United States v. David McCall, Jr.
20 F.4th 1108
| 6th Cir. | 2021Background
- David McCall pleaded guilty to a 2013 heroin-distribution conspiracy and was sentenced as a career offender to 235 months' imprisonment.
- This court later decided in United States v. Havis that attempted controlled-substance offenses (and, by extension, some conspiracies) do not qualify as career-offender predicates, potentially reducing McCall's guideline exposure.
- In 2020 McCall sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing three extraordinary-and-compelling factors: COVID-19 risk in prison, his rehabilitation, and the sentencing disparity after Havis.
- The district court denied relief, finding McCall showed no COVID-related medical vulnerability, treating Havis as nonretroactive and thus not a valid basis, and noting rehabilitation alone is statutorily insufficient.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the district court abused its discretion by refusing to consider McCall’s Havis-based sentencing disparity together with his other asserted factors and by failing to assess whether McCall could receive or benefit from a COVID-19 vaccine.
Issues
| Issue | McCall's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nonretroactive change in sentencing law (Havis) may be considered as part of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for compassionate release | Havis-created disparity, when combined with other factors (COVID, rehabilitation), supports relief | Nonretroactive sentencing changes cannot constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons (per Tomes/Jarvis) | The court followed Owens: a nonretroactive change may be considered as one factor among several; district court abused its discretion by refusing to do so and remanded for consideration |
| Whether COVID-19 incarceration risk supports release given vaccine access | McCall asserted pandemic risk in prison warrants consideration | Gov't argued generalized fear is insufficient; vaccine access typically defeats COVID-related claims | Court held the district court erred by not determining whether McCall could receive or benefit from a vaccine and directed the court to assess this on remand |
| Whether rehabilitation alone can be an extraordinary and compelling reason | McCall cited rehabilitation as part of his showing (not as sole basis) | Rehabilitation alone is statutorily barred from qualifying | The court affirmed that rehabilitation alone cannot suffice under 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), but may be weighed in combination with other factors |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by treating nonretroactive law changes as unavailable to consider | McCall argued the court misapplied the law and could consider Havis with other factors | Gov't contended the district court permissibly exercised discretion | The Sixth Circuit found an abuse of discretion because the district court appeared to believe it was unable to consider nonretroactive changes and failed to evaluate COVID/vaccine-related facts; reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (attempted controlled-substance offenses do not qualify as career-offender predicates)
- United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021) (a nonretroactive sentencing change may be considered along with other factors as extraordinary and compelling)
- United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 2021) (nonretroactive First Step Act changes cannot, standing alone, justify compassionate release)
- United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021) (held Tomes controlling and rejected Owens’ approach)
- United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2021) (reaffirmed limits on considering certain nonretroactive sentencing-law changes)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (standard of review and framework for compassionate-release motions)
- United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747 (6th Cir. 2021) (incarceration during the pandemic is not extraordinary if defendant has access to vaccine)
- United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2020) (procedural history and effect of First Step Act on compassionate-release filings)
- Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (courts must consider § 3553(a) factors when reducing a sentence)