Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109

Background

ECCO is San Diego's comprehensive campaign finance ordinance enacted in 1973 governing municipal elections.
Plaintiffs—Thalheimer, ABC PAC, Lincoln Club, San Diego Republican Party, and Nienstedt—seek to enjoin five ECCO provisions before the 2010 elections.
Challenged provisions include §27.2936 (fund-raising/spending limits for committees), §27.2938 (12-month pre-election contribution window), §§27.2950-51 (ban on non-individual organizational contributions), and §27.2935 ($500 contribution limit).
District court preliminarily enjoined §27.2936 and §27.2950-51 as applied to political parties; preliminarily upheld §27.2938 with limitations; §27.2935 was not challenged on appeal.
Verified complaint details plaintiffs’ intent to solicit and use organizational and individual contributions now, and defendant City defends the restrictions as rooted in anti-corruption and integrity concerns.
The Ninth Circuit reviews for abuse of discretion on the preliminary injunction, with law applied under Buckley and subsequent First Amendment campaign finance precedents.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of ECCO §27.2936	Thalheimer likely to succeed; law violates First Amendment.	City justifies as closely drawn to anti-corruption goals.	Likely to be unconstitutional under either standard; affirmed partial injunctions.
Constitutionality of ECCO §27.2938 (temporal ban)	Temporal ban burdens speech unfairly and favors incumbents.	Temporal ban is a minimal, closely drawn restriction justified by anti-corruption concerns.	District court reasonably applied Buckley-era reasoning; likely constitutional.
Constitutionality of ECCO §§27.2950-51 (non-individual ban) as applied to parties	Ban targets organizations and parties unfairly; violates First Amendment.	Anti-circumvention rationale supports limits on non-individual contributions.	Likely to succeed as applied to political parties; overall regime reviewed closely.
Effect of ECCO §27.2934 (party contributions up to $1,000) on mootness/jurisdiction	New provision should be enjoined pending merits.	New provision does not moot the appeal; voluntary cessation does not defeat jurisdiction.	Ruling discussed mootness; district court’s analysis not disturbed; not dispositive on the merits here.

Key Cases Cited

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (expenditure limits strict scrutiny; contribution limits closely drawn)
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (overruled anti-distortion rationale; independent expenditures cannot be limited by anti-corruption rationale)
Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (coordinated party spending treated as contributions for anti-circumvention analysis)
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (special harms of party-related contribution limits; 'danger signs' framework for closely drawn scrutiny)
Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684 (2010) (independent expenditures and contribution limits analyzed; anti-corruption rationale narrowed by Citizens United)
Cal. Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (multi-candidate PACs and integrity concerns justify certain contribution limits)
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (empirical evidence burden varies with novelty of justification in recall contexts)
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (preliminary injunction standard tracks ultimate burden of proof; speech restrictions must be justified)
Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940 (1998) (Buckley-based temporal restrictions may be constitutional when closely drawn)
North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (1999) (recall/temporary limits; heightened scrutiny in certain contexts)
Beaumont v. FEC, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (anti-circumvention interest valid to restrict direct contributions by organizations)
Vermont statutes (Randall plurality reference), 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (contribution limits must be assessed for special party-related harms)