Steve Braden v. United States, 817 F.3d 926

In 2009 Steve Allen Braden was convicted of drug and firearms offenses and sentenced; the district court classified him as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) based on prior convictions. He received concurrent 40-year terms and a consecutive 5-year term.
In 2011 Braden filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition raising multiple claims (ineffective assistance, illegal search, jury issues, etc.). The district court appointed counsel and authorized counsel to file an amended motion if necessary.
Appointed counsel filed an amended § 2255 motion that added claims and stated it was intended to supplement (not supersede) the pro se petition.
The district court treated the amended petition as superseding the pro se petition, deemed pro se claims waived unless adopted with briefing, and denied relief on the claims raised by counsel; it later denied a Rule 59(e) motion.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit held that the amended petition did not supersede the pro se petition (counsel expressly intended to supplement and the amended filing referenced the pro se filing) and thus vacated the dismissal of the pro se claims and remanded for consideration.
The court also addressed—based on an expanded certificate of appealability—whether Braden’s Tennessee aggravated-assault convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies after Johnson v. United States; it concluded they qualify under the ACCA force clause and affirmed his ACCA classification.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by treating the appointed-counsel amended § 2255 petition as superseding Braden’s pro se petition	Braden: amended petition was intended to supplement pro se filing; pro se claims remain pending and must be considered	Gov't: district court in substance considered pro se claims; supersession was proper as amended pleadings generally supersede originals	Court: reversed — amended petition did not supersede because it expressly adopted and supplemented the pro se petition; remand for district court to consider pro se claims
Whether Braden still qualifies as an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA after Johnson v. United States	Braden: two prior Tennessee aggravated-assault convictions may have been treated under the ACCA residual clause, which Johnson invalidated	Gov't: Shepard documents show convictions rested on assault with a deadly weapon, invoking the ACCA force clause (not the residual clause)	Court: affirmed — Shepard documents show convictions under Tenn. Code §39-13-102(a)(1)(B) (use/display of deadly weapon); these are violent felonies under the ACCA force clause, so Johnson does not change his ACCA status

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (limited set of documents may be consulted to identify basis of prior conviction)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
United States v. Elliott, 757 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2014) (structure of ACCA violent-felony definitions and force/residual distinctions)
United States v. Cooper, 739 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. 2014) (Tenn. § 39-13-102 is divisible for categorical analysis)
Shreve v. Franklin Cty., Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 2014) (amended pleading supersession principles)
In re Watkins, 810 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2015) (Johnson announces a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)