Troy Thompson v. Ira Mercer
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15241
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Keith Thompson stole a vehicle, abducted its sleeping occupant, and fled for about two hours at speeds over 100 mph.
- A 911 call revealed Keith’s threats to kill himself and that he possessed a firearm in the vehicle.
- Mercer waited with an AR-15 on a rural road and fired into the truck’s hood, then into the windshield, killing Keith after twelve rounds were fired.
- There were no bystanders in the area; multiple law enforcement units pursued Keith and attempted to disable the vehicle.
- The Thompsons sued Mercer and Palo Pinto County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law; the district court granted summary judgment and immunity to Mercer and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The court reviews summary judgment de novo and applies qualified immunity standards; it concluded no constitutional violation and affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Mercer violate the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force? | Thompsons contend excessive force was used. | Mercer acted to terminate a dangerous chase and protect the public. | No Fourth Amendment violation; force deemed reasonable. |
| Is Mercer entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim? | Right was clearly established and violated by Mercer. | Right not clearly established; reasonable officer could believe conduct constitutional. | Mercer entitled to qualified immunity. |
| Was the County properly dismissed under Monell due to lack of policy or custom showing causation? | County policy/custom caused the violation and should be litigated. | No constitutional violation; policy not alleged or shown. | Dismissal of County claim affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (U.S. 2007) (framework for assessing reasonable force in vehicle pursuits; risk to public)
- Carnaby v. City of Hous., 636 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2011) (excessive-force standard in § 1983; clearly established rights)
- Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003) (threat-of-serious-harm justification for deadly force)
- Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2007) (qualified-immunity standard and clearly established rights)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step review for qualified immunity; broadly integrated into more recent cases)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (modifies Saucier by permitting sequence to be altered for efficiency)
- Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009) (jury vs. bench determination when material facts are disputed)
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (U.S. 2014) (limits on use of deadly force to terminate dangerous flight)
- Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1992) (threats to officers during pursuit and duty to protect bystanders)
- Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1985) (police procedures and avoidability of force in pursuit contexts)
- Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch, 566 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2009) (inherent danger of vehicular flight even without bystanders present)
- Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (U.S. 2011) (requirement of a clearly established right in context)
- Martinez v. Maverick Cnty., 507 F. App’x 446 (5th Cir. 2013) (deadly force reasonable where suspect armed and dangerous)