United States v. Clinton Rumley
952 F.3d 538
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2008 Clinton Rumley was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and sentenced under the ACCA to a 15-year mandatory term based on four designated Virginia violent-felony priors (the PSR listed at least five possible predicates).
- The Supreme Court’s decision in Samuel Johnson narrowed ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” by invalidating the residual clause; Welch made that rule retroactive on collateral review.
- Rumley obtained authorization to file a successive § 2255; the district court concluded two of the four 2008 predicates no longer qualified and vacated his sentence, ordering a de novo resentencing.
- For the 2019 resentencing the probation officer’s revised PSR added a 1979 unlawful-wounding conviction (which had appeared in the 2008 PSR but had not been designated then) as a predicate; the government produced three court records and a probation officer’s testimony.
- The district court found the 1979 conviction proved, held that Virginia unlawful wounding satisfies ACCA’s force clause, adopted the revised PSR, and reimposed the 15-year ACCA sentence.
- On appeal Rumley argued (1) Hodge bars use of a previously undesignated conviction in collateral proceedings/resentencing, (2) the 1979 conviction evidence was insufficient/authentication defective, and (3) unlawful wounding does not qualify as a "violent felony" under ACCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rumley) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hodge prohibits designation of a previously undesignated prior at de novo resentencing | Hodge should bar the government from using the 1979 conviction because it was not designated at the 2008 sentencing; government had one fair opportunity then | Hodge addressed collateral proceedings without a de novo resentencing; here the court ordered a new sentencing with a revised PSR, full notice, and opportunity to contest | Hodge does not bar designation at a de novo resentencing where the defendant received notice and a full opportunity to litigate the predicate convictions; affirmed |
| Whether the government proved the fact of conviction (1979 unlawful wounding) | Documents were not properly authenticated/certified; judgment unsigned so conviction not established | Produced court records (indictment notice, signed plea agreement, unsigned judgment) and probation officer testimony identifying them as official state-court records | District court did not clearly err: testimony and documents provided sufficient indicia of reliability/authentication to prove the conviction by a preponderance |
| Whether Virginia unlawful wounding qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" under the force clause | The statute can be violated by omissions or de minimis force (e.g., withholding care), so it need not involve "physical force" as ACCA requires | §18.2-51 requires intentional causation of bodily injury with intent to maim/disfigure/disable/kill; intentional causation necessarily involves violent physical force (including indirect means) | The offense categorically involves the use of physical force as required by §924(e)(2)(B)(i); unlawful wounding qualifies as an ACCA predicate |
| Whether the government waived relying on the 1979 conviction by omitting it in 2008 | Government had an opportunity in 2008 and should not be allowed a "second bite" after collateral attack | Law changed after 2008 (Samuel Johnson); resentencing procedures allow consideration of additional reliable information under §3661 and Pepper; no deliberate waiver shown | No waiver; allowing consideration at resentencing is consistent with sentencing law and the changed legal landscape |
Key Cases Cited
- Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Samuel Johnson rule applies retroactively on collateral review)
- United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018) (government may not designate a new ACCA predicate for the first time on collateral review without adequate notice)
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (resentencing may consider additional evidence/information)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (use of force may be indirect; knowing/intentional causation of bodily injury involves use of force)
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Reid, 861 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2017) (Virginia statutes requiring intentional infliction of bodily injury match ACCA’s force clause)
- United States v. Archie, 771 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2014) (government must prove prior convictions by a preponderance at sentencing)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (mens rea requirement: negligent or accidental conduct does not satisfy force-based predicates)
- United States v. Allred, 942 F.3d 641 (4th Cir. 2019) (intentional causation of injury satisfies ACCA force requirement)