Tomick v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
157 Conn.App. 312
Conn. App. Ct.2015Background
- Tomick, a UPS package car driver with a prior lumbar injury, reinjured his back on November 30, 2004 while working and reported the incident to his supervisor.
- On December 1–2, 2004 Tomick sought medical care, requested a helper, was told a helper would be provided but none was assigned, experienced significant pain, and was sent to a clinic where he was released to modified duty with medication and lifting restrictions.
- Supervisors (Trudelle and others) confronted Tomick about his conduct; after a heated interaction and demands that he submit to a fitness-for-duty/drug test, management informed him he was terminated for violating UPS’s workplace violence policy; a meeting with union representatives on December 3 formally confirmed the discharge.
- Tomick sued under multiple counts including disability discrimination under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60; a jury found for Tomick on several counts and awarded compensatory and punitive damages; the trial court later set aside the punitive damages award.
- On appeal (Tomick I) this court remanded for findings identifying the operative date of the adverse employment decision and whether Tomick was qualified to perform essential job functions on that date; on remand the trial court applied McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and found Tomick had a prima facie case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff must prove he was qualified to perform essential job functions on the date of the adverse employment decision to make a prima facie disability-discrimination case | Tomick argued qualification was not necessary here because the relevance of qualification depends on the factual context and UPS’s stated reason was pretextual | UPS argued a plaintiff must be able to perform essential functions at the time of the adverse act; qualification is a fundamental prima facie element | Court held qualification need not be an element where it is not relevant to whether discrimination occurred; here UPS’s asserted reason (workplace violence) did not make qualification material, so Tomick established a prima facie case |
| Date of adverse employment decision (Dec 1–3, 2004) | Tomick relied on jury findings and trial-court facts that termination was communicated Dec 2 and ratified Dec 3 | UPS contended the decision date mattered because qualification should be measured that day | Court found jury could reasonably conclude the decision was made Dec 1–2 and communicated Dec 2, but declined to rest its disposition on resolving the precise date because qualification was not required here |
| Appropriate analytical framework (McDonnell Douglas pretext vs. mixed-motive) | Tomick favored a mixed-motive framework | UPS urged McDonnell Douglas pretext framework | Court applied the pretext/McDonnell Douglas framework as appropriate given dispute over whether employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual |
| Whether punitive damages are authorized under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-104 | Tomick argued § 46a-104’s grant of "legal and equitable relief, including but not limited to..." authorizes punitive damages | UPS argued punitive damages are not authorized because § 46a-104 does not expressly provide them and Connecticut requires explicit statutory authorization for punitive/multiple damages | Court held § 46a-104 does not authorize punitive damages; Connecticut law requires explicit statutory language for punitive/multiple damages and § 46a-104 already provides attorney’s fees and costs |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes flexible prima facie burden-shifting framework)
- Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (clarifies burden-shifting under McDonnell Douglas)
- Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (McDonnell Douglas is not inflexible; prima facie proof varies by context)
- United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (focus on whether employer intentionally discriminated)
- Levy v. Comm’n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96 (Connecticut adoption of framework and mixed-motive principles)
- Perez-Dixon v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483 (qualification element not required when irrelevant to disparate discipline inquiry)
- Ames v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 267 Conn. 524 (Connecticut requires explicit statutory language to award punitive/multiple damages)
- Feliciano v. AutoZone, Inc., 316 Conn. 65 (state courts look to federal law for guidance on discrimination analyses)