sentencing A variance. asking substantially without sentences guidelines consider judges to quires explanations is' give to commensurate them reason” “specific give to range and (a)(2) (a)(1) and respect subsections not to this range, yet permits deviating from process to them—and but to exalt the size of relation to to no reasoning bear sen- unwarranted avoidance of make the respect variance, not one destined is impossible. disparities all but tencing in the recommendations Commission’s long run. all only respеcts Fifth, principle 3553(a) factors, in the but also point about lingering doubt

Any un- is principle, one that (a)(6), modest end is a by subsection ought to be relieved cases. most make a difference likely unwar- “avoid courts to commands which the review of sen- to affect unlikely It is among defen- disparities sentence ranted moderate- vary slightly or even tences who have been records with similar dants recommenda- ly from Commission’s conduct.” What similar guilty of found terms, proportionality By its tions. dis- “unwarranted” an would way of ex- in the ask little would principle lacking suffi- a sentence if not be parity little that varies planation from the disparity for its justification cient And the mandate guidelines. from the similаrly defen- situated of other dispari- unwarranted “avoid[ing] , district court can a else How dants? 3553(a)(6), weight have little ties,” § will an that matter or for judge, variances. moderate or even with modest disparities are occur- such tell when judge, only and the principle, The value consulting the ring without on the an effect have seem to time it would judges avoid how else can And range? sentence, trial is when the instance, validity of a or in the first disparities such guide- substantially from the court varies review, demand- without them on correct lines. supported be variances ing substantial are several reasons? There

by substantial vari- respect to substantial Sixth, with here, answer practical questions principle would ances, proportionality to factor allow is to courts of them appel- tool of indispensable be seem to equation. into the proportionality rough other reason for no late review—if meas- benchmark no other there Fourth, considerations proportionality *9 at the of a sentence 3553(a) ure the § reasonableness fac- the other not forsake do sentencing range ends high or low the of- notably, the nature tors —most else Congress. Where by defendant, id. authorized fense gauging in start appellate court would an 3553(a)(1), “the sen- need § reasonableness such a say, sentence? recidivist sex offenders because that We know that the sentencing ‍​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍court must would generate never nationwide consis- start with the probation department’s pre- The tency. Supreme perhaps Court could report as to an appropriate gather nationwide information about sen- guidelines’ sentencing range, and the court tencing ranges crimes, for different but subject must report to adversarial that prospect, not, workable or seems un- Rita, process. See 127 S.Ct. at 2465. We likely happen to time any soon. a'As know that sentencing court may grant matter, practical the most meaningful way downward or upward departures to indi- for appellate courts to “iron sentencing out viduals deserving of them. See U.S.S.G. differences,” Booker, 543 U.S. at 5K2.0(a); Rita, § S.Ct. 2461-62. and to “avoid excessive sentenc- that, And we know once the sentencing ing disparities while maintaining flexibility court 3553(a) accounts for all of the fac- to individualize sentences where neces- tors and comes to a reasoned judgment sary,” 264-65, id. at 125 S.Ct. is to about their application to given individu- permit them to account for strength al, we give must the benefit of doubt to the sentencing court’s explanation in rela- the district court’s judgment conducting — tion to the size of its deviation from the reasonableness review that comes noth- guidelines. ing more than abuse-of-discretion review. By contrast, it is

Id. at difficult to any 2465. see great risk of hаrm arising from applying But reasonableness review still amounts the proportionality principle to extreme review, rough without proportionali- Again, variances. take this case. key The ty as an guide it available is difficult to question reasonableness-review why is imagine how to conduct it in the setting of same factors underlying the “Repeat and extreme variances. Take our in task Dangerous Sex Against Offender Minors” case. Congress year set a 0-60 sentencing sentencing guideline, 4B1.5(a), U.S.S.G. offense, for this and the district which Poynter’s increased guidelines range gave court 60-year sentence. from 97-121 months months, to 188-235 Without proportionality review, without not account for the same concerns that the the option of measuring the force of the district expressed.in raising his sen- district explanations court’s for exceeding tence to 720 Everything months. roughly 20-year guidelines-recom- said imposing 720-month mended sen- against the length of that tence could have been variance, said about what an indi- principle would guide us? vidual The sentenced within the considerations, 188-235 month all im- range. portant What is sure, missing, short, to be tell us nothing by addi- reasoning, themselves tional about the types of additional factfinding. individuals If appellate be court may sentenced at the not ask a extreme ends of congressional court to explain why the most extreme range. They qualitative guides, variance justified -justified available is — quantitative without the rough relation to recommendations the extent of the vari- of the Sentencing Commission, ance—it is difficult see why appellate courts would principled have no way to courts would not be required uphold distinguish one appealed sentence from an- such variances. And if one takes the par- other. Neither district courts simony nor courts principle seriously, what better appeals can- their experiences use own way is there to that a ensure sentence is determining appropriate for, (in “sufficient” the context of a proposed *10 Davis, in variance) to the decision we Cоmpared “no downward substantial 99.91% as (in a variance of upheld downward the context of necessary” than greater variance) extraordinary family light in of reasonable upward substantial proposed a Husein, v. in United States ex- circumstances courts the district to insist that (6th Cir.2007). There F.3d Sentencing from the such variances plain by discussing the distinguished Davis only we recommendations—-the Commission’s the the court should consider fact to whether sentences guide empirical defendant. of each individual than neces- “worthiness” greater “no “sufficient” Thus, worthy Husein Id. at 333. was sary”? histo- prior no criminal who had defendant III. remorseful, and had a difficult ry, very was home. family situation at reasons, the sen- we vаcate For these the case and remand recites, below imposed this case majority opinion tence theAs resentencing. the district court upward a 206% variance represents However, range. the top the of Guidelines dissenting. SILER, Judge, Circuit Husein, Poynter in reasoning adopt the who was a sex offender dissent, here I not because respectfully I can any unworthy as defendant about as the do not know my colleagues think highly offended court was The district be. a discretion- law, this is such but because previously had fact by the when the district that I believe ary matter minors, involved in sexual abuse with been the Guidelines correctly calculates court drugs and other 3553(a) gave that he alcohol and then considers the children, any- not learn and that he did upheld, factors, should be the sentence counseling the first from his after thing a factor which adds unless court fami- The court saw offense. under considered have been not no doubt dis- and was lies of the victims or of the crime unless the circumstances or in Poynter had continued tressed that no variance such offender were juve- sexually abusing prior conduct his justified. could be the Guidelines present these of- At the time niles. in Obviously, decision United fenses, previous from his parole he onwas (6th Cir.2006), Davis, is the v. Al- sodomy with minor. offenses of decision, we From of this circuit. law case is variance though upward majority uses quоtation which get the was in variance “ the downward what double judge’s farther the ‘[T]he this case: Husein, figure beyond no set there is sen- departs from vary, and may court which justifi- compelling the ... the more tence unworthy as Husein as Poynter here is 3553(a)’ on factors Section based cation variance. worthy of a downward was (quoting at 496 Id. must be.” Bridgewater, 479 In Dean, United States (6th Cir.2007), we found Cir.2005)). that a F.3d In we found for the months of 120 unrea- maximum 99.89% was variance downward possession charge under pri- The defendant circumstances. under the sonable substantively was pornography child by used circumstances mary the district Bridgewater, In time unreasonable. long in Davis were the variance the horrible nature considered his sen- his crimes and interval ef- emphasized the destructive age, 70 crime advanced and the defendant’s tence the lives had on pornography child fect years old. *11 opined children. The court that “it would not take a chance on him victimizing

anybody Id. at 442. Although else.”

decision does not indicate what the sen- was, tencing range still it shows that the court could render a maximum statutory protect Therefore, sentence to children. I case, would find that in this the district court did not abuse its discretion in ren-

dering Poynter. the sentence against ‍​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍Thus, I would affirm. ALCALA,

Isidro Plaintiff-Appellant, INDUSTRIES, EMHART INCORPORATED, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-3153. Appeals, Court of Seventh Circuit. Argued Feb. 2007. July

Decided 2007. July Published 2007.* * This tion, originally decision was released as being it is published reissued opin- as a unpublished By order. the court’s own mo- ion.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Poynter
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 26, 2007
Citation: 495 F.3d 349
Docket Number: 05-6508
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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