71 F.4th 468
6th Cir.2023Background
- In 2015 federal agents charged Terrance Kimbrough with 18 offenses after he murdered rival dealers Brendon Leggs and Monte Watson (the latter a potential witness), among other violent acts.
- In August 2018 Kimbrough pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement: he admitted facts in a 12‑page stipulation, pleaded to seven counts (including two §924(j) murder‑with‑a‑firearm counts), and accepted a binding sentencing range of 480–520 months; the court imposed 504 months.
- The plea avoided exposure to a mandatory life sentence on a dismissed federal‑witness murder count (18 U.S.C. §1512(a)).
- In a 28 U.S.C. §2255 motion, Kimbrough claimed counsel was ineffective for advising the plea because the §924(j) convictions rested on attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which he argued is not a “crime of violence.” The district court agreed that attempted Hobbs Act robbery failed to qualify but denied relief for lack of Strickland prejudice.
- After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor confirmed that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence, the Sixth Circuit reviewed only the ineffective‑assistance claim and affirmed the denial of §2255 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s advice to plead guilty was constitutionally deficient for failing to challenge §924(j)’s predicate (attempted Hobbs Act robbery) | Counsel should have pursued the argument (Taylor later adopted) that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a "crime of violence" | Counsel’s performance was reasonable given pre‑plea precedent uniformly rejecting the argument and the utility of securing a favorable plea | Not deficient; counsel not required to foresee Taylor or sacrifice a beneficial plea |
| Whether Kimbrough established Strickland prejudice (would have rejected plea/insisted on trial) | He would have rejected the plea or obtained a better outcome had counsel raised the challenge | No realistic defense or chance of avoiding a life sentence at trial; plea avoided mandatory life and produced a meaningful benefit | No prejudice; no reasonable probability of different result |
| Whether the allegedly invalid §924(j) count "infected" the plea process such that relief is warranted | The invalid predicate undermined the plea’s voluntariness and fairness | Plea range reflected overall conduct, not any single charge; no evidence the §924(j) count dominated negotiations | Claim fails; no showing the plea would have changed |
| Whether the COA should be expanded to permit direct challenge to the §924(j) conviction despite procedural default | Request to expand COA invoking novelty and actual innocence to overcome default | Claim procedurally defaulted; cannot show cause or actual innocence (admitted witness murder carries mandatory life) | Denied/forfeited; default not overcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes ineffective‑assistance standard)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard for guilty pleas requires reasonable probability defendant would have gone to trial)
- United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (held attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated §924(c) residual‑clause vagueness)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (invalidated a residual‑clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied vagueness doctrine to a similarly worded residual clause)
- Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) (counsel may reasonably trade merits arguments for a favorable plea)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (procedural default: cause and prejudice or actual innocence required to excuse default)
- Nagi v. United States, 90 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1996) (counsel not ineffective for foregoing speculative arguments to secure a plea)
- Chase v. MaCauley, 971 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 2020) (distinguishes cases where outcome was dictated by existing precedent)