United States v. Albert Dowthard, 948 F.3d 814

In Nov. 2018 Dowthard fired a revolver from a car, was arrested, and charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession) and sentenced under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), to 186 months based on four prior Illinois felony convictions.
The indictment and plea admitted he knowingly possessed the gun and had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by >1 year, but did not allege that he knew of his felon status as an element of § 922(g).
After pleading guilty under a written agreement (reserving a challenge to the plea and sentence), the district court treated four prior convictions as ACCA predicates: a 2004 serious drug offense, aggravated battery (bodily harm), attempted aggravated domestic battery by strangulation, and residential burglary.
Rehaif v. United States was decided on appeal, holding that conviction under §§ 922(g)/924(a) requires proof the defendant knew his prohibited status; Dowthard argued Rehaif invalidated his plea but did not move to withdraw the plea below, so appellate review is for plain error.
The Seventh Circuit held Dowthard failed to show prejudice under plain-error review (he never argued he would have gone to trial if properly informed and his criminal history made ignorance implausible) and that attempted aggravated domestic battery (by strangulation) qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA; thus conviction and sentence were affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Dowthard)	Defendant's Argument (U.S.)	Held
Whether Rehaif requires vacatur of conviction/plea because indictment/plea omitted mens rea that defendant knew he was a felon	Rehaif requires knowledge of felon status; indictment/plea omission is fatal and plea should be withdrawable	Plea waived most indictment defects; any Rehaif error reviewed for plain error and Dowthard cannot show he would not have pleaded guilty	No vacatur; Dowthard forfeited the issue and fails plain-error prejudice showing, so conviction stands
Whether attempted aggravated domestic battery (strangulation) and residential burglary qualify as ACCA "violent felonies"	Attempt statutes may not require attempted use of force or force as an element, so attempt conviction might not meet ACCA elements clause; residential burglary may differ from federal burglary	The Illinois attempt statute requires a substantial step toward a force-based crime, and strangulation element supplies force; precedent holds Illinois attempt of force crime counts; prior burglary precedent supports ACCA treatment	Attempted aggravated domestic battery by strangulation qualifies under the elements clause; with that predicate and the drug and aggravated battery convictions, ACCA enhancement stands; sentence affirmed

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (holding government must prove defendant knew his prohibited status for § 922(g) convictions)
Cotton v. United States, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (omission of an element from an indictment is not jurisdictional)
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (guilty pleas waive certain challenges to the indictment and trial-related defects)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain-error standard and its four prongs)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force" for elements clause)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (clarifying scope of "physical force" in violent-felony context)
Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2017) (Illinois attempt to commit a force-based crime counts as an attempt to use force under § 924(e))
United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing Indiana attempt law from Illinois attempt in force-analysis)
United States v. Mancillas, 880 F.3d 297 (7th Cir. 2018) (strangulation/offenses involving airway pressure constitute force for violent-felony analysis)
United States v. Waters, 823 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 2016) (Illinois domestic-battery variants have force as an element)