Michelle MARTINEZ; Mario Martinez, Jr., A Minor, By and Through Next Friend Mario Martinez, Sr.; Mario Martinez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MAVERICK COUNTY; Tomas Herrera, As Maverick County Sheriff in His Individual Capacity; Roberto Sifuentes, Maverick County Sheriff‘s Deputy in His Individual Capacity; Marcos Jesus Rivera, Maverick County Sheriff‘s Deputy in His Individual Capacity; Osvaldo Lopez, Maverick County Sheriff‘s Deputy in His Individual Capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 11-51226
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
Jan. 15, 2013
PER CURIAM:*
Roberto Mireles appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. He argues that the district court erred in imposing a leadership sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).
The facts set forth in the Presentence Report (PSR) reflect that Mireles recruited his codefendant, Ernesto Fierro, and gave him instructions concerning obtaining the cocaine from two unknown persons and delivering it to a confidential informant. Although Mireles identified a witness who he stated could corroborate his allegation that Fierro was the actual leader or organizer of the conspiracy, the Government interviewed the witness and determined that the witness was not credible. Because Mireles did not present any evidence to rebut the facts in the PSR, the district court was entitled to rely on those facts. See United States v. Cabrera, 288 F.3d 163, 173-74 (5th Cir.2002). Those facts support the district court‘s finding that Mireles acted as a leader or organizer. See United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 204 (5th Cir.2005); United States v. Giraldo, 111 F.3d 21, 24-25 (5th Cir.1997).
Mireles argues that the district court erred in not considering his statement for purposes of awarding a safety valve adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. At sentencing, the Government stated that Mireles had not been truthful in his debriefing; that he attempted to minimize his role in the offense by alleging that Fierro was the actual leader or organizer; and that the information in Mireles‘s statement was not fruitful. Thus, the record supports the district court‘s determination that Mireles was not entitled to the safety valve adjustment because he was not truthful with the Government in his debriefing and because the district court determined that he was a leader or organizer in the conspiracy. Therefore, Mireles did not meet his burden to establish that he was entitled to the safety valve adjustment. See United States v. McCrimmon, 443 F.3d 454, 457 (5th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
William S. Helfand, Norman Ray Giles, Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry, Houston, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal arises out of the events leading up to and following the arrest of Plaintiff-Appellant Michelle Martinez subsequent to a traffic stop in Eagle Pass, Texas. Martinez and her husband and son appeal the district court‘s dismissal of claims and grant of summary judgment for
Various Maverick County Deputies (the “Deputies“) were involved in an incident following an attempted traffic stop of Martinez for misdemeanor traffic violations. Martinez resisted arrest and attempted to flee in her vehicle at a high speed. A deputy pursued, using several techniques to stop her, including maneuvering her vehicle off the road and shooting her tires. Martinez continued to flee in her vehicle, nearly hitting another officer who had arrived in the area to assist. Fearing for their safety and that of others in the surrounding community, the Deputies shot at Martinez‘s vehicle 15 to 18 times. One of these shots struck her in the neck, injuring her and rendering her a quadriplegic.
On appeal, Martinez essentially challenges the entirety of the district court‘s ruling on her substantive claims:1
1. Denial of Medical Care. We agree with the district court that Martinez failed to state a claim for denial of medical care against any defendant. Martinez did not allege the existence of any additional harm beyond her original injury occasioned by the Deputies’ alleged failure to provide or summon medical help immediately. See Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir.1993).
2. Sheriff‘s Office Policy or Custom. Nor did Martinez sufficiently allege the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom of the Maverick County Sheriff‘s Office resulting in a violation of her rights, as required to state a claim against it. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578-81 (5th Cir.2001). While Martinez made wide-ranging conclusory allegations of corruption within the Sheriff‘s Office, she failed to identify any injury-causing policy or to establish that her injuries were the direct result of any such policies. See id. at 578; see also Bd. of Comm‘rs. of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
3. Inadequate Training. Martinez‘s claim of constitutionally inadequate training against the Sheriff‘s Office was not supported with sufficient evidence suggesting that the County deviated from
4. Individual Deputies’ Qualified Immunity Defense. Martinez also failed to rebut the Deputies’ qualified immunity defense by showing that the Deputies’ use of force was excessive or objectively unreasonable. See Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir.2009). An officer‘s use of deadly force is presumptively reasonable, and thus presumptively not in violation of the constitution, when the officer reasonably believes that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others. See id. The Deputies were reasonable to believe that Martinez‘s erratic attempts to flee posed a threat of serious harm to themselves and the surrounding community, making qualified immunity on the excessive force claims and summary judgment, appropriate.
5. Official Immunity Under Texas Law. Finally, we agree with the district court that the Deputies and Sheriff Herrera were entitled to official immunity under Texas law on Martinez‘s state law claims. See City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653-58 (Tex.1994). Maverick County is also immune from Martinez‘s tort claims. See
AFFIRMED.
Notes
Liability under § 1983 for a supervisor may exist based either on “personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation,” or “a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor‘s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir.1987). Since Martinez‘s complaint did not allege that Sheriff Herrera had personal involvement in the events leading to her injury, the district court properly dismissed the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against him, as the complaint lacked allegations that sufficiently tied the constitutional violations to Sheriff Herrera‘s alleged wrongful conduct. In sum, the individual-capacity suit against Sheriff Herrera fails because nothing in the record shows that he had any direct, personal involvement in the Martinez incident. See Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.1983). Because an official-capacity suit is a suit against a municipality, that aspect of Martinez‘s suit is subsumed in the municipal liability discussion herein.