Steven Lefemine v. Dan Wideman, 758 F.3d 551

Background

In 2005–2007 Steven Lefemine and Columbia Christians for Life displayed graphic anti-abortion signs on a public sidewalk in Greenwood County; officers ordered them to stop, claiming traffic disturbance and public decency concerns.
Lefemine sued county sheriff’s officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory relief, an injunction, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees for First Amendment violations; the district court found a violation and entered an injunction and declaratory judgment but denied damages (qualified immunity) and denied fees.
The Fourth Circuit initially affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certiorari, held Lefemine was a prevailing party because the injunction changed official behavior, and remanded for consideration of whether special circumstances made a fee award unjust.
On remand the district court identified three “special circumstances” (qualified immunity, absence of a Sheriff’s Office policy or custom, and limited nature of relief) and denied fees; Lefemine appealed the fee denial.
The Fourth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion: none of the three factors—individually or together—constituted the narrowly construed “special circumstances” that justify denying fees under Section 1988, and remanded for fee proceedings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a prevailing §1988 plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to attorney’s fees absent special circumstances	Fees should be awarded because Section 1988’s purpose is to ensure access to courts and fees are the norm for prevailing civil rights plaintiffs	Fees may be unjust when special circumstances exist (as the district court found)	Court: prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily recover fees; special-circumstance exception is very narrow and was not met here
Whether defendants’ qualified immunity is a special circumstance warranting denial of fees	Qualified immunity prevented monetary recovery, but that does not make fee award unjust; immunity supports awarding fees	Qualified immunity that shielded officers from damages makes fee awards unjust	Court: qualified immunity is not a special circumstance that negates fees; immunity often supports fee awards because it limits damages
Whether absence of a municipal policy/custom (Monell) is a special circumstance that bars fees	Lack of Monell liability for the Sheriff’s Office does not defeat fees for successful claims against officials	Because the entity couldn’t be held liable, fee award is unjust or should be reduced	Court: absence of a policy or custom is not a special circumstance; plaintiff’s success against officers still warrants fees
Whether the limited nature of relief (injunctive/declaratory vs. money) justifies denying fees	The injunction and declaratory relief were meaningful and broad enough given the officials’ prior threats; limited relief does not make fees unjust	Relief was limited and partly de minimis (other protests occurred without incident), so fees should be denied	Court: relief was substantial (injunction/declaratory judgment) and not comparable to cases awarding only nominal damages; this factor does not justify denying fees

Key Cases Cited

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (prevailing civil rights plaintiffs ordinarily recover attorney’s fees absent special circumstances)
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (Section 1988’s purpose and importance where immunities limit damages)
Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (fees appropriate where relief is granted against officials immune from damages)
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires official policy or custom)
Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991) (rare special circumstance: pro se attorney-plaintiff bars fee award)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (limited/nominal damages may justify little or no fee in certain circumstances)
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2005) (standard of review for fee-award decisions)
Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844 (4th Cir. 1980) (good faith or ability to pay are not special circumstances to deny fees)
Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071 (4th Cir. 1986) (lodestar is the critical focus for calculating reasonable attorney’s fees)