*1 OF FOR THE COUNTY PULLIAM, MAGISTRATE v. ALLEN CULPEPER, VIRGINIA et al. May Argued 1983 Decided November
No. 82-1432.
52B *2 Blackmun, J., opinion Court, Brennan, delivered the in which White, Marshall, Stevens, JJ., Powell, joined. J., and filed a dis- Rehnquist senting opinion, Burger, J., O’Connor, in which C. and and JJ., joined, post, p. 544. Baliles, L.
Gerald General of Attorney Virginia, argued were Wil- the cause him on the petitioner. With briefs Broaddus, liam G. Donald Attorney General, Chief Deputy Gehring Lacy, C. J. B. Elizabeth and Attorneys Deputy Jerry P. Slonaker, General, and Attorney Assistant General. Wyatt Deborah Chasen the cause for argued respondents. Jeffries, was John Calvin Jr* With her on the brief of Min- urging *Briefs of amici filed for the State curiae reversal were Minnesota, III, Attorney of Humphrey nesota et al. Hubert H. General Harbison, Blomgren General, Douglas Kent Deputy Attorney G. Chief C. Blanke, General, Douglas D. and the Special Attorneys Assistant Attorneys A. General Charles respective for their States as follows: Alabama, Alaska, K. of Graddick of Robert Corbin Norman Gorsuch of C. California, Arizona, Arkansas, Kamp of John Steven of Van de Clark John Connecticut, Charles Colorado, Joseph Duane Woodard of of Lieberman Oberly Florida, J. Bowers Delaware, M. III of Michael Jim Smith oí Hartigan of Georgia, Tany Hong Hawaii, Idaho, F. S. Neil Jim Jones Iowa, Illinois, T. Linley E. Robert Indiana, Pearson Miller Thomas J. Guste, Jr., Kansas, Stephan Kentucky, L. William J. Steven Beshear of of the Court. the opinion delivered Blackmun Justice im- scope concerning issues This case raises declaratory seeks suit that from civil munity 1871, amended, Act of as the Civil Rights § of relief under under the Civil from fee awards made 42 U. S. C. as Act Stat. Fees Awards Attorney’s Rights § 1988. C. U. S. amended, in Culpeper Magistrate Pulliam a state Gladys
Petitioner R. Allen and Jesse W. Richmond Respondents Va. County, Pulliam a 1983 action Nicholson were plaintiffs *3 for the Eastern District Court in the United States brought Pulliam’s Magistrate claimed Virginia. They District of nonjailable arrested for bail on imposing persons of practice Tierney Stephan H. Maine, Maryland, E. Sachs Louisiana, of of James of Kelley Michigan, J. Massachusetts, Francis X. Bellotti of Frank Wil- of D. Michael T. Missouri, liam A. Attain John Ashcroft Mississippi, of of Douglas McKay of Nebraska, Greely of Paul L. Brian Montana, of Nevada, Gregory H. Irwin I. Kimmelman of Smith of Hampshire, New L. Edmisten North York, Robert Abrams New Jersey, of New of Rufus Celebrezze,Jr., Dakota, Anthony Carolina, Robert 0. J. North of Wefald Turpén Oklahoma, Frohnmayer Oregon, Michael C. David Ohio, of of of Leroy S. Zimmerman Dennis J. Roberts II of Rhode Pennsylvania, of Meierhenry T. Travis Medlock of Island, Mark V. Carolina, of South South Leech, Jr., William M. Jim Mattox of David Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, of Jr., Easton, L. Wilkinson of John J. Kenneth 0. Utah, Vermont, Jr., Eikenberry Washington, Chauncey Browning, H. Virginia, of West Bronson La C. Follette Wisconsin, and A. G. McClintock Wyoming; Harrell, James, the American Bar Association Morris W. Ervin by and Roth; Phillip J. Paul L. Friedman by for the Conference of Chief Justices Sullivan; and Michael D. Cooke, for the Honorable Lawrence H. Chief Feigenbaum, Judge Paul A. Michael Colod- York, by of New State ner, Falk; and Kenneth Gafni, and for the Honorable Abraham J. Howland Abramson and Charles Pennsylvania, by Administrator of W. W. Johns. urging Briefs of amici curiae affirmance American were filed for the Larson;
Civil Liberties Union et al. Burt E. Richard Neubome and and Lloyd for the J. Lawyers by National Association of Criminal Defense Snook III. offenses under law Virginia incarcerating and those per- if they sons could not meet bail was unconstitutional. enjoined District Court agreed practice. That court also respondents $7,691.09 awarded costs and attor- fees 1988. The ney’s under United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected petitioner’s claim that award of fees her should have attorney’s been barred agree We with the Court principles judicial immunity. and affirm award. Appeals Respondent Allen was arrested in 1980 for January alleg-
I insulting abusive and 3 mis- edly using language, Class §18.2-416 demeanor under Va. Code The maxi- mum for a misdemeanor is a Class fine. See penalty $500 §18.2-ll(c). set a Petitioner bond Respondent $250. bond, Allen unable to post petitioner committed Allen he County jail, to the where remained for 14 Culpeper tried, was then found days. fined, He and released. guilty, The trial judge subsequently reopened judgment reversed the conviction. Allen claim, then filed his *4 and seeking declaratory injunctive relief against petitioner’s of for practice incarcerating trial nonincar- persons waiting cerable offenses.1 Nicholson was four
Respondent incarcerated times within the 2-month of period immediately before and after the filing Allen’s His arrests for complaint. were violations alleged § Va. Code 18.2-388 drunk in (1982), being Section public. 18.2-388 a Class misdemeanor for which the maximum 11(d). § is a fine. Like penalty Allen, re- $100 18.2— Nicholson was six spondent incarcerated for two to periods 1Respondent challenged judge Allen pro also the failure of the trial to appearance, appoint counsel, rights vide a first to and to advise Allen of his during incarceration. District Court dismissed claim played trial because “he role the pretrial no direct in detention of plaintiff.” App. 31-82. either in Allen’s suit He intervened bond. for failure to
days post as party plaintiff. a to re- practice it to be petitioner’s Court found
The District declared offenses. court for bond nonincarcerable quire protec- process equal a violation of due to be practice respondents, found that court also it.2 The enjoined tion and claims, their were entitled substantially prevailed having in attorney’s fees, accordance to reasonable costs, including request to submit a for respondents §with 1988. It directed 23. did within 10 Petitioner days. App. to petitioner costs not this order. appeal for fees and costs total- request submitted
Respondents $7,038. of this $7,691.09. component figure The fee ling constitutionality Virginia Respondents challenged both the had petitioner’s imposing pretrial practice bail for detention statute (later repealed by § Virginia 19.2-74.1 nonincarcerable offenses. Code 382) Acts, prohibited custody any person 1981 Va. ch. the retention jail for he arrested a misdemeanor which could not receive sentence. exception persons profane The statute contained an for those arrested § swearing being public, or drunk violation 18.2-388. See 1980Va. however, Acts, pretrial ch. 344. Section 19.2-74.A. authorized deten any person arresting likely tion of such “believed officer to be disregard “reasonably arresting a summons” or believed officer likely any person.” to cause harm to himself other
The District Court declared both 19.2-74 and 19.2-74.1 unconstitu- [they] tional the extent persons “[t]o authorize the incarceration charged authorized, with jail solely misdemeanors for which no time is they App. enjoined petitioner because cannot meet bond.” It 22. practice Culpeper County, Virginia, “[t]he course conduct in under persons prior jail which are confined to trial on offenses for which no time Id., solely they is authorized because cannot meet at 23. bond.” Although the District Court respondents concluded that had been held id., jail “solely inability bail,” because of their to make it also di- *5 “[a]ny pretrial persons rected that detention for Class 3 and arrested 4 grounds Class misdemeanors person lawfully on the that the is deemed likely danger to be a may only long himself or to others last so as such danger persists and must cease when the condition which created the dan- ger changes abates, arrangements or or person are made for release third-party custody into under danger.” circumstances which abate Id., at 22. objections prayed filed and
Petitioner
“that the Court reduce
attorney’s
request
Id.,
of Plaintiffs for
33.
fees.”
figure
granted
The court found
fees
reasonable and
fees
requested
in the
amount.
and costs
appeal
awarding
Petitioner took an
from the order
attor-
ney’s
argued
her.
that,
officer,
fees
She
as a
absolutely
attorney’s
immune
she was
from an award of
fees.
Appeals
language
legislative
reviewed the
§
history
of 1988. It concluded that a
officer is not
attorney’s
immune from an award of
fees in an action in which
prospective
properly
is
relief
awarded
her. Since
already
judicial immunity
the court
had determined that
did
§
injunctive
declaratory
not extend to
1983,3
relief under
prospective
properly
the court concluded that
relief
had been
against petitioner.
It
awarded
therefore affirmed the award
(1982).
attorney’s
Burke,
Allen v.
II
(1983),
granted
case,
We
certiorari
this
Although injunctive
that have faced the issue
Courts of Appeals
United States
does
such re-
not bar
agreement
are
however,
question.7
has never decided
Court,
lief.6 This
prevailing plaintiffs
litigation
particularly important
such
necessary
rights
adequately
if Federal civil and constitutional
are to be
sure,
large
brought
protected.
pro-
in a
under the
To be
number
cases
only injunctive
sought,
pre-
visions covered
H. R.
relief is
(Footnote
vailing
ordinarily
plaintiffs should
recover their counsel fees.”
omitted.)
21.1(a) provides:
question pre
This Court’s Rule
“The statement of a
comprise every subsidiary
fairly in
question
sented will be deemed to
question
judicial immunity
therein.” The
cluded
whether
should have
injunctive
“fairly
barred the
in this
in the
awarded
case is
included”
presented.
question
6Although
Supreme
Virginia
Court
Consumers
v.
Union
States, Inc.,
(1980),
United
did state that the Courts
of
of
Appeals appeared to
question,
be divided on
an examination
pronouncements
agree
recent
they
those courts
indicates that
are
judicial immunity
injunctive
See,
g.,
ment that
is no bar to
e.
In re
relief.
1982);
Rico,
Supreme
(CA1
Justices
Court Puerto
529
in our own
is the
analysis
common law.
starting point
on
that common-
assumption
Our cases have proceeded
in-
were
legislative
judicial immunity
law
principles
and that
should
judicial system
they
into our
not
corporated
clear
intent
to do so.
legislative
absent
abrogated
Ray,
Tenney
Pierson
547,
(1967);
v.
554-555
v.
Brandhove, 341
(1951).
367
the first and
Accordingly,
U. S.
judi-
the common law recognized
crucial
is whether
question
from
collateral relief.
prospective
cial immunity
itself, there was no such
as an
thing
At the common law
Injunctive
relief was an
injunction
judge.
equita-
against
only
ble
that could be awarded
the Chancellor
remedy
2
before other courts. See
parties
proceedings
(11th
1873).
¶
ed.
875,
J.
Jurisprudence
p.
Story, Equity
injunction, however,
the use of the
says
This limitation on
And the limi-
immunity.
about the
nothing
scope
judicial
not from
but from the sub-
judicial immunity,
tation derived
Ibid.
authority.
stantive confines of
Chancellor’s
Although there were no
common-law
injunctions against
there is a
parallel
injunction
common-law
to the
judges,
at issue here. That
is found
the collateral
parallel
prospec-
tive relief available against
the use of the
judges through
A
King’s prerogative writs.
brief excursion into common-law
history
helps
the relevance of these writs to the
explain
whether
question
immunity
of common-law
bar
principles
relief
officer.
(ED
1969) (no immunity),
denied,
Mo.
cert.
A number thority days. Among Council, these were the the in those Admiralty, Chancery, the the and the ecclesi- Chamber, Star supremacy In an effort to assert the of astical courts. Ibid. the interference courts, Lord Coke forbade the common-law properly equity triable at common courts of with matters Rydley, Eng. Rep. 335, Heath v. Jac. 79 286 law. Cro. (K. 1614). Floyd Rep. Barker, in 12 Earlier, B. Co. Rep. colleagues Eng. and his of the Star Coke King’s judges of Bench im- Chamber had declared the the prosecution competing mune their courts for they doing theory upon so, acts. In announced the the which concept judicial immunity judge of was built. involved Floyd Judge and Barker awas common-law of Assize who presided charged had over a trial. murder He was then conspiracy. the Star Chamber with The court concluded judges of the common not to law should be called any Judge King.” account “before other at suit of the Eng. Rep., Id., at at 1307. agreed,
“[A]nd Judges it was that insomuch as the justice, the realm have the administration of under the King, subjects, they ought to all his not to drawn into question any supposed corruption, which extends annihilating any judicial proceed- record, or of ings tending justice before them, or the slander King, King which will trench the scandal of except King they himself, it be before the himself; only King, are to make an account to God and the and not any suggestion Id., to answer to the Star-Chamber.” Eng. Rep., at 1307. language principle quoted illustrates, As Coke’s this immunity only higher judges King’s extended to the In Holdsworth, at 159-160. Coke’s time, courts. See beyond theory expanded protect his narrow concern of judges ing from their rival courts, so that common-law immunity, were accorded at least for of all courts jurisdiction.8 v. Stansfield, actions within their See Scott (1868)(immunity county court, 3 L. Ex. 220 extended to a R. placed precedent record; ex an inferior court reliance tending immunity to the court of a coroner and to a court- record); Haggard court not of martial, an inferior court and a v. Pelicier Freres [1892] A. C. (1891) (judge Consular given Madagascar same as of a record). theory In refined, court of itself was addition, *9 shifting preserve King’s its focus from the need to the author ity public independent judicial to the interest in decisionmak- ing. reprinted Downes, v. in in footnote Calder Taaffe (a) (P. 1840)(“An Eng. Rep. Halket, v. n. 12, 18, 13 ac C. Judge tion before one is in what is done the another, Appeal; Appeal equal nature an is and the from an to an equal. It is a in solecism the law. . . that the Plaintiff’s case independence Judges”).
is the of the 8 Cohen, Suing Judges: History & See Feinman Theory, 31 C. L. S. (1980). 201, demonstrated, always easy Rev. 211 As will be not to it was determine what actions jurisdiction. were within a court’s A limi similar imposed King’s tation was on authority judge by the the to control use prerogative appears, however, the It jurisdictional writs. limit that the was taken seriously offering protection more more the — —when personal liability judicial issue was for an erroneous when the action than question involved the Gwinne prerogative Compare reach of the writs. Poole, 2 (C. 935, Eng. Rep. 1692), Lut. 125 Gapper, with Gould 522 P. (K. 1804). Eng. 5 East. Rep. B. Exchequer judges By of the Court one of the language our contem- in close to explained understanding porary of the doctrine: judges who are all courts “It appointed essential permitted be the law should administer independ- protection law, it under administer ently freely, fear. This favor and without without protection or provision not for the benefit law is corrupt judge, but for the benefit a malicious public, that the should at interest it is whose independence, liberty functions with their to exercise consequences.” v. Stansfield, Scott fear of and without Bradley quoted Fisher, Ex., L. R. n. 335, 350, Wall. light of the common law’s focus
It is independence control exercised collateral particular Kang’s inferior courts has Bench over rival and significance. King’s significant Bench collateral control exercised through prerogative and rival
over inferior courts the use corpus, pro- certiorari, writs. The writs included habeas quo regno. hibition, mandamus, and ne exeat warranto, (7th 1956). interesting Holdsworth, at 226-231 ed. Most purposes prohibition our current are the manda- writs judge, theory pre- mus.9 The writs issued prohibition appears writ of to have been used more than the writ of *10 person mandamus to control inferior any courts. issue to Mandamus could respect in anything pertained that to his in the nature of a office and was (4th 1973). public Halsbury’s duty. 1 England ¶ 81 The Laws ed. prerogative other writs are also of The some relevance here. writ of cer- tiorari, instance, for proceedings issued to remove from an inferior tribunal to ensure that the keeping jurisdiction effectuating court was within its the rules of the common law. Once a writ certiorari was delivered to a judge, proceed he was suspend forbidden to further in the case. Failure proceedings contempt. Pound, Appellate amounted to a See R. Procedure (1941). in Civil Cases 61
533 exceeding jurisdiction require vent him from his him to practice, controlling Id., exercise it. at 228-229. In an infe- proper jurisdiction in rior court exercise of its meant that King’s pre- Bench used and continues to use the writs to judge committing including vent a errors, from all manner of departing justice, proceeding from the rules of natural with a misconstruing interest, suit which he has an substantive rejecting legal Halsbury’s 1 law, and evidence. See Laws of (4th 1973); England ¶¶76, 130 ed. 81, Gordon, The Observ- ance of Law as a Condition of L. Jurisdiction, 47 Rev. Q. 386, (1931).10 394
Examples King’s are numerous which a by issuing prohibition request Bench, a writ of at the enjoined aof party court, before an inferior or rival that court committing proceeding perceived from a trial or with during generally error the course of that trial. See Dobbs, by Consent, Decline Jurisdiction 40 N. C. L. Rev. 49, particularly 60-61 ing writs were useful exercis- courts, collateral control over the ecclesiastical since the King’s Bench exercised no direct over those review tribunals. (K. Eng. Rep. Friend, In Shatter 1 Show. 510 B. 1691), example, granted prohibition the court Spiritual refusing proof Court for to allow the defendant’s payment 10-poundlegacy, justices of a one of the conclud- ing thing that “it was an unconscionable unreasonable to dis- proof.” Eng. Rep., Id., allow the at 512.11 10 Gordon observes that the fiction that misconstruction of substantive abandoned, law constitutes jurisdiction action excess of has been disregard ground prohibition textbooks now show of a statute as a dis jurisdiction. Rev., Gordon, Q. tinct from want or excess of 47 L. at 394. Burwell, (K. Harrison 1670), In Eng. Rep. Vent. B. King’s granted Bench prohibition against Spiritual a writ of Court that had declared void as marriage incestuous a man and the woman between a great who had been married to his uncle. The court concluded Spiritual misinterpreted marriage Court had as barred the Levitical jurisdiction decree and that it had no marriage not barred declare void a (1877) Dale, Serjeant Q. (prohi- decree. See also B. D. 558 *11 Eng. Rep. 5 East. Gapper, In Gould implicit what had been (K. explicit made court 1804), B. the of prohi It held that a writ earlier decisions. a number a court had exceeded only not when granted be bition would either a noncommon- court, the also when but its jurisdiction, court, misconstrued had common-law an inferior law court or the rules of the civil under or, acting Parliament an Act of law the courts of common than otherwise decided law, had might fact that the error subject. the same would upon to the deemed to be irrelevant was appeal be corrected on view, In the court’s prohibition. a writ of availability the Spiri a case was that “[n]ot such prohibition reason for statute], but to construe jurisdiction [the tual had not prevented of misconstruction were to be the mischiefs 1111.12 Id., at Eng. Rep., by prohibition.” bishop hearing prevent Arches issued to from a case bition to the Court of Steele, interest); N. R. 12 C. B. which he had an White Scott (1862) (writ prohibition Judge to a of the Arches Court of issued Canterbury until he of evidence the common law allowed the introduction admitted). required to be King use of the writ can be found in In Similar more recent cases. North, [1927] K. B. 491 vicar had been ordered Consis- tory pay alleged Court to for the restoration of he a fresco was to have painted caused to sought prohibition, claiming be over. He a writ of opportunity he had had no notice or to be heard. court concluded that deprivation property opportunity without notice and an to heard contrary general to the land, granted prohibition. laws of the quoted Blackstone, 12 Thecourt in Gould who described the use of prohibition the writ of as follows: may law; “This writ issue to as, either inferior courts of common to the palatine principality Wales, plea courts of counties or they if hold land or lying franchises; other matters not respective within their county-courts baron, they any courts where attempt plea hold mat- forty shillings: may ter of the value of or it be directed to the courts Chris- tian, university courts, chivalry, admiralty, court of or the court of they any where concern jurisdic- themselves with matter not within their attempt try tion: if the validity as first should pleaded, of a custom or the latter a contract made or kingdom. Or, to be executed within this if, handling clearly cognizance, matters within they transgress their prescribed the bounds to them England; they the laws of as where re- *12 the Bench exercised direct
Although King’s review the courts, inferior it the common-law also used writ of prohi- g., e. In re Hill, See, bition to those courts. control (1855) Exch. 726 issued to (prohibition prevent judge in a in he, accord, case which of his own had proceeding a claim to an amount his jurisdiction).13 amended within King has continued into modern In times. practice Emerson, [1913] 2 Ir. R. instance, the court granted a writ of a of the prohibition preventing justice peace, acting in from proceeding a with a judicial capacity, deposition, be- cause of a likelihood that a reasonable public conclude might that the statements indicated bias in favor of magistrate’s the Crown. The court directed the to to magistrate pay costs him the to settle with the complaining party, leaving Crown the matter of indemnification. the Bench relationship King’s between and its collat-
eral and inferior courts is not in precisely paralleled our sys- tem the between the state and relationship federal courts. quire prove tithes, to payment legacy, two witnesses the of a a release or like; For, prohibition the such cases also a will be awarded. as the fact signing release, payment, properly a or of spiritual ques- actual is not tion, only courts, but to allowed be decided in those or because incident accessory original to question clearly jurisdiction; some it within their therefore, ought differ, according where the two laws to be decided not to spiritual, temporal law; but the question might else the deter- same ways, according mined different depending: to the court in which the suit is endure, impropriety, government an which no ought wise can to ground prohibition. which is therefore a if or the And either the party proceed may prohibition, shall after such an attachment be had against them, punish contempt, to them for the at the discretion it; court that against them, awarded and an action will repair lie to party injured damages.” Blackstone, 3 W. Commentaries *112—*113 (footnotes omitted). Adamson, Queen (1875) (mandamus Q. also 1 B. D. issued require justices peace applications to hear for a summons to an based swer a evidence). Q. B. 371 charge distaste (1891) (mandamus conspiracy Queen applicants’ views); issued to do grievous harm, require magistrate where refusal had been Marsham, hear [1892] legal practice on the common-law rely we the extent To however, immunity, doctrine our own shaping through preroga- Bench King’s exercised control that, at least It indicates relevant. is highly tive writs *13 inconsistency no between there was law, common view of the from judicial authority protected that immunity principle a harassing persecution,” wasting, “a wide, Taaffe (a), Downes, availability n. and the Rep., 13 Eng. indi- Nor, in cases. as exceptional relief injunctive collateral limit necessary law deem it common above, cated did the no avenue to situations where alternative relief this collateral supra. Gould Gapper, was available. See review in insulating It the Bench was successful King’s is true that But that success had less its from collateral review. judges with immunity the doctrine of than the fact judicial do with Bench, the not the only superior judges King’s courts, ecclesiastical courts or inferior common-law had to issue authority prerogative writs.14
IV Our own experience fully is consistent the common with law’s of a rule of rejection judicial from immunity prospective relief. We never have rule of had a absolute immu judicial from nity relief, and there prospective is no evidence that the absence of that immunity has had a on effect chilling judicial independence. None of the seminal opinions immunity, either or in England this has involved country, 14Blackstone prohibition “only indicates that a writ of properly issued out bench, king’s of the court of being writ; king’s prerogative but for the justice, furtherance of may it now also be had some cases out of the court chancery, pleas, exchequer; common judge par directed to the ties, any of a court, suit inferior commanding them to cease from prosecution Blackstone, (footnotes thereof.” 3 W. Commentaries *112 omitted). significant point ecclesiastical and inferior courts against King’s could not retaliate Bench use of the writ. relief.15 No Court of ever Appeals from
immunity injunctive relief a injunctive against bars immunity has concluded that At least seven Circuits have indi 6, supra. See n. judge. no that there is bar to such re affirmatively cated an judgment injunction in situations where their lief, and necessary prevent irreparable officer was against courts to a constitutional have injury rights, petitioner’s that relief.16 granted relief raises
For the most part,
protection
different from those addressed
concerns
im
already
awards.
limitations
damages
obtaining equitable
posed by
requirements
any defendant —a
of an
showing
inadequate remedy
see Beacon
harm,
risk of
irreparable
at law and of a serious
Theatres,
Westover,
(1959)17—
Inc. 506-507
*14
curtail
the risk that
will be harassed
severely
judges
their
the threat of
to
compromised by
having
independence
Barker,
(K.
15 See, g., Floyd
e.
23, Eng.
Rep.
Rep.
12
B.
Co.
77
1305
1607) (criminal prosecution
Downes,
conspiracy);
reprinted
for
v.
Taaffe
Halket,
(a) (P.
1840)(dam
footnote in Calder v.
12, 15,
Eng. Rep.
13
n.
C.
Stansfield,
ages
for
Scott v.
imprisonment);
assault and false
L.
3
R.
(1868) (damages
Brigham,
slander);
Ex. 220
Randall v.
for
17 Whenthe is whether enjoin a pending federal court should a state-court proceeding, irreparable injury “even is insufficient unless it is ” great Harris, ‘both Younger 37, immediate.’ 401 U. 46 S. Boykin, Fenner (1926). quoting 240, 243-244 See discussion at n. infra. 538 by disgruntled litigants.18 suits against
defend themselves
harassment of
prevent
to
limitations serve
Similar
Because mandamus
of mandamus.
the writ
use of
through
liti-
a
judge
consequence making
unfortunate
has “the
counsel or to leave his defense
obtain personal
obliged
gant,
him,” the Court has stressed
before
litigants
to one of
Ex
really extraordinary causes.”
“reserved for
it should
Occasionally,
260
how-
S.
Fahey,
332 U.
parte
causes”
in such
extraordinary
and,
“really
are
ever,
there
judicial immunity
no
suggestion
has been
cases, there
issuing
from
the writ.19
court
prevents
supervising
availablity
injunctive
imposes limitations on the
relief
Article III also
Rico,
Supreme
judge.
In re Justices
Puerto
a
1982) (no
(CA1
controversy
case or
a
who ad
F. 2d
between
litigant
judicates
and a
who attacks the constitution
claims under
statute
statute).
(1983)
Angeles Lyons,
Los
461 U.
ality of the
See also
S.
(claims
practice
unconstitutional state
too
speculative).
(CA5
West,
1964), petition
F. 2d
of manda
In Hall v.
writ
by Negro
rights
pend
plaintiffs
mus was filed
in a civil
case that had been
years.
ing
Although
more than 11
other
before
District Court
two
Courts,
Court,
District
affirmed
this
had declared unconstitutional
segregated
system
passed
Louisiana
school
and the state statute
to allow
public
desegregation,
the school
board
close
schools to avoid
the board
it
change
segregated
had made clear that
intended
take no action to
system
court,
without a further order
District Court. The
how
ever,
Appeals
refused to act. The Court of
therefore issued a writ of man
*15
damus, compelling the District Court to
the
a
order
defendants to submit
plan for the
desegregation
commencement of
of the schools under their
Attorney
States,
control.
also In re
See
General
the United
596 F. 2d
of
(CA2) (writ
granted
58
of mandamus
contempt
to vacate District Court’s
(1979).
against
General),
Attorney
denied,
order
cert.
Congress predecessor, enacted and its Rights provide independ- Civil Act of 1866,14 27, Stat. an protection rights. ent avenue for of federal constitutional remedy necessary was considered because courts “state being injure were used harass and be- individuals, either powerless stop deprivations cause the state courts were league upon abrogation were in with those who were bent federally protected rights.” Foster, Mitchum Ray, Pierson also S., 386 U. (dissenting opinion)(every Congress 558-564 spoke Member of who to the issue assumed that would be under liable §1983).
Subsequent interpretations Rights of the Civil Acts this acknowledge Congress’ intent to reach unconstitu- including tional judges. actions all state actors, In Ex parte Virginia, §4 Rights 100 U. S. 339 of the Civil employed Act of Stat. to authorize a crimi- excluding nal persons indictment *17 service on account of their race. The reasoned jury the prohibits that Fourteenth Amendment a State from de- the nying any person jurisdiction equal within its protection only by of the laws. Since a State acts its execu- legislative, or tive, judicial authorities, the constitutional must provision authorities, including addressed to those the State’s an exercise of to judges. Congress’ authority Section was and, enforce the of the Fourteenth Amendment provisions like unconstitutional Amendment, judicial the reached state action.21 Virginia parte Ex intent interpretation Congress’ not lost its with the Civil Acts has force enacting Rights supra, Foster, In Mitchum
the of time. the passage § Court found 1983 to be an to the anti- explicit exception Virginia parte Ex injunction statute, for the citing propo- sition the to “very that was purpose interpose people, federal courts between States and the as guard- ians federal people’s rights protect people —to law, unconstitutional action under color state ‘whether that action be executive, judicial.’” S., or 407 U. legislative, at 242.
Much has changed since Civil Acts were Rights passed. It no longer proper to assume that a state court will not act to a federal prevent deprivation constitutional that a state judge will be implicated that remain deprivation. We steadfast our conclusion, nevertheless, Congress that intended 1983 to be an for federal independent protection and find rights nothing to to that intended suggest Congress insu- expand judicial common-law doctrine late state judges completely from federal review. collateral conclude
We bar judicial immunity prospec- is not a tive in her judicial acting officer
21The judge Court assumed performing a ministerial rather judicial conclude, however, than a function. It if the went on that even performing function, had been he would be liable under S., statute. 100 U. at 348-349. In so we no as concluding, express opinion capacity. *18 of the relief awarded in this case. injunctive
to the propriety of injunctive did not the award relief appeal Petitioner of Appeals The Court therefore had no op- her. against had an respondents adequate to consider whether portunity relief or rendering law, equitable inappropriate,22 at remedy Littleton, S., Virginia instance, provides, at 502. for U. O’Shea v. bail, denying requiring or excessive see appellate for review of orders bail corpus from and for state habeas relief unlaw Va. Code 19.2-124 1983). detention, (Supp. hand, § 8.01-654 On the other ful see Va. Code pretrial by imposed peti of the detention the nature and short duration may impossible respondents it have for to avail tioner was such that been Pugh, of these remedies. Gerstein v. 420 U. themselves Cf. S. n. 11 effect,” showing post, no to this fact that has been “[t]here 13, hardly rejecting the relief awarded here for n. is a sufficient basis for questioning equitable on in cur- the effectiveness the limitations relief tailing risk for such relief. the dissent- of harassment suits What ignore petitioner challenge not ers is that did the relief awarded showing” respondents “There has been no because never have been her. showing. on to make such a called reasons,
For there is no merit to the dissenters’ insistence that similar judi- scope injunctive illustrates the order entered here threat injunctive against judges. independence allowing cial inherent relief post, place, interpretation In at 554-555. the first the dissenters’ compelled by language of the District Court’s order is no means that pretrial de- merely order. The order declared the constitutional limits dangerousness. suggestion tention for There no before the District was petitioner misapplied provision pretrial Court that had detention dangerousness. enjoined only from the Accordingly, petitioner County, Virginia, “practice Culpeper and course of under which conduct persons prior jail is are confined to trial on offenses for which no time solely they Cert. App. authorized because cannot meet bond.” to Pet. for judgment following are required 11. No calls the court’s order petitioner longer impose no bond for offenses for which no incarceration scope important, authorized statute. More to the extent that the unclear, may raised District Court’s order that issue should have been injunctive relief, where, by appeal petitioner from the had demonstrated intrusive, injunctive against her the Court that the relief ordered was too its no to tailor Appeals doubt would have ordered the District Court Littleton, narrowly. supra. relief more See O’Shea v. narrowly the order itself should have been
whether more record us tailored. On the before and without the benefit of Appeals’ unwilling specu- assessment, we are the Court possibilities. proceed, about these therefore, late We to the judicial immunity question whether bars an award of attor- ney’s obtaining §1988, under fees, one who succeeds officer.
y judicial immunity Petitioner insists bars a fee award attorney’s equivalent because tary damages fees are functional of mone- *19 monetary damages indisputably pro- are immunity. by judicial chilling She hibited reasons that damages chilling no effect of a award is less when the award attorney’s is denominated fees. logic perhaps, petitioner’s reasoning. some is,
There Congress, The in it that it is for Court, weakness not this abrogate to determine whether and to what extent to judiciary’s immunity. Ray, common-law See Pierson v. 386 § Congress 554. S.,U. at has made clear in 1988its intent attorney’s any that fees be available action to enforce a provision Finney, of 1983. Hutto See also 437 S.U. (1978). legislative history 694 The of the statute confirms Congress’ attorney’s intent that an fee award be available damages “immunity even when would be barred or limited special only public doctrines and offi- defenses, available (1976).23 Rep. p. cials.” H. R. 94-1558, No. See also Congress’ As further indication of apply intent that Ray, contains a citation to Pierson officers, Report the House citation to Pierson suggests Petitioner refers that to an decision, aspect regarding qualified other immunities of officials adopt interpre the Executive Branch. We see no need to such a strained Report clearly public against tation. The House referred to officials whom precluded, damages damages were as well as those lim whom were Pierson involved Report, only ited. Of the three cases cited House damages complete preclusion of a award. Virginia Supreme Union Consumers United Court of (“The Inc., S., 738-739 House States, U. Committee Congress permit Report 1988] [§ intended to indicates prospective attorney’s in cases which fees awards properly defendants who would be awarded awards”). damages immune from hardly plain.
Congress’ im- could be more Judicial intent attorney’s munity fees under bar to the award is no §C. 1988. U. S. Appeals, allowing judgment of the award
The the Court attorney’s against petitioner, is therefore fees affirmed.
It is so ordered. Powell, Justice, Justice with whom Chief Jus- Justice O’Connor Rehnquist, join, tice dissenting. today rule reaffirms the are immune The Court damages, they may from suits for but holds that be sued for declaratory personally injunctive and relief and held liable for attorney’s money judgments in of costs and fees the form merely basis of erroneous decisions. on the support finds no in common basis for the Court’s distinction *20 immunity judicial and in effect eviscerates the doctrine of law long accepted that the common law so has as absolute. recognizes judi- principle that The Court the established immunity against cial serves as the bulwark threats to “inde- judicial pendent decisionmaking,” ante, Yet, at 531. at immunity judicial time it bar same concludes does not injunctive declaratory suits for or relief with the attendant attorney’s for claims costs and reasons that fees. Court part, against “[f]or the most a raises by protection from concerns different those addressed damages judges Ante, from illus- awards.” at 537. This case reasoning. trates the unsoundness of that affirms The Court Magis- money judgment against $7,691.09 a a state awarded judicial trate the determination that she made erroneous respect pretrial decisions with to detentions. Such bail
545 independent the same threat deci- judgment poses $7,691.09 or sionmaking “damages” whether it be labeled Moreover, in that amount. as was held “attorney’s fees” and a half an “action before one for what century ago, Judge . . . done another... case by independence [is a] Downes, v. footnote in Judges.” reprinted Taaffe (a) (P. Halket, Calder v. 1840). n. 12, 18, C. Eng. Rep. a suit burdens defend such are identical having for or damages character and whether suit be degree, relief. The of the Court prospective holding today subordi- nates realities to labels. The rationale of the common-law cases refutes the distinction drawn the Court. immunity
I
Since
this Court
has held that
consistently
are
g.,
e.
Ray,
from
immune
civil suits
absolutely
damages.
See,
Stump
Sparkman,
Pierson v.
v.
(1978);
U. S.
Bradley
Fisher,
(1967);
scope determine the common law to therefore, have looked to We, A be available. review immunity when should absolute less nothing suggests the law reveals common —much today draws between distinction the Court requires —the (with liability relief the attendant suits for prospective fees) suits for attorney’s damages. and costs is one the earliest The doctrine judicial It was established common law.4 products English continual collateral finality the protect judgments and to jurisdiction5 protect in courts of competing attack the prosecution not with held that lower lees had been threatened against judicial jurisdiction. The suit officials court had lacked Art. Ill Littleton, (1974), O’Shea 488 was dismissed on the same U. S. Pugh, Although the lower court in Gerstein ground. U. S. 103 against judicial officers, only had ordered the state prosecutor sought Thus, propriety the did not consider the review. judicial of the relief awarded officers. Ray, Pierson 554-555 See Union, “[tjhere supra, Consumers In the Court observed that history . . legislative suggest is no. indication in the of the Act to that Con gress permit attorney’s premised intended to an award of fees to be on acts enjoy legislative immunity.” for which would defendants absolute Simi larly, legislative history suggest there is no indication in the of the Act to Congress scope immunity. intended to diminish (1327- recognized early reign doctrine was as as the III Edward 1377). (2d Holdsworth, History English 6 W. A Law 234-235 ed. 1937). 5During early period, ap medieval there thing was no such as an peal Judges from court to court. attacking were not immune from suits judicial acts, procedure their common challenging ruling complaint was to file a judgment" against judge. of “false Holdsworth, (7th History 1956); A English W. Law 213-214 ed. Holdsworth, time, King’s at 235. At this Bench the central court, jurisdiction common-law and it vied for with the local feudal courts protect and the ecclesiastical finality courts. To and authoritativeness courts, of its decisions from competing King’s collateral attack in these Bench appellate procedure borrowed the idea of from the ecclesiastical *22 from intimidation
judicial decisionmaking and outside inter- ference.6 the Gradually, protection judicial independence objective. became its source of intimi- primary specific dation the articulated common-law cases was the English threat of vexatious litigation should judges required defend their acts in collateral civil In judicial proceedings. Downes, (a), supra, at n. the justices observed: Taaffe “If . . you subject once break down the barrier. [judges] to an let the action, you upon judicial authority wide, . . ..” The common-law wasting, harassing persecution on judicial cases made no reference to the effect independ- ence of remedies such as an award of particular damages. early of this Court echo the opinions principal justifica- tion for the doctrine articulated at common English Fisher, Bradley law. In the supra, emphasis was the Pound, Appellate courts. R. Procedure Civil Cases 25-26 To procedure, necessary judicial ensure this it was to immunize the acts judicial common-law collateral attack —hence the doctrine immunity. judge prevailing party original Because the rather than the to the suit complaint became the named defendant in a imprisonment, false it was judge who suffered the litigation consequences burdens of any judgment. The litigation adverse burdens of In could be substantial. days, early judge expense, required, the defendant was at his own prepare setting proceedings upon challenged a record forth the which his judicial bring decisions were made and to send four suitors of the court to King’s Id., the record judgment before Bench. at 26. If the was false, found to be Holdsworth, amerced fined. at 235. recognized The common personal law that the litigation threat of would jeopardize independence decisionmaking: judges, to avoid being called before a acts, hostile tribunal to account for their could by personal be deterred judging dispassionately considerations from merits of Downes, the cases before them. Eng. Rep., Taaffe (“A (a) Judge ought n. . . . any personal be uninfluenced consid operating eration upon mind, whatsoever hearing his he when a discus concerning rights sion of contending parties; otherwise, instead hearing them abstractedly, portion a considerable of his attention must be himself”). devolved to *23 litigation. harassing The Court and vexatious burden observed: compelled judge to answer in a civil
“If... could be subjected judicial he would be for acts,... necessity action for his preserving complete protection to the his every produced him in evidence before of all the record litigated arguments cited and case, and of authorities might presented, he able in order that to show the might by losing judge he be summoned before whom party he did with that he had decided as . . . subjected integrity; would be the second might he in his turn be held burden, as also a similar by losing party.” Id., at 349. amenable Addressing judicial independence, the need for the Court therefore concluded: public deeply judi- th[e] [of
“‘The are interested in rule immunity], . which . . established in cial order judges, independence prevent secure them Ibid, being (quoting harassed vexatious actions.’” Fray Eng. Rep. Blackburn, 3 B. 576, 578, & S. (1863)). justification immunity emphasized for the doctrine Bradley repeated subsequent has been decisions this g., Ray, Court. See, e. Pierson v. 386 U. Butz v. S., 554; Economou, In these cases as litigation, pecu- well, the burdens of rather than the threat niary posing judicial independ- loss, are cited as a threat to occasioning immunity. ence and apply equally the need for These burdens against judges allegedly
to all suits errone- or ous maliciousconduct. It is immaterial whether sought injunction damages is an as in case, this or as in Ray Stump Sparkman. Pierson Indeed, the Court today, largely ignoring litigation it that was the burden of immunity, argu- that motivated the common-law makes no contrary. Bradley ment to Unless the rationale of cases rejected, immunity the common-law relief must be suits coextensive against judges damages. from suits for with
I—I A nevertheless the common argues The Court law *24 can be viewed as absence of immu- England supporting the the for The injunctive where suit is relief. Court con- nity that suits cedes, must, injunctive as it for relief at English could not be maintained either common law Ante, or in the courts of at 529. Injunctive English equity. at common law was avail- inequitable proceedings relief trial; or, verdict, able in “to after equity stay [a common-law] or, after to stay judgment, stay execution.” judgment; (11th 1873). ¶ Story, J. ed. Equity Jurisprudence p. But relief was available only against parties such to the Id., common-law and not proceedings judge. 72. The ¶875, at suit relief at issue here is injunctive precisely the of suit that the Court concedes could not type have been either maintained at common law or equity. however, reasons that of Court, writs prohibition and mandamus a “common-law to the present parallel here.” Ante, issue at 529. injunction writs of prerogative mandamus and are prohibition not to suits simply analogous relief from the injunctive of common-law judgments courts, and the of availability these judicial writs against officials has to do with nothing It has judicial immunity. been at common long recognized law that judicial immunity protects only those acts committed within the of proper scope a judge’s jurisdiction, but provides no for acts protection committed excess of jurisdiction.7 Holdsworth, supra n. at 236-237: Marshalsea, The Case “[I]n ‘a difference was when a court has taken of jurisdiction cause, proceeds erroneously, . . . there no ac- ... [against judge]. jurisdiction tion lies . . . But when the not court has prohibition were intended and mandamus Because writs only jurisdiction,8 they posed proper exercise to control implicated judicial independence none of the no threat immunity. judges England’s judicial policies Thus, subject to suit for writs mandamus were inferior courts immunity prohibition, all suits attack- barred but proper scope ing judicial of their made within decisions peti- allegation jurisdiction.9 is this case that There no jurisdiction. her The suit for tioner exceeded solely appli- construction and on an erroneous based precisely litigation kind of this cation of law. It is intended common-law doctrine prohibit.
B prerogative may writs have The Court’s observation judg- English to correct errors of been used at common law jurisdiction excesses is irrelevant to the ment rather than “rely practice shap- case at bar. on the common-law We *25 ing judicial immunity,” only ante, our 536, own doctrine at practices the to the extent that common-law consulted are judicial systems. our own consistent with Court’s reli- English ignores practice ance on common-law this constraint. rivalry English temporal spiritual It the between the King’s myth adopt courts that induced the Bench to the cause, judice, the is coram non proceeding then the whole actions ” Marshalsea, [against judge] the lie’ Case the (quoting Rep. will 10 Co. 68b, (K. 1613)). 76a, 1027, Eng. Rep. 77 1038 B. Fisher, Bradley (1872). See also 13 335, v. Wall. 351-353 8 Holdsworth, supra 5, 1 See n. at 228-229. 9Holdsworth observed: “ agreed is ‘[I]t that the king's superior courts are not liable to personally answer for their judgment. special errors in . . . courts of [I]n jurisdiction and limited a made, acting ... distinction must while but authority they within the line of protected their are judg- as to errors ment; they Holdsworth, supra, protected.’” 239, otherwise are not Seare, Miller v. (quoting n. 4 1141, 1145, Eng. Rep. 673, 2 Bl. W. (K. 1777)). 674-675 B. common of substantive law affects the court’s
misapplication out, the Court points As jurisdiction.10 relationship Bench and its rival ecclesiastical King’s between courts Ante, in our judicial system. finds no at 535. There parallel no indication the courts of this ever resorted country the fictional use of writs found at prerogative com- English law. To the our courts contrary, expressly mon have re- the fiction and have limited the use of mandamus jected to jurisdictional issues or to cases where the prohibition court Roche Milk Evaporated duty has clear act. Assn., (1943). See also Bankers &Life 21, 319 U. S. Holland, Co. Casualty (1953); Will U. S. 382-383 States, United 103-104 Nor is there indication that the use of any expansive pre- writs modified the doctrine of rogative England in this Indeed, country.11 use of the sparing example, Gordon, 10 For the Court cites The Observance Law as Jurisdiction, Q. L. provides: Condition of Rev. which misapply apply “The idea that to or fail to . substantive . . law affects a jurisdiction, tribunal’s province, even when it acts within its is now generally recognized wrong. upon as That there was at one time doubt point hostility was due to the former . King’s Bench toward . . Although King’s ecclesiastical Courts. it Bench admitted could Courts, course, could, not redress mere error in such it restrain their jurisdiction through prohibition. excesses of the writ of And under the pretext merely keeping jurisdiction, that it was them within their it issued prohibitions any to these they applied Courts whenever stat- or construed (Footnotes omitted.) way King’s ute in a Bench approve did not of.” Blackstone, *115;Dobbs, See also 3 W. Commentaries The Decline *26 *113— (1961). By Consent, 49, Jurisdiction 40 N. C. L. Rev. 60-61 11 early Fisher, Bradley the As as decision in v. a clear this Court drew judicial judge’s distinction between erroneous acts committed within jurisdiction, immunity, for which there committed and acts absolute jurisdiction, Wall., in excess of 351-353. which there was none. 13 at distinction, coupled principle This with the that writs of mandamus prohibition only jurisdictional errors, hardly could issue to correct clear suggests easy availability prerogative against England’s that the of writs scope judicial immunity country. ecclesiastical courts limited the in this jurispru- in American prohibition mandamus writs part by large the concern for in motivated has been dence counseling in the independence. restraint judicial Cases repeatedly prerogative that such have observed writs use consequence” “plac[ing] trial “the unfortunate have writs being litigants position judges without in the anomalous uncompensated Buy La volunteers.” other than counsel (1957). Kerr Co., 249, U. See also Leather S. Howes (1976); Court, District 426 U. S. States United Casualty supra, parte Co., Ex 384-385; Bankers &Life response Fahey, In 259-260 to this S. 332 U. Appellate pro- Procedure have Rules of the Federal concern, judge respondent proceeding in a for manda- the vided that may appear proceeding prohibition elect not to the mus or petition. conceding the issues raised the Fed. without 21(b).12 Finally, consistently App. courts have Rule Proc. any judicial independence require that concerns for held prevailing party costs to a in an action for manda- award of prohibition only against party mus or be made the at interest judge. and not the Court of United States Appeals explained: for the First Circuit contrary protect-
“It would be to the fundamental rules ing freedom action to tax costs judge any one of the constitutional courts any apprehend United States reason of failure to 21(b) provides Rule part: relevant judge “If respondents named appear do not desire to proceeding, they may by letter, so advise the clerk parties and all but the petition thereby shall not be taken as admitted.” Indeed, Appeals Court of for the District of not Columbia Circuit has required even judge joined States party. United as a In King, App. 179, 183, D. C. 2d the court F. “In courts, reasoned: the federal when purpose is to se- mandamus ruling cure a on the intrinsic act, merits of a not— need desirably only should not —be named as an party, active but at most as party a nominal with no real interest in the outcome.” *27 In re Haight Co., & Freese
law
correctly.”
In sum, the to the perceived analogy use of prerogative writs at common law does English simply not withstand anal- ysis. above, As shown rests on a analogy peculiar prac- tice at law that English common was occasioned by the unique relationship King’s between Bench and England’s ecclesi- astical courts. That finds no relationship this parallel Moreover, our country. courts, and the Federal Rules Procedure, have to limit Appellate sought the use of manda- mus and for the very purpose prohibition protecting judi- cial It is immunity. extraordinary, therefore, the use of today rely prerogative should writs England justify officials this to harass- exposing country ing litigation subj and to ect them to personal liability money in the form of costs and judgments attorney’s fees.
I I I The Court that the suggests availability injunctive relief under no serious “risk that will be ha poses rassed and their independence threat compromised to defend liti having by disgruntled themselves suits Ante, this gants.” at 537-538. The reasons advanced for are that will be unless optimism equitable relief unavailable . can and . . plaintiff show “an at law inadequate remedy Ibid. a serious risk this suit irreparable Again, harm.” ex refutes the were Court’s remedies argument. Adequate law.13 available to each of the under state pressly respondents respondents says may impossible The Court that “it have been Ante, provided Virginia law. avail themselves” other remedies however, for al Virginia law, provides specific n. 22. remedies two 1983) provides leged Virginia (Supp. unlawful detention. Code 8.01-654 by any circuit corpus granted that a “writ of habeas . . . shall be forthwith *28 irreparable showing any harm this case there Nor was injunctive petitioner Nevertheless, relief. in the absence litigation, making the burdens of extended to bear was forced judicial immunity.14 clear the need for absolute English common-lawcases and the discussed, As both identify harassing the burdens this Court decisions of pecuniary litigation, loss, as threat- the threat rather than injunctive independence. ening judicial In suits for relief, likely damages, just scenario was well in suits for as justices by Downes: stated one Taaffe immunity, judges] judicial “[Without doctrine of every species to other of correction become amenable the bar—the next One hour at at the a Court.... They or some other Court. would of the same bench, busy harassing getting time, from one station have a Judge to the accused—from the the other—from the to (a). Eng. Rep., corrected.” 13 at n. corrector to the litigation, ever-present The threat burdensome made re- by today’s may decision, well influence deter- alistic particularly in minations, likely close cases the decision is where unpopular. to be any person probable court” to who shows there he is is cause to believe added).
being unlawfully (emphasis Moreover, Virginia detained Code (1983) provides specific procedure appealing 19.2-124 a for unreasonable “successively higher bail determinations up to the next court ... including Supreme Virginia.” suggests Court of pretrial here, may view of the short duration detention these remedies not have showing been available. There has been to this effect. In no any event, Stump Sparkman, judi- 435 U. indicates that S. depend cial does not upon availability of other remedies. 14Responding dissent, to this there no Court states that has been showing unavailability petitioner of alternative remedies because never Ante, challenged injunctive relief point, awarded. n. 22. however, injunctive this suit for proceed relief was allowed showing, official finding without the District Court, that unavailable, alternative remedies were or that there would be irreparable harm. injunctive may pose greater
Suits for even threats to judicial independence they injunction if are successful and an specter contempt proceedings alleged is ordered. The likely orders is violations of inhibit unbiased judicial decisionmaking liability as much as the threat of *29 Again, damages. point. suit a this is case The enjoined of order entered here was unlimited duration and petitioner authorizing pretrial any per- from detention of charged son with a class of misdemeanor, certain unless that likely person “lawfully danger deemed to be a to himself “only long danger persists.” or to and so as such others,” App. particular “likely 22. Whether a defendant is abe danger “long [that danger or to to himself others” and how questions normally necessarily will] last” are left to the presiding judge. contempt— The discretion of threat of possibility imprisonment a or with the fine even —could courageous judge exercising well deter even the most from independently this discretion from and free intimidation.16 Finally, harassing litigation potential and its for intimida- prevailing plaintiff tion increases in suits where the is enti- attorney’s Perhaps tled to fees. reasons, for understandable passes § opinion lightly the Court’s over the effect of 1988. provision major In fact, that has become a additional source litigation. Since its enactment in suits state judgment following required “[n]o Court states that calls are [injunctive] petitioner longer impose court’s order that no bond for offenses Ante, 542, n. by for which no incarceration is 22. authorized statute.” (now under Virginia repealed) statement This inaccurate. statute permitted jail respondents’ which was set time for nonincarcerable bail danger magistrate posed a offenses if the determined that the arrestee course, dangerousness, to himself to others. The determination of “judgment by petitioner requires By enjoining call” official. charged authorizing pretrial with nonin- detention for arrestees bond,” “solely they the District carcerable offenses because cannot meet pro contempt “judgment Court’s order threatened mistaken calls” with ceedings. Injunctive judicial officer’s discretion relief often will limit a increasing contempt. risk increased Con- geometrically.16 § 1983 have under
officials of facilitating § for the specific purpose enacted gress means to obtain counsel to limited citizens encouraging §§ 1983 and 1988 are available But § 1983 remedies. pursue of a ability plaintiff engage the financial regardless awards,17 fee now The lure substantial counsel. private §1983 assures plaintiffs, made to routinely prevailing to recommend and these press not be reluctant will lawyers when it reality suggests again ignores The Court suits.18 litigation of the total civil rights accounted 8.3% cases Civil 30, 1982, for the 12 months ended June District Courts the Federal prisoners rights filed state state officials had 1982 civil suits similar suits filed in over the number of 1977 before increased 115.6% an added incentive to 1983 fee award under became prospect Report of the Director of Administrative Office of claims. Annual *30 (1982). 100-103 United States Courts precipitous §1988 increased with the 17 Recentfee awards under have Stenson, (1984), In Blum v. 465 886 for hourly rise in rates. U. S. exam third-year hourly were ple, rates of for second- and associates $95 $105 Indeed, “prevailing community. large in found to be the rates” fee See, recently judges. awards have been awarded state-court 1983) (fees (WD $17,412 g., Ayoob, e. Morrison v. No. 78-267 Pa. and $5,075 injunctive in for awarded state-court suit and de relief), aff’d, (CA3), denied, claratory rehearing 727 F. 2d 2d 728 F. denied, post, p. cert. 973. 18 Nor, illustrates, litigation necessarily as this case do the burdens of end approves when a district court a fee as The Court’s decision reasonable. likely request makes it that a for an additional fee will for be made services Appeals request rendered in the Court of and this Court. Such could ongoing litigation. disputes result in Regrettably, over the reasonable §of major litiga ness 1988fee awards often become the in the entire issue attorney’s tion. This is demonstrated the fact that two fees cases have litigated Eckerkart, Hensley been this Court successive Terms. (1983); Stenson, 461 U. Copeland S. Blum v. supra. See also Marshall, (1980) (en App. banc); D. F. C. 2d 880 National Assn. Secretary Defense, Concerned Veterans 219 U. S. App. Moreover, D. petitions C. F. 2d 1319 work fee may compensated higher hourly See, rates than work on the merits. g., Ayoob, e. Morrison v. supra (hourly rates of and awarded to $40 $75 legal initially prosecuted services firm claim; § the 1983 fees of $45 private prepare petition). awarded firm hired to litigate $110 the fee availability relief under 1983, that the com- attorney’s prospect poses bined fees under 1988, with the harassing litigation potentially no threat of with its serious judicial independence. consequences adverse
> why principled judicial immunity In reason sum, I see no damages prospective injunc- should but not for bar suits providing pro- The fundamental rationale for this tive relief. English tection to the office—articulated cases applies repeated equally in decisions of this Court— types underlying principle, both of asserted relief. The vital law, to the rule of assurance detachment and independence. today is the Nor Court’s decision public broader interest that the doctrine of absolute immu- Bradley, nity serve. is intended to at 349. Wall.,