State v. Worsley
293 Ga. 315
| Ga. | 2013Background
- In 1995 Johnnie Worsley killed his wife, Flora Worsley, and his 17‑year‑old stepdaughter, Yameika Bell; he confessed and was convicted of two murders and a rape in 1998 and sentenced to death for each murder.
- At trial Worsley pled guilty but mentally ill; the defense presented expert testimony (Dr. Daniel Grant) about Worsley’s long‑term dysthymia, borderline cognitive functioning (IQ ~78), memory deficits, substance exposure, head injuries, and other mitigating factors.
- At the guilt phase the defense emphasized mental impairment; at sentencing defense presented only a jailer’s testimony as live mitigating evidence and relied in argument on earlier mental‑health evidence and military service.
- More than a decade later the trial court granted a new sentencing trial, finding ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing for (1) failing to present family mitigation witnesses and (2) failing to object to improper victim‑impact testimony.
- The State appealed; the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the grant of a new sentencing trial, holding counsel’s tactical decision not to call family witnesses was reasonable and the failure to object to limited victim‑impact remarks was not prejudicial under Strickland.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Worsley) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Failure to present family mitigation witnesses at sentencing | Counsel failed to call sisters and other relatives who would have testified about upbringing, Army service, work ethic, and pleas for mercy; this deficient performance prejudiced sentencing | Counsel reasonably declined to call family because their testimony conflicted with expert mitigation, was vague, contradicted one another, risked damaging cross‑examination (e.g., brother in prison), and added little beyond Dr. Grant | Court: No ineffective assistance — counsel’s strategic choice was reasonable and record does not show deficient performance or prejudice |
| 2) Inadequate investigation of mitigation witnesses | Counsel did not sufficiently investigate (no in‑person visits, failure to contact teachers), so potential mitigation was unexplored | Counsel spoke with family, obtained school records and used expert; record does not show counsel lacked knowledge of available mitigation or that further investigation would have produced materially different evidence | Court: No ineffective assistance — no clear failure to investigate; presumption of reasonable judgment applies |
| 3) Failure to object to victim‑impact statements recommending death | Counsel should have objected to relatives’ statements urging a death sentence as improper victim‑impact evidence | Even if omission was unreasonable, the remarks were brief, non‑inflammatory, largely cumulative of other admissible victim‑impact, and the case against Worsley was strong | Court: No prejudice — omission not a Strickland‑level error; harmless and would not likely change outcome |
| 4) Overall application of Strickland prejudice standard to sentencing | Worsley: cumulative omissions deprived him of a reliable sentencing proceeding and warrant a new sentencing trial | State: Errors (if any) were not shown to create a reasonable probability of a different sentence given brutality of crimes and substantial mitigating evidence already before jury | Court: Applied Strickland; found no reasonable probability sentencing would have differed, reversed new‑trial order and reinstated death sentences |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes deficient performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (counsel performance judged by prevailing professional norms)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (counsel’s duty to investigate mitigation and strategic‑decision deference)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (high deference to counsel; reasonable‑probability prejudice standard)
- Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (limitations on victim‑impact evidence in capital sentencing)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (overruled Booth on federal constitutional ban but relevant to victim‑impact analysis)
- Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. en banc) (presumption that counsel acted reasonably where record is silent)