State v. Williamson, 183 N.E.3d 660

Background

Antonio Williamson, a Summit County deputy, became a suspect in a 2017 Akron Police Department (APD) sexual‑assault investigation; APD asked the Sheriff’s Office to check whether Williamson had searched for the accuser in LEADS/OHLEG.
The Ohio Attorney General (AG) audited OHLEG and found numerous self‑searches by Williamson; the AG advised that the searches warranted investigation and instructed the Sheriff’s Office to present results to the county prosecutor.
The Sheriff’s Office conducted a criminal investigation (Detective Kline), shared findings with the AG and then the Summit County Prosecutor, and Williamson was indicted on ten counts for unauthorized OHLEG use (R.C. 2913.04(D)).
Williamson later obtained usage records showing several white deputies (G.P., A.B., W.W., C.P.) had performed similar database searches but had only administrative reviews and were not criminally prosecuted; he moved to dismiss the OHLEG counts for selective prosecution.
The trial court found selective prosecution (race‑based disparate treatment by the Sheriff’s Office) and dismissed the OHLEG counts; the State appealed.
The Ninth District reversed: it held the trial court’s key findings were unsupported or speculative, the procedural posture differed (Williamson faced a criminal investigation at AG direction), comparators were not similarly situated, and there was evidence of non‑discriminatory reasons (including a contemporaneous prosecution of a white deputy, B.T.). Case remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Williamson)	Held
Whether dismissal was proper for selective prosecution of OHLEG counts	Trial court erred; dismissal unwarranted because record does not prove selective prosecution	Williamson argued he was singled out for prosecution due to race because white deputies with similar accesses were not criminally prosecuted	Reversed: trial court erred; State met showing that selective‑prosecution burden was unmet by Williamson
Whether selective‑prosecution claim may target the Sheriff’s Office rather than the prosecutor	State argued selective‑prosecution claims must target prosecutorial decisions, not internal sheriff discretion	Williamson argued Sheriff’s Office selectively referred him for prosecution while protecting white deputies	Appellate court declined to decide this argument (State raised it first on appeal) because State did not preserve it below
Whether comparators (G.P., A.B., W.W., C.P.) were similarly situated	State: comparators differed in material respects (no AG‑directed criminal investigation; some searches had known law‑enforcement purposes)	Williamson: those deputies committed similar OHLEG/LEADS misuse but were shielded from prosecution due to race	Held: comparators not similarly situated; differences in procedural posture and known lawful purpose for searches were nondiscriminatory reasons
Whether record shows invidious/discriminatory intent by Sheriff or prosecutor	State: AG directed criminal investigation and referral; evidence shows nondiscriminatory reasons and at least one white deputy (B.T.) was prosecuted contemporaneously	Williamson: Sheriff intervened to protect white deputies; trial court properly inferred racial motive	Held: appellate court found the trial court’s inference of racial motive unsupported or speculative and failed to account for B.T. prosecution; no sufficient proof of intentional discrimination

Key Cases Cited

State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 (2003) (appellate review of mixed questions of law and fact on selective‑prosecution motions is analogous to suppression review)
State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180 (1998) (defendant bears heavy burden to make prima facie showing of selective prosecution: similarly situated plus invidious intent)
State v. Freeman, 20 Ohio St.3d 55 (1985) (differing treatment alone insufficient; must show discriminatory intent)
State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132 (1980) (selective enforcement not per se constitutional violation)
State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181 (2002) (selective‑prosecution doctrine rooted in equal‑protection principles)
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (selective‑prosecution standards and discrimination grounds)
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (selective prosecution and due process/equal protection principles)
Harsco Corp. v. Tracy, 86 Ohio St.3d 189 (1999) (definition of "similarly situated" — persons alike in all relevant aspects)
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992) (standard for comparing classes for equal protection)