State v. Quinn
95 N.E.3d 664
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Defendant James Quinn was convicted by a jury of multiple felonies (domestic violence, kidnapping, abduction, intimidation of a victim) after a two-day trial and sentenced to a total of 20 years' imprisonment.
- Quinn appealed, the Second District affirmed, he filed an application to reopen on ineffective assistance grounds focused on trial court rulings during voir dire; the court granted reopening and Quinn proceeded pro se.
- Quinn challenged two prospective jurors for cause during voir dire: (1) "the Locksmith" who said he tended to believe police testimony over lay witnesses because of long experience working with law enforcement; (2) a Clark County deputy who knew the prosecutors, the lead detective, and said he was "familiar with the defendant."
- The trial court overruled both challenges for cause; Quinn used peremptory strikes to remove both jurors and exhausted his peremptory challenges.
- Quinn argued on reopened appeal that the overruling of the two challenges forced him to exhaust peremptory strikes and therefore required reversal; he also alleged nondisclosure and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the deputy's involvement, but the court limited review to jury-selection errors.
- The majority held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenges for cause and affirmed; a concurring opinion found any juror bias harmless on the facts, and a dissent would have reversed as to both jurors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Quinn) | Defendant's Argument (State / Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a challenge for cause to the Locksmith juror who said he tended to believe police | Locksmith's statements showed an inability to be impartial and required excusal for cause; failure forced Quinn to expend a peremptory strike | Juror acknowledged presumption of innocence and burden of proof and did not say he could not be fair; trial court could credit his assurance of impartiality | Denial not an abuse of discretion; juror qualified to serve |
| Whether denial of a challenge for cause to a deputy sheriff juror who knew prosecutors and the defendant required reversal | Deputy's employment and familiarity with parties created bias and required excusal; nondisclosure by deputy or state is prosecutorial misconduct | On the record, deputy's answers raised only a possibility of bias; defense failed to question further to establish actual partiality; burden on movant to prove cause | Denial not an abuse of discretion because defendant did not elicit facts showing inability to be impartial |
| Whether error (if any) in overruling challenges was prejudicial because it forced exhaustion of peremptory strikes | Overruling forced Quinn to use peremptory strikes and thus prejudiced his rights to peremptories | Court will not reverse unless composition of jury panel may have been affected; judge's credibility calls entitled to deference | No reversible error: no showing that jury composition was affected or that challenge rulings were prejudicial |
Key Cases Cited
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1992) (right to impartial jury and voir dire standards)
- Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (U.S. 1980) (juror views that prevent performance justify exclusion)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (deference to trial court's juror-bias credibility determinations)
- Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (U.S. 1987) (prejudice analysis focuses on potential effect on jury composition)
- DePew v. State, 38 Ohio St.3d 275 (Ohio 1988) (appellate deference to trial judge on juror credibility)
- State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277 (Ohio 1988) (same principle regarding juror-bias review)
- State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118 (Ohio 2008) (no complaint when overruling challenge for cause does not force exhaustion of peremptories)
- Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161 (Ohio 1990) (challenge-for-cause rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83 (Ohio 1985) (definition of abuse of discretion)
