917 F.3d 1238
10th Cir.2019Background
- Dustin Ash pled guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm; the PSR treated him as having one prior "crime of violence" and set a Guidelines base level accordingly, producing an 84–105 month range and a 94-month sentence.
- The PSR treated a 2012 Kansas conviction for reckless aggravated battery as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); Ash objected because the Kansas statute permits reckless mens rea.
- The government contended Ash had at least two qualifying prior crimes of violence, adding a 2001 Missouri second-degree robbery conviction and arguing for a higher base offense level; the district court rejected the robbery qualification but accepted the Kansas conviction as a crime of violence.
- Both parties appealed: Ash appealed the Kansas ruling; the government cross-appealed the Missouri robbery ruling.
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether each prior conviction qualifies under the Guidelines’ elements clause (use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force against another).
- The panel applied recent Supreme Court and circuit authority (notably Stokeling and Bettcher) to resolve whether Missouri second-degree robbery and Kansas reckless aggravated battery are categorically crimes of violence.
Issues
| Issue | Ash's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Missouri second-degree robbery is a § 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence | Missouri statute can be satisfied by mere touching/snatch; thus not categorically violent | Statute requires overcoming victim resistance or use/threat of physical force; qualifies under Stokeling | Robbery qualifies as a crime of violence; conviction is categorically covered under elements clause |
| Whether Kansas reckless aggravated battery is a § 4B1.2(a)(1) crime of violence | Reckless mens rea falls below the "use" of force requirement and therefore cannot qualify | Voisine and intervening authority allow reckless mental state to satisfy "use" of force | Reckless aggravated battery qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause |
| Whether district court’s Guidelines calculation was correct given qualifying priors | Ash: only one qualifying prior → lower base level | Gov: at least two qualifying priors → higher base level | Court reversed in part: both prior convictions qualify → district court miscalculated range; remand for resentencing |
| Whether the Missouri statute can be met by mere snatching without resistance | Ash: caselaw shows convictions without resistance | Government: Missouri caselaw requires overcoming resistance or taking property attached to person | Court: Missouri cases distinguish snatching from robberies that overcome resistance; statute requires sufficient force to overcome resistance per Stokeling |
Key Cases Cited
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (elements clause covers robbery requiring overcoming victim resistance)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless domestic assault can satisfy statutory "use" of force)
- United States v. Bettcher, 911 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2018) (Voisine compels treating reckless crimes as crimes of violence under § 4B1.2)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) ("use" of force requires active employment, not mere negligence)
- United States v. Wray, 776 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) (de novo review and application of the categorical approach to § 4B1.2)
- United States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2016) (framework for identifying the minimum force required by state statute)
- United States v. Swopes, 886 F.3d 668 (8th Cir. 2018) (Missouri second-degree robbery requires proof of physical force consistent with elements clause)
- United States v. Bong, 913 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2019) (application of Stokeling to distinguish robbery statutes that permit mere snatching from those that require overcoming resistance)
