Background

• Stout pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession of a firearm and to knowingly possessing body armor after a prior crime of violence; the prior conviction was for Kentucky second-degree escape.
• The Kentucky offense (520.030) covers escape from custody and can include diverse conduct; the record showed Stout escaped by scaling a wall and exiting through an existing hole, not by cutting the fence.
• The district court classified Stout’s Kentucky escape as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) and imposed a § 931(a)(2) enhancement based on that classification.
• Stout admitted scaling the wall and using the hole; government argued the escape created a substantial risk of force during the offense.
• Stout appealed challenging the § 16(b) classification, and the government moved to dismiss the other charge of felon-in-possession.
• The panel majority affirmed the district court’s ruling; a separate dissent argued the conduct was not a crime of violence under § 16(b).

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (establishes categorical approach for § 16 deference to offense type)
• Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2004) (§ 16(b) requires active, inherently violent offenses; burglary as classic example)
• Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (U.S. 2005) (allows using limited documents to determine nature of prior offense when elements are ambiguous)
• Ford, 560 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2009) (distinguishes walkaway escapes from secured-custody escapes under § 16; adopts categorical approach within Kentucky statute context)
• Amos, 501 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2007) (discusses § 16(b) as constrained compared to ACCA; inherence notion in analysis)
• Templeton, 543 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2008) (data on violence during escape used to evaluate risk under some standards)