Stuckey v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 3d 219

Sean Stuckey, convicted in 2008 of being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), received an ACCA-enhanced sentence of 188 months based on three prior predicate convictions.
Two prior New York convictions at issue: Robbery in the First Degree under N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(3) (use/threaten use of a dangerous instrument) and § 160.15(4) (display of what appears to be a firearm).
At sentencing the government treated those two first-degree robbery convictions as ACCA “violent felonies”; Stuckey moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 arguing they are not ACCA violent felonies.
Legal question turns on whether those New York subsections qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the categorical/modified categorical approach, in light of Johnson v. United States (defining “physical force” as violent force) and Leocal v. Ashcroft ("use" requires active employment/intent).
The government produced Certificates of Disposition showing Stuckey’s convictions were under subsections (4) and (3), allowing the court to apply the modified categorical approach.
The court denied Stuckey’s § 2255 petition, holding subsections 3 and 4 are ACCA violent felonies under the elements-based (categorical) analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether NY Penal Law § 160.15(3) & (4) are ACCA “violent felonies”	Stuckey: statute permits aggravating violent conduct to be committed by “another participant” and NY law imposes no intent as to aggravators, so a defendant could be strictly liable for another’s violent act and thus not necessarily have intended violent force (Leocal + Johnson require intent to use violent force).	Government: ACCA looks to the elements of the statutory offense; subsections (3) and (4) have elements involving use/display of weapons or dangerous instruments and satisfy Johnson’s violent-force standard; intent-as-to-aggravator is not required by the ACCA.	Court: Held subsections (3) and (4) are violent felonies under the ACCA; categorical focus is on the crime’s elements, not individual defendant’s specific mens rea as to an accomplice’s conduct.

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (defines “physical force” as violent force)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 ("use" requires active employment; suggests intent beyond negligence)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (categorical and modified categorical approaches)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (realistic probability standard limiting overbroad hypotheticals)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (documents courts may consult under modified categorical approach)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (retroactivity of Johnson 2015 on collateral review)