United States v. Corey Townsend
886 F.3d 441
4th Cir.2018Background
- Townsend pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)) and was sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)) based on three prior felony convictions.
- The ACCA predicates included a 1998 robbery with a firearm, a 1998 pair of assault convictions (one described as Assault with Deadly Weapon with Intent to Kill Inflicting Serious Injury (AWDWIKISI) and one as Assault with Deadly Weapon Inflicting Serious Injury (AWDWISI)), and several 1989 property-related convictions.
- Townsend filed a § 2255 motion after Johnson v. United States and argued his ACCA enhancement was invalid given the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the residual clause; the district court dismissed his motion.
- On appeal Townsend contested (1) the characterization of his two assault convictions (arguing both were AWDWISI) and (2) whether AWDWIKISI qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA force clause.
- The Fourth Circuit took judicial notice of a corrected state sentencing sheet showing one AWDWIKISI conviction and one AWDWISI conviction, and proceeded to decide whether AWDWIKISI is categorically a violent felony.
- The court held that AWDWIKISI necessarily includes a specific intent to kill and therefore is categorically a violent felony under the ACCA force clause, so Johnson did not vacate Townsend’s ACCA enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Townsend) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Which assault convictions did Townsend have? | Sentencing sheet ambiguous; both convictions listed under same statute, so should be treated as two AWDWISI convictions. | State court corrected clerical error; record shows one AWDWIKISI and one AWDWISI. | Court accepted judicial notice of amended sheet and held Townsend has one AWDWIKISI and one AWDWISI. |
| 2. Is AWDWIKISI a "violent felony" under the ACCA force clause? | AWDWIKISI may be satisfiable by culpable negligence or recklessness, which would not meet Leocal’s requirement for "use" of force. | AWDWIKISI requires proof of a specific intent to kill, which satisfies the ACCA force clause. | AWDWIKISI is categorically a violent felony under the force clause. |
| 3. Does North Carolina precedent (e.g., Jones) lower the mens rea for intent to kill to culpable negligence? | Relies on dicta in State v. Jones to argue intent-to-kill element can be satisfied by culpable negligence. | Jones did not decide the mens rea for AWDWIKISI; pre- and post-Jones North Carolina cases require specific intent to kill. | Court rejects Townsend’s reading of Jones; Jones is dicta and does not alter the specific-intent requirement. |
| 4. Does Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause invalidate Townsend’s ACCA sentence? | Johnson eliminates the residual clause; Townsend challenges remaining predicates under ACCA. | Even without the residual clause, AWDWIKISI qualifies under the ACCA force clause, so the enhancement stands. | Because AWDWIKISI is a force-clause violent felony, Johnson does not overturn the ACCA enhancement; sentence affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) ("use of physical force" requires mens rea greater than negligence)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limits documents for modified categorical approach)
- State v. Grigsby, 526 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. 2000) (interpreting AWDWIKISI elements, including specific intent to kill)
- United States v. Vinson, 805 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2015) (assault intent may be inferred from culpable negligence; does not resolve AWDWIKISI intent-to-kill issue)
- United States v. Burns-Johnson, 864 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing categorical approach for violent-felony analysis)
- United States v. Washington, 629 F.3d 403 (4th Cir. 2011) (Shepard’s limits do not fully apply when determining the bare offense of a guilty plea)
- United States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2016) (standard of review: de novo for ACCA predicate questions)