Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Almost a decade ago, a state child protective services worker and a county deputy sheriff interviewed a girl at her elementary school in Oregon about allegations that her father had sexually abused her. The girl’s mother subsequently sued the government officials on the child’s behalf for damages under Rev. Stat. § 1979,42 U. S. C. § 1983, claiming that the interview infringed the Fourth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed, ruling that the officials had violated the Constitution
The two officials sought this Court’s review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the Fourth Amendment. We granted their petitions to examine two questions. First, may government officials who prevail on grounds of qualified immunity obtain our review of a court of appeals’ decision that their conduct violated the Constitution? And second, if we may consider cases in this procedural posture, did the Ninth Circuit correctly determine that this interview breached the Fourth Amendment?
We conclude that this Court generally may review a lower court’s constitutionаl ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it. The case has become moot because the child has grown up and moved across the country, and so will never again be subject to the Oregon in-school interviewing practices whose constitutionality is at issue. We therefore do not reach the Fourth Amendment question in this case. In line with our normal practice when mootness frustrates a party’s right to appeal, see United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,
I
In February 2003, police arrested Nimrod Greene for suspected sexual abuse of a young boy unrelated to him. During the investigation of that offense, the boy’s parents told police that they suspected Greene of molesting his 9-year-old daughter S. G. The police reported this information to the Oregon Department of Human Services, which assigned petitioner Bob Camreta, a child protective services caseworker, to assess S. G.’s safety. Several days later, Camreta, accom
Respondent Sarah Greene, S. G.’s mother, subsequently sued Camreta and Alford on S. G.’s behalf
The District Court granted summary judgment to Camreta and Alford, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Court of Appeals first ruled that the interview violated S. G.’s rights because Camreta and Alford had “seize[d] and interrogate[d] S. G. in the absence of a warrant, a court order, exigent circumstances, or parental consent.”
The Ninth Circuit explained why it had ehosen to rule on the merits of the constitutional claim, rather than merely hold that the officials were immune from suit. By addressing the legality of the interview, the court said, it could “pro
Although the judgment entered was in their favor, Camreta and Alford petitioned this Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. S. G. declined to cross-petition for review of the decision that the officials have immunity. We granted certiorari.
II
We first consider our ability to act on a petition brought by government officials who have won final judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, but who object to an appellate court’s ruling that they violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Camreta and Alford are, without doubt, prevailing parties. The Ninth Circuit’s decision shielded them from monetary liability, and S. G. chose not to contest that ruling. So whatever else follows, they will not have to pay S. G. the damages she sought. The question we confront is whether we may nonetheless review the Court of Appeals’ holding that the officials violated the Constitution.
The statute governing this Court’s jurisdiction authorizes us to adjudicate a case in this posture, and S. G. does not contend otherwise. The relevant provision confers unqualified power on this Court to grant certiorari “upon the petition of any party.” 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1) (emphasis added). That language covers petitions brought by litigants who have prevailed, as well as those who have lost, in the court below. See E. Gressman, K. Geller, S. Shapiro, T. Bishop, &
S. G., however, alleges two impediments to our exercise of statutory authority here, one constitutional and the other prudential. First, she claims that Article III bars review because petitions submitted by immunized officials present no case or controversy. See Brief for Respondent 31-39. Second, she argues that our settled practice of declining to hear appeals by prevailing parties should apply with full force when officials have оbtained immunity. ’ See id., at 24-27. We disagree on both counts.
A
Article III of the Constitution grants this Court authority to adjudicate legal disputes only in the context of “Cases” or “Controversies.” To enforce this limitation, we demand that litigants demonstrate a “personal stake” in the suit. Summers v. Earth Island Institute,
This Article III standard often will be met when immunized officials seek to challenge a ruling that their conduct violated the Constitution. That is not because a court has made a retrospective judgment about the lawfulness of the officials' behavior, for that judgment is unaccompanied by any personal liability. Rather, it is because the judgment may have prospective effect on the parties. The court in such a case says: “Although this official is immune from dam
We therefore reject S. G.’s view that Article III bars us from adjudicating any and all challenges brought by government officials who have received immunity below. That the victor has filed the appeal does not deprive us of jurisdiсtion. The parties in such eases may yet have a sufficient “interest in the outcome of [a litigated] issue” to present a case or controversy. Deposit Guaranty,
B
Article III aside, an important question of judicial policy remains. As a matter of practice and prudence, we have generally declined to consider cases at the request of a pre
We think just such a reason places qualified immunity eases in a special category when it comes to this Court’s review of appeals brought by winners. The constitutional determinations that prevailing parties ask us to consider in these cases are not mere dicta or “statements in opinions.” Rooney,
To begin, then, with the nature of these suits: Under § 1983 (invoked in this case) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
And indeed, our usual adjudicatory rules suggest that a court should forbear resolving this issue. After all, a “longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn.,
But we have long recognized that this day may never come — that our regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in limbo. County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
For this reason, we have permitted lower courts to avoid avoidance — that is, to determine whether a right exists beforе examining whether it was clearly established. See, e. g., ibid.; Lewis,
Here, the Court of Appeals followed exactly this two-step process, for exactly the reasons we have said may in select circumstances make it “advantageous.” Id., at 242. The court, as noted earlier, explained that it was “addressing] both prongs of the qualified immunity inquiry ... to provide guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child welfare within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.”
Given its purpose and effect, such a decision is reviewable in this Court at the behest of an immunized official. No mere dictum, a constitutional ruling preparatory to a grant of immunity creates law that governs the official’s behavior. If our usual rule pertaining to prevailing parties applied, the official would “fac[e] an unenviable choice”: He must either acquiesce in a ruling he had no opportunity to contest in this Court, or “defy the views of the lower court, adhere to practices that have been declared illegal, and thus invite new suits and potential punitive damages.” Pearson,
We emphasize, however, two limits of today’s holding. First, it addresses only our own authority to review cases in this procedural posture. The Ninth Circuit had no occasion to consider whether it could hear an appeal from an immu
Ill
Although we reject S. G.’s arguments for dismissing this case at the threshold, we find that a separate jurisdictional
As we explained above, supra, at 702-703, in a dispute of this kind, both the plaintiff and the defendant ordinarily retain a stake in the outcome. That is true of one defendant here: Camreta remains employed as a child protective services worker, so he has an interest in challenging the Ninth Circuit’s ruling requiring him to obtain a warrant bеfore conducting an in-school interview.
Camreta makes only one counterargument: He avers that S. G. has a continuing interest in the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling because it may help her establish a municipal liability claim against Deschutes County. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; id., at 8. S. G.’s initial complaint charged that the county has an official policy of unconstitutionally subjecting schoolchildren to police interrogation. See n. 2, supra. Finding no evidence of such a policy (even assuming that an unlawful seizure had occurred in this case), the District Court granted summary judgment to the county, App. to Pet. for Cert, in No. 09-1454, pp. 66-67, and S. G. did not appeal that ruling,
We thus must decide how to dispose of this case. When a civil suit becomes moot pending appeal, we have the authority to “direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, deсree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 28 U. S. C. § 2106. Our “established” (though not exceptionless) practice in this situation is to vacate the judgment below. See Munsingwear,
In this case, the happenstance of S. G.’s moving across country and becoming an adult has deprived Camreta of his appeal rights. Mootness has frustrated his ability to challenge the Court of Appeals’ ruling that he must obtain a warrant before interviewing a suspected child abuse victim
It is so ordered.
Notes
Because Greene filed suit as next friend for her minor daughter, we will refer to respondent as S. G. throughout this opinion.
S. G. also sued Deschutes County, alleging that it has a policy of unconstitutionally seizing children in public schools. See
The dissent diseusses Deposit Guaranty and Electrical Fittings at length in an effort to distinguish them from this suit. See post, at 718-722 (opinion of Kennedy, X). But we do not say those cases are foursquare with this one on their facts; we rely on them only for the proposition that this Court has previously identified no special Article III bar on review of appeals brought by parties who obtained a judgment in their favor below. The dissent does not, because it cannot, dispute that simple point.
Contrary to the dissent’s view, see post, at 726, the injury to the official thus occurs independent of any future suit brought by a third party. Indeed, no such suit is likely to arise because the prospect of damages liability will force the official to ehange his conduct.
The constitutional issue could arise in a case in which qualified immunity is unavailable — for example, “in a suit to enjoin future conduct, in an action against a municipality, or in litigating a suppression motion in a criminal proceeding.” Lewis,
The dissent complains that our decision “allows plaintiffs to obtain binding constitutional determinations on the merits that lie beyond this Court’s jurisdiction to review.” Post, at 725. But that is not the case. It is not this decision but our prior precedents that allow lower courts to issue “binding constitutional determinations” in qualified immunity cases even when the plaintiff is not entitled to money damages. And it is not our decision but the dissent that would insulate these rulings from this Court’s power to review.
We note, however, that the considerations persuading us to permit review of petitions in this posture may not have the same force as applied to a district court decision. “A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.” 18 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[l][d], p. 134-26 (3d ed. 2011). Many Courts of Appeals therefore decline to consider district court precedent when determining if constitutional rights are clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity. See, e. g., Kalka v. Hawk,
Justice Sotomayor maintains that, because this case is moot, “[t]here is no warrant for reaching th[e] question” whether immunized officials may obtain our consideration of an adverse constitutional ruling. Post, at 715 (opinion concurring in judgment). But this Court has never held that it may consider only one threshold issue per case. And here, as we will explain, infra, at 712-714, and n. 10, our discussion of reviewability is critical to our ultimate disposition of this suit. Moreover, that issue was fully litigated in this Court. We granted certiorari to consider whether “the Ninth Circuit’s constitutional ruling [is] reviewable, notwithstanding that [the Court of Appeals] ruled in [the officials’] favor on qualified immunity grounds.” Pet. for Cert, in No. 09-1454, p. i. And all the parties, as well as the United States as amicus curiae, addressed that question in their briefs and oral arguments. Compare Brief for Petitioner in No. 09-1454, pp. 41-44, Brief for Petitioner in No. 09-1478, p. 4, n. 1, Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 09-1454, pp. 3-13, Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 09-1478, pp. 5-6, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11-20, and Tr. of Oral Arg. 4-14, 17-24, 54-58, with Brief for Respondent 24-42 and Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-31, 46-52.
The same cannot be said for Deputy Sheriff Alford. In their briefs, the parties informed us that Alford no longer works for Deschutes County or in law enforcement. See Brief for Respondent 1, n. 2; Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 09-1478. Because Alford will not again participate in a child abuse investigation, he has lost his interest in the Fourth Amendment ruling. See supra, at 702-703; cf. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,
Our analysis of the proper disposition of this case follows from our conclusion that government officials who secure a favorable judgment on immunity grounds may obtain our review of an adverse constitutional holding. See supra, at 708. As just noted, Munsingwear justified vacatur to protect a litigant who had the right to appeal but lost that opportunity due to happenstance.
Our disposition of this case differs slightly from the normal Munsingwear order vacating the lower court’s judgment and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the relevant claim. We leave untouched the Court of Appeals’ ruling on qualified immunity and its corresponding dismissal of S. G.’s claim because S. G. chose not to challenge that ruling. We vacate the Ninth Circuit’s ruling addressing the merits of the Fourth Amendment issue because, as we have explained, supra, at 707-708, that is the part of the decision that mootness prevents us from reviewing but that has prospective effects on Camreta. See Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc.,
Concurrence Opinion
with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that this case is moot and that vacatur is the appropriate disposition; unlike the majority, however, I would go no further. As the exchange
The majority suggests that we must decide whether Camreta has a “right to appeal” in order to vacate the judgment below under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.,
Dissenting Opinion
with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
Today’s decision results from what is emerging as a rather troubling consequence from the reasoning of our recent qualified immunity cases. The Court is correct to note the problem presented when, on the one hand, its precedents permit or invite courts to rule on the merits of a constitutional claim even when qualifiеd immunity disposes of the matter; and, on the other hand, jurisdictional principles prevent us from reviewing those invited rulings. It does seem that clarification is required. In my view, however, the correct solution is not to override jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions. Dictum, though not precedent, may have its utility; but it ought not to be treated as a judgment standing on its own. So, while acknowledging the problem the Court confronts, my concern with the rule adopted for this case calls for this respectful dissent.
I
The Court acknowledges our “settled refusal to entertain an appeal,” including a petition for certiorari, “by a party on an issue as to which he prevailed.” Ante, at 704 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the outset, however, it is important to state this rule more fully to show its foundational character. A party that has already obtained the judgment it requested may not seek review to challenge the reasoning of a judicial decision. As we have said on many occasions: “This Court reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.” California v. Rooney,
The rule against hearing appeals or accepting petitions for certiorari by prevailing parties is related to the Article III prohibition against issuing advisory opinions. This principle underlies, for example, the settled rule against hearing cases involving a disputed judgment based on grounds of state law. As Justice Jackson explained for the Court: “[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” Herb v. Pitcairn,
The rule against hearing appeals by prevailing parties applies in countless situations, many involving government parties. Deficient performance may not yield prejudice under Strickland v. Washington,
The Court nonetheless holds that defendants who prevail in the courts of appeals based on qualified immunity may still obtain review in this Court. This point is put in perspective by the fact that the Court today, in an altogether unprecedented disposition, says that it vacates not a judgment but rather “part of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.” Ante, at 714. The Court’s conclusion is unsettling in its implications. Even on the Court’s reading of our cases, the almost invariable rule is that prevailing parties are not permitted to obtain a writ of certiorari. Cf. Kalka v. Hawk,
The Court defends its holding with citations to just two of our cases. Ante, at 702. Neither provides support for the Court’s result.
The first case is Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co.,
The second case is Deposit Guaranty Nat. Bank v. Roper,
Neither Electrical Fittings nor Deposit Guaranty provides support for the rule adopted today. Those decisions instead held that, in the unusual circumstances presented, particular parties who at first appeared to have prevailed below had in fact failed to obtain the judgments they had sought. This Court therefore had jurisdiction, including of course jurisdiction under Article III, to provide relief for the harm caused by the adverse judgments entered below. The parties seeking appeal in Electrical Fittings and Deposit Guaranty might be compared with plaintiffs who have requested $1,000 in relief but obtained only $500. Such parties have prevailed in part, but have not “receive[d] all that [they] ha[d] sought.” Deposit Guaranty, supra, at 333. In contrast the Court appears to assume that petitioners in the present case are true prevailing parties. They have ob
The Court points to policy concerns as the basis for its willingness to hear appeals by prevailing parties. Ante, at 703-706. But those concerns are unwarranted. In only one dissenting opinion has it been suggested that certiorari should be granted to reach a merits determination “locked inside” a favorable qualified immunity ruling. Bunting v. Mellen,
The instant case thus appears to be the first in which the Court’s new exception to the prevailing-party rule might have been applied. And even here that exception is neither necessary nor sufficient for the merits to be adjudicated by this Court. The Fourth Amendment question decided below is bound to arise again in future cases. Indeed, the reasoning of the decision below implicates a number of decisions in other Courts of Appeals. Cf.
The Court errs in reading Electrical Fittings and Deposit Guaranty to permit review and, indeed, the provision of relief disconnected from any judgment. The result is an erroneous and unbounded exception to an essential principle of judicial restraint. Parties who have obtained all requested relief may not seek review here.
II
As today’s decision illustrates, our recent qualified immunity cases tend to produce decisions that are in tension with conventional principles of case-or-controversy adjudication. This Court has given the courts of appeals “permission” to find constitutional violations when ordering dismissal or summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Ante, at 705; see Pearson, supra. This invitation, as the Court is correct to note, was intended to produce binding constitutional holdings on the merits. Ante, at 706-707. The goal was to make dictum precedent, in order to hasten the gradual process of constitutional interpretation and alter the behavior of government defendants. Ibid. The present case brings the difficulties of that objective into perspective. In express reliance on the permission granted in Pearson, the Court of Appeals went out of its way to announce what may be an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution; and, under our case law, the Ninth Circuit must give that dictum legal effect as precedent in future cases.
In this way unnecessary merits decisions in qualified immunity cases could come to resemble declaratory judgments or injunctions. Indeed the United States as amicus curiae contends that the merits decision below “has an effect similar to an injunction or a declaratory judgment against the government as a whole.” Brief for United States 13. Today’s opinion adopts that view, providing as relief the vacatur of “part of the Ninth Circuit's opinion” — namely, the part of the
The Court of Appeals in this ease did not in fact issue a declaratory judgment or injunction embodying a determination on the merits, and it does not appear that a judgment of that kind could have issued. Plaintiffs must establish standing as to each form of relief they request, yet the plaintiff in this case had no separate interest in obtaining a declaratory judgment. See Los Angeles v. Lyons,
The Court creates an exception to the prevailing-party rule in order to solve the difficulties created by our qualifiеd immunity jurisprudence, but the Court’s solution creates new problems. Sometimes defendants in qualified immunity cases have no particular interest in disputing the constitutional merits. Acknowledging as much, the Court notes that petitioner Alford no longer works for the government and so “has lost his interest in the Fourth Amendment ruling.” Ante, at 710, n. 9. In concluding that Alford lacks
The Court today avoids this difficulty by concluding that petitioner Camreta has suffered an Article III injury. Ante, at 703; cf. ante, at 710, n. 9 (“[W]e do not decide any questions that would arise if [Alford] were the only defendant”). But the Court can reach that conclusion only because, “аs part of his job,” Camreta “regularly engages” in conduct made unlawful by the reasoning of the Court of Appeals. Ante, at 703. As discussed below, this conclusion is doubtful. See infra, at 725-727. In any event the Court’s standing analysis will be inapplicable in most qualified immunity cases. Cf. ante, at 702 (asserting that the “Article III standard often will be met”). When an officer is sued for taking an extraordinary action, such as using excessive force during a high-speed car chase, there is little possibility that a constitutional decision on the merits will again influence that officer’s conduct. The officer, like petitioner Alford or the petitioner in Bunting, would have no interest in litigating the merits in the court of appeals and, under the Court’s rule, would seem unable to obtain review of a merits ruling by petitioning for certiorari. See ante, at 701-703; ante, at 710,
Ill
It is most doubtful that Article III permits appeals by any officer to whom the reasoning of a judicial decision might be applied in a later suit. Yet that appears to be the implicatiоn of the Court’s holding. The favorable judgment of the Court of Appeals did not in itself cause petitioner Camreta to suffer an Article III injury entitling him to appeal. Cf. supra, at 716-722 (discussing Electrical Fittings and Deposit Guaranty)-, ASARCO Inc. v. Radish,
The Court’s analysis appears to rest on the premise that the reasoning of the decision below in itself causes Camreta injury. Until today, however, precedential reasoning of general applicability divorcеd from a particular adverse judgment was not thought to yield “standing to appeal.” Parr v. United States,
The conclusion that precedent of general applicability cannot in itself create standing to sue or appeal flows from basic principles. Camreta’s asserted injury is caused not by the Court of Appeals or by respondent but rather by “the independent action of some third party not before the court”— that is, by the still-unidentified private plaintiffs whose lawsuits Camreta hopes to avoid. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
IV
If today’s decision proves to be more than an isolated anomaly, the Court might find it necessary to reconsider its special permission that the courts of appeals may issue unnecessary merits determinations in qualified immunity cases with binding precedential effect.
Other dynamics permit the law of the Constitution to be elaborated within the conventional framework of a case or controversy. “[T]he development of constitutional law is by no means entirely dependent on cases in which the defendant may seek qualified immunity.” Pearson,
It would be preferable at least to explore refinements to our qualified immunity jurisprudence before altering basic principles of jurisdiction. For instance, the objectives of qualified immunity might be satisfied if there were no bаr to reaching the merits and issuing judgment when requested damages are nominal and substantial attorney’s fees are waived or not allowed. Cf. Farrar v. Hobby,
The desire to resolve more constitutional questions ought not lead to altering our jurisdictional rules. That is the precise object that our legal tradition tells us we should resist.
There will be instances where courts discuss the merits in qualified immunity cases. It is sometimes a better analytic approach and a preferred allocation of judicial time and resources to dismiss a claim on the merits rather than to dismiss based on qualified immunity. And “[i]t often may be difficult to decide whether a right is clearly established without deciding precisely what the existing constitutional right happens to be.” Pearson, supra, at 236 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court should not superintend the judicial decisionmaking process in qualified immunity cases under special rules, lest it make the judicial process more complex for civil rights suits than for other litigation. It follows, however, that the Court should provide no special permission to reach the merits. If qualified immunity cases were treated like other cases raising constitutional questions, settled principles of constitutional avoidance would apply. So would conventional rules regarding dictum and
* * *
The distance our qualified immunity jurisprudence has taken us from foundational principles is made all the more apparent by today’s decision. The Court must construe two of its precedents in so broad a manner that they are taken out of their proper and logical confines. To vacate the reasoning of the decision below, the Court accepts that obiter dictum is not just binding precedent but a judgment susceptible to plenary review. I would dismiss this case and note that our jurisdictional rule against hearing appeals by prevailing parties precludes petitioners’ attempt to obtain review of judicial reasoning disconnected from a judgment.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, which reasonably applies our precedents, strange though they may be. The alternative solution, as Justice Kennedy suggests, see post, at 727 (dissenting opinion), is to end the extraordinary practice of ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz,