Tammy Rosebrough v. Buckeye Valley High School
690 F.3d 427
| 6th Cir. | 2012Background
- Rosebrough, born without a left hand, applied for a cook/bus driver trainee position at Buckeye Valley North High School and discussed requirements with supervisor Cope.
- Cope indicated a waiver from the Ohio Department of Education was needed before she could operate a school bus, and a waiver was ultimately approved in January 2008 after initial deficiencies.
- Rosebrough began training as a bus driver trainee in early 2008, with a trainer who later allegedly made discriminatory comments about her disability.
- Rosebrough raised complaints about discriminatory remarks in February 2008; Cope discussed concerns with the trainer and superintendent, who indicated they would consider her employment as a driver.
- She proceeded with training but canceled a CDL test when routing changes prevented a substitute trainer; she then sought employment and CDL training elsewhere but did not complete Buckeye Valley’s program.
- In March 2009, Rosebrough sued Buckeye Valley for ADA/disability discrimination, Ohio handicap discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the district court granted summary judgment on all claims, finding she was not a qualified individual due to lack of CDL.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rosebrough was 'otherwise qualified' for the trainee position without a CDL | Rosebrough was a trainee; CDL not required for training to obtain one. | A CDL is required to perform the essential functions of the bus-driver trainee role. | Reversed; trainee position protected; CDL not necessary for training. |
| Whether ADA protects discrimination during job training | ADA covers discrimination during training to obtain essential job qualifications. | Only post-training employment actions are protected under the ADA. | Protected; training period falls within ADA coverage. |
| Whether the district court properly analyzed the remaining prima facie elements | District court erred by not addressing all elements beyond 'otherwise qualified'. | Not fully addressed on appeal; remand appropriate for complete analysis. | Remanded for district court to consider remaining prima facie elements. |
| Whether the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim can proceed given dismissal on discrimination grounds | Distress claim should be evaluated independently of ADA analysis. | Based on the same dispositive reasoning as discrimination, may be foreclosed. | Remand to allow district court to address all elements of the claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hopkins v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 196 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. 1999) (elements of prima facie disability claim)
- Plant v. Morton Int’l Inc., 212 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2000) (disability discrimination analysis framework)
- Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661 (6th Cir. 2008) (definition of disability and coverage under ADA)
- United States v. Miss. Dep’t of Public Safety, 321 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2003) (ADA coverage of trainees at academy)
- Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 944 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (genuine issue of material fact for discrimination claim by trainee)
- Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2009) (extreme and outrageous conduct standard in Ohio tort claims)
- Baab v. AMR Servs. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (extreme and outrageous conduct in Ohio emotional distress claims)
- Banford v. Aldrich Chem. Co., Inc., 932 N.E.2d 319 (Ohio 2010) (definition of serious emotional distress under Ohio law)