*1 ADAMS v. TEXAS No. Argued 79-5175. March June 25, 1980 Decided *2 Brennan, Court, White, J., opinion in which delivered J., Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, joined. Powell, JJ., Stewart, J., opinion, post, p. Burger, concurred concurring 51. C. filed a judgment, concurring in the Marshall, J., opinion filed an judgment. post, p. Behnquist, dissenting opinion, 52. J., post, p. filed 51. Bruder for petitioner. Melvyn the cause Carson argued George A. Stephen Cooper him on the brief were J. With Preston.
Douglas Becker, M. Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, Ted L. Hartley, Executive Assist ant Attorney General, and W. Barton Boling, Assistant Attor ney General.*
Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
This
presents
question
whether Texas con-
travened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as construed
applied
in Witherspoon
Illinois,
I Trials for capital offenses in Texas are conducted in a two- phase proceeding. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. Ann., (Vernon 37.071 Supp. 1979). In the first the phase, jury con- siders question the of the guilt defendant’s or innocence. If jury the finds the defendant guilty of capital a offense, trial court holds a separate sentencing proceeding at which a range wide of additional evidence mitigation in or aggravation is admissible. jury The is then required to answer the follow- ing questions based on evidence during adduced either phase of the trial:
“(1) whether the conduct of the that defendant caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and Greenberg, *Jack James M. III, Nabrit Berger, Joel John Boger, Charles and Anthony G. Amsterdam filed a brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Fund, Educational Inc., as amicus curiae urging reversal. the death expectation
with the reasonable result; or would another deceased defendant probability is a “(2) whether there con- would of violence commit criminal acts society; continuing threat stitute a conduct whether the evidence, “(3) if raised unreasonable killing deceased defendant deceased.” by the any, provocation, response to the (b). Art. 37.071 answer doubt a reasonable beyond jury
If the finds required is “Yes,” the court is questions of these to each answer finds that If the a death. impose sentence a sen- imposes court “No,” is questions three any of the (e). (c), Arts. imprisonment. of life tence capital with charged this case was petitioner exami- dire During voir officer.1 murdering peace offense prosecutor, jurors, prospective of individual nation to whether inquired as intensively judge, trial sometimes “murders (1) (a) (1974), whoever Ann. 19.03 Penal Code Tex. Under discharge of an lawful acting in the who is fireman officer or peace fireman” officer peace ais person knows duty who the official penalty for authorizes felony. Texas also aof guilty kidnaping, bur in the course committed murder other offenses: four remunera for arson; committed murder rape, or *4 forcible glary, robbery, a escape from attempting to escaping or while tion; committed murder inmate. by prison a employee prison of a institution; and murder penal 19.03. § jury’s discre- scheme, the punishment capital Texas the current Under authorizes 19.03, by which both sentencing § is limited tion over by Code Tex. crimes, and aggravated class of only a small penalty for a sen- mandates 1979), which Supp. (Vernon Ann., Art. 37.071 Proc. Crim. the statu- of to each “Yes” if, jury answers only if, but of tence to the response adopted in system was This questions. tory penalty v. Furman together with Texas, decided in Branch judgment Court’s giving the a statute down struck (1972), which S. Georgia, 408 U. not. The penalty or impose the death whether jury discretion absolute Jurek in punishment scheme capital Texas revised upheld the (1976). Texas, their attitudes about the death penalty permitted them to take the oath set forth in Tex. Penal Code §Ann. 12.31 (b) (1974). Section (b) provides 12.31 as follows:
“Prospective jurors shall be informed a sentence of imprisonment life or death is mandatory on conviction of felony. A prospective juror shall be disquali- fied serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue fact.” of Typically, the prospective juror was first advised that State was seeking the death penalty and asked to his state general views on the subject, which were explored sometimes in depth. considerable He was then informed detail special procedure used Texas capital cases, including in particular the fact that “Yes” answers the three punish- questions ment would automatically result the trial judge’s imposing the death sentence. Finally, he was asked whether he could state under oath, as required by § 12.31 (b), the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations any issue of On fact. the State’s submission and petitioner’s over objections, judge trial excused number prospective jurors who were unwilling or unable to take 12.31 oath. selected under procedure this peti- convicted the
tioner charged offense and answered the statutory questions affirmatively punishment at the thus phase, causing judge trial impose the death sentence required by (e). 37.071 Art. On appeal, petitioner argued pro- spective jurors had been excluded in violation of this Court’s decision in Illinois, supra. The Texas Court rejected Criminal Appeals the contention on the authority of its previous cases, which had “consistently held statutory for the scheme selection jurors in capital cases in. particular and in Texas, application of (b)] [§ to the *5 punishment issues, comports with the constitutional require-
43 We (1979). 728 717, 2d Witherspoon.” 577 W. of S. ments 990 444 certiorari, U. for of a petition writ granted following questions: (1979), limited to the Illinois, 391 Witherspoon of “(1) Is doctrine em- procedure bifurcated to applicable 510, U. S. so, If did (2) cases? capital Texas by ployed pro- case present service in jury exclusion (b) 12.31 § Code Penal to Texas jurors pursuant spective Illinois, supra?”2 the doctrine violate II A juries selecting for procedure Witherspoon involved state had sentencing jury did cases, where the capital should death whether the to complete discretion as may State held that context, In the Court this imposed. by a imposed a death sentence constitutionally execute not exami- during voir dire who revealed of all those culled jury were against scruples conscientious they had nation was The State punishment. capital opposed to otherwise rule of broad-based in such a interest no valid to have held no penalty, opposes the who man exclusion, since “[a] discretionary judg- make can it, who favors one less than he oath obey the thus can him . . . entrusted ment 519. at Illinois, S., Witherspoon v. juror.” as a takes seriously prejudiced was other hand, on the defendant, The to death him sentenced which practice. the State’s peti- which impartiality of that “woefully short fell id., 518. punishment, the issue entitled” tioner punishment, opposed who those excluding all By the Court panel of (1979), a Estelle, 2d 1297 F. Burns In Penal Tex. application of found Fifth Circuit for the Appeals Wither- violated of that facts (1974) Ann. Code rehearing en case for set the since Circuit has Fifth spoon. The en bane Janu argument on oral held court (1979). The 2d 598 F. banc. no decision. yet issued has 1980, but ary *6 State “crossed the line of neutrality” “produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man Id., to die.” at 520, 521. recognized that the might State well power have
to jurors exclude grounds on more narrowly drawn:
“[Njothing say we today .upon bears power of a State to a execute defendant sentenced to death a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact for excluded cause were those who made unmistakably (1) clear that they would automatically against vote imposition of capital punishment regard without any to evidence might be developed at the trial of the case before them, (2) or that their attitude toward prevent would them from making an impartial ” decision as to the guilt defendant’s Id., at 522-523, 21 (emphasis n. in original).
This statement seems clearly designed to accommodate State’s legitimate interest jurors obtaining who could fol- low their instructions obey their oaths. For example, juror a would no doubt violate his oath if he impar- were not tial question of guilt. Similarly, the Illinois law in effect at the time Witherspoon required decided the least consider the death penalty, although it accorded the jury absolute discretion as to whether not to impose it. A juror wholly unable even consider imposing the death penalty, no matter what given facts of a case, clearly be unable to follow the law of in assessing Illinois . punishment.
In Holman, Boulden v. 478, 483-484 we (1969), again emphasized the legitimate State’s interest obtaining jurors able to follow the law:
“[Ijt possible entirely person who has a ‘fixed opinion against’ or who does not ‘believe in’ capital pun- might ishment nevertheless perfectly juror as a able by existing abide law—to follow conscientiously in- fairly judge to consider structions of a trial case.” imposition particular in a death sentence we (1978), 595-596 Ohio, And Lockett v. 438 U. S. sev- challenge exclusion upheld against Witherspoon to the affirmatively jurors respond eral who were unable to *7 following question: and to well oath you you that could take an feel
“[D]o or is law, the truely try this case follow . and . . [sic] oath, an take strong you conviction so that cannot your capital regard in to possibility knowing that a exists punishment?” proposition general the
This line of cases establishes views on his based challenged for cause may juror not prevent those views capital punishment about unless as a duties his performance the substantially impair or his oath. with his instructions in juror accordance consider and decide jurors will may insist, however, State as the conscientiously apply law impartially the facts court. charged by the
B rule concluding. this difficulty in little We have Texas by employed procedure the bifurcated applies to stat- Illinois the differs procedure This cases.3 in three decided Witherspoon was at the time in effect ute punish- assessed jury Witherspoon (1) ways: principal whereas verdict, its itas rendered same time at the ment subsequent in a punishment considers jury Texas unfettered given jury was Witherspoon (2) the proceeding; not, whereas or sentence impose discretion applied (1976), Georgia, 429 U. S. Davis In simi penalty scheme a death arising under a case Witherspoon doctrine amicus system. Petitioner Texas the current respects to lar in some applicability conclusively establishes Davis suggest that however, foreclosed, question treat do not case. present We in that case. explicitly raised not the issue because discretion of a Texas jury circumscribed require- ment that it impartially answer the statutory questions; and (3) the Witherspoon jury directly imposed the death sentence, whereas juries Texas merely give answers to the statutory ques- tions, which in turn determine the pronounced sentence by the trial judge. Because of these differences, plays a some- what more limited role in Texas than it did in If Illinois. juror is to obey his oath and follow the law of Texas, he must be willing only not to accept certain circum- stances death is an acceptable penalty but also to answer the statutory questions without conscious distortion bias. The State does not violate the Witherspoon doctrine when it excludes prospective jurors who are unable or unwilling to address the penalty questions with degree this of impartiality. jurors
Nevertheless, in Texas must determine whether the presented evidence by the State convinces beyond them rea- *8 sonable doubt that each of the three questions put to them must be in answered the affirmative. In doing they so, must consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, whether appearing in the presented evidence at trial on guilt or innocence or during the sentencing proceedings. Jurors will characteristically know that affirmative answers questions will in result the automatic imposition of the death penalty, Hovila State, 532 S. 2d 293, (Tex. W. 294 Crim. App. 1975), and each jurors whose exclusion is challenged by petitioner was so informed. In essence, Texas juries must be allowed to consider “on the of all basis relevant evidence only not why a death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed.” Texas, Jurek 428 U. S. 262, (1976) 271 (opinion of Stewart, and Powell, JJ.). process This not is Stevens, an exact science, and the jurors under the Texas procedure bifurcated unavoidably exer- cise a range of judgment and discretion while true remaining to their instructions and their oaths.
With these mind, considerations in is apparent it that juror’s Texas views about the death penalty might influence exceed- without but his role performs he which in manner 2d, S. W. discretion,” “guided ing circumstances, he In such law. Texas him under permitted Exclu- Witherspoon. with consistently excluded be not could exam- must exclusions, other like (b), 12.31 § under sions light.4 this in ined
C may and Witherspoon that urges State The jurors excluding for bases independent and separate as coexist consistent is statute under exclusion that and in Texas construed as Amendments Fourteenth and Sixth with State’s is 48. It Respondent for Brief Witherspoon. were present jurors some even that position under' permitted that than broader grounds excluded under proper nevertheless exclusion Witherspoon, hold with the is consistent argument The State’s (b). § 12.31 Appeals Criminal Texas Court in the decisions ings Witherspoon relationship between considered have which unpersuasive. is is, itas such argument, The (b). 5 § 12.31 that peradventure beyond is clear it matter, initial As an any prospective challenging for ground not is Witherspoon sys Texas to the Witherspoon “applies” that concedes State Even proposi this suggests The State 36-48. Respondent Brief for tem. experience Texas agrees but “logic,” a matter questionable tion Witherspoon’s applicability. conclusively demonstrate case law consistently held has Appeals of Criminal Texas 2d State, 542 S. W. g., Woodkins E. State. well” is “alive *9 State, 556 Burns v. (1977); 960 S. denied, U. 431 (1976), cert. 855, 862 State, 556 v. Brock (1977); 935 U. S. denied, 434 275, cert. 270, 2d S. W. State, v. Whitmore (1977); 1002 U. S. denied, 434 312, 309, cert. 2d S. W. (1976). 889, 893 2d S. 570 W. denied, 431 (1976), cert. 664, 672 5 2d State, W. 542 S. v. g., Moore E. State, 556 Shippy v. 862; supra, State, at v. Woodkins (1977); 949 U. S. supra, State, v. Burns (1977); 935 denied, S. 434 U. 251, cert. 246, 2d S. W. denied, cert. (1977), 287, 297-298 2d State, W. S. 556 v. 275-276; Freeman at State, Hughes v. 313; State, supra, at Brock v. (1978); 1088 S. 434 U. Hughes v. (1978); 903 S. denied, U. 439 cert. 857, 859-861, 2d S. W. 562 48
juror. It is rather a limitation on the power State’s to ex clude: prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on “any broader basis” than inability to follow the law or abide their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out. With erspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. atS., 522, n. 21. point While this may seem too obvious to bear repetition, it is apparent from their frequent references Witherspoon ground as a for “dis qualifying” prospective jurors6 that the State, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, might have fallen into the error of assuming that Witherspoon and 12.31 (b) are both grounds for exclusion, so that there is no conflict if (b) § 12.31 excludes prospective jurors that Witherspoon does not.
Nor do we agree with the
argument
State’s
it
because
has a
origin
different
and purpose §
(b)
12.31
and will
cannot
not
lead to exclusions forbidden by Witherspoon. Unlike
grounds for exclusion having nothing to
do with
pun-
ishment, such
personal
bias, ill health, financial hardship,
or peremptory challenges, § 12.31 (b)
focuses the inquiry
directly on the prospective juror’s beliefs about
penalty, and hence clearly falls within the scope of the Wither-
spoon
doctrine.
State could, consistently with Wither-
spoon, use
§ 12.31
prospective
exclude
jurors whose
views on capital punishment are such as to make them unable
to follow the
law obey their oaths. But
use of §
State, 563
581,
S.
2dW.
(1978),
denied,
cert.
(1979) ;
Ill con- have we record, examination our own on Based exclude in this applied (b) was 12.31 cluded Wither- under impermissible grounds jurors prospective touchstone here, the employed As related cases. and spoon putative not whether (b) was § under inquiry answer instructions their follow would could jurors honestly they affirmative questions posited doubt. reasonable beyond it warranted evidence believed imposi- the fact whether touchstone Rather, automatically would follow death tion any effect have would questions to the answers affirmative test Such duties. of their performance jurors’ on the all would they who stated jurors exclude did, could, and who but penalty, possibility “affected” conse- lethal potentially only that meant apparently with deliberations their invest would decision their quences emo- them involve gravity seriousness greater *11 tionally.7 Others were excluded only because they were unable positively to state whether or not their deliberations would in any way be “affected.” But neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to or deny confirm any effect what- soever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of jurors to follow the court’s instructions obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the pen- death alty. grounds The for excluding jurors these were conse- quently insufficient under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend- ments. Nor in our view would the Constitution permit the exclusion of jurors from the penalty phase of a Texas murder trial they aver that they will honestly find the facts and answer the questions in the they affirmative if are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, but not otherwise, yet who frankly concede that the prospects of the death penalty may affect what their judgment honest of the facts will be or they what may deem to be a reasonable doubt. Such assessments and judgments by jurors are inherent the jury and to system, exclude jurors all who would be in slightest way affected by the prospect of the death penalty their views about such a penalty would be to deprive the defendant of the impartial jury to which he or she is entitled under the law. repeat
We State may bar from jury service those whose beliefs capital about punishment would lead them to ignore the law or violate their oaths. But in present Texas has applied § 12.31 (b) to jurors exclude only whose fault was to take responsibilities their special with seriousness or to acknowledge honestly that they might or might not 7 Prospective jurors Mahon, Jenson, and Ferguson fell category. into this As Jenson said point at one during his voir dire examination: “Well, I probably think it my [affect because deliberations] afterall you’re [sic], talking about a man’s life definitely here. You don’t want to take it lightly.” Tr. of Voir Dire 367. 8 Prospective jurors Coyle, White, McDonald, and Riddle were excluded ground. on this us that before record in the appear It does not
be affected. pun- to irrevocably opposed were so individuals these efforts legitimate the State’s frustrate ishment scheme. constitutionally valid its administer execute -State disentitles Constitution Accordingly, the such which by a imposed of death a sentence excluded. been jurors have prospective Appeals Criminal Texas judgment *12 im- the sustains that it extent the to reversed consequently penalty. the death position ordered. So judgment. the in concurs Justice Chief concurring. Brennan, Justice Mr. believe I continue Court’s.opinion, I the join Although contrary circumstances, in all is, penalty
that imposition against prohibition Amendment’s Eighth the S.U. 428 Georgia, v. Gregg punishments. unusual and cruel dissenting). J., (Brennan, (1976) 227 153, judgment. concurring in Marshall, Justice Mr. all under is, penalty death that believe I continue prohibited punishment unusual cruel circumstances, Georgia, v. Furman Amendments. Fourteenth Eighth ; concurring) J., (Marshall, (1972) 314-374 238, U. S. 408 J., (Marshall, (1976) 153, 231-241 S. 428 U. Georgia, Gregg v. 437-440 420, S.U. 446 Georgia, Godfrey dissenting); In addi judgment). in concurring J., (Marshall, (1980) veniremen exclusion with agree I tion, Illinois, this doctriné'.of violated case Court’s join however, I not, do (1968). 510 S.U. 391 imposed be ever may assumption Amendment Eighth command violating the without Cf. imposed. punishments” unusual "cruel no Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. (1980) J., (Marshall, concurring in judgment). I join in the judgment Court.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting. The Court today holds that, under Witherspoon Illinois, (1968), the State of Texas may not excuse from service on a jury considering a capital persons who are unwilling or unable to swear that the possibility that defendant will be executed will not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact. Thus, aat time when this Court should be re-examining the doctrinal underpinnings of Witherspoon in light of our intervening decisions capital cases, it in- stead expands precedent those underpinnings had remained wholly static and would benefit expansion of the holding. I myself find constrained to dissent. At the time Witherspoon was decided, like Illinois, many States, gave juries in capital complete cases and unbridled discretion in considering the death penalty. In the words of Witherspoon itself, “the *13 of State Illinois empowered the jury ... to ‘yes’ answer or ‘no’ to question the whether this defendant fit was to live.” 391 S.,U. n. 20. This feature of the capital-sentencing scheme under consideration in that case was perhaps the single most important factor in this Court’s ultimate decision:
“'[I]n Illinois ... the jury given broad discretion to decide whether or not death is “the proper penalty” in given a case, and juror’s a general views about capital punishment play an inevitable any role in such decision. “A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one .who it, favors can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State and can thus obey the oath he takes a juror. But a jury from which all such men have been excluded perform cannot the task de- manded of it. Guided by neither rule nor standard,
53 must that jury fit,’ a itas reject [sees] or select 'free to punish- capital imprisonment life between choose less—than nothing do must more —and little can do ment ultimate the community the of conscience the express (emphasis Id., at 519 death.” or life of question omitted). footnote original; excluding of constitutionality the about feels one However a such penalty death the about qualms with
persons the formed that conditions admit has to one jury, deci- recent Our exist. longer no for predicate little leave penalty the death constitutionality of on the sions recent less slightly only Court’s to this contrary that, doubt a (1971), 183 S.U. 402 California, v. McGautha decision capital impose whether decision leave not may State un- solely defendant particular a upon punishment 408 Georgia, v. Furman jury. See aof discretion trammeled (1976); 153 428 U. S. Georgia, v. Gregg (1972); S. 238 U. Texas, 428 Jurek (1976); 242 Florida, S. Proffitt (1976). Louisiana, U. (1976); Roberts U. S. imposition requires in Texas in force presently statute answers if the death affirmative: in the questions three that caused defendant conduct “(1) whether deliberately committed deceased expectation reasonable with result; would another deceased defendant probability is a there whether “(2) con- would of violence acts criminal commit society; threat .continuing stitute the conduct whether evidence, raised “(3) if *14 unreasonable deceased killing the the defendant the deceased.” by any, provocation, response (Vernon Art. Ann., Proc. Crim. Code Tex. 1979). Supp. If the jury answers any of these inquiries negative,
capital punishment cannot be imposed.
It is hard to imagine a system of capital sentencing leaves less discretion in the hands of the jury while at the same time allowing them to consider the particular circum- stances each case—that is, perform their assigned task at all. In upholding system this against constitutional chal- lenge in Jurek Texas, supra, the opinion announcing the judgment stressed that this procedure “guides and focuses the jury’s objective consideration of the particularized circum- stances of the individual offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death.” Id., at 274 (em- phasis added). Given this mandate to a jury in a capital case to answer certain specific questions on the basis of the evidence I submitted, see no reason why Texas should not be entitled to require each juror to swear that he or she will answer questions those without regard to possible their cumu- lative consequences.
In holding otherwise, the Court seems to recognize that the jury’s role in this case is fundamentally different from that considered in Witherspoon. It nevertheless dismisses this difference on the grounds that the sentencing process em- ployed by Texas “is not an exact science” and that “the jurors under the Texas procedure bifurcated unavoidably exercise a range of judgment and discretion while remaining true to their instructions and their Ante, oaths.” at 46. I would suggest that the Court’s observations in this regard are as true when applied to the initial determination of guilt as they are when applied to the sentencing proceeding. In either determination, juror is required to make “unscien- tific” determinations and to a good exercise deal of discretion within the bounds of his or her oath. In I can fact. see no plausible distinction between the role of in guilt/innoeence phase of role, the trial and its defined Texas, State of in the phase. sentencing No one would suggest, however, that jurors could not be excused for cause
55 capital punish- of possibility swear they if declined of the defendant’s determination not affect their ment would Illinois, S., at Witherspoon or Cf. guilt innocence. invalid holding render today’s (“Nor does 21 . 523, n. . . other any or sentence, in this conviction, opposed to as case”). pointed Black Justice Witherspoon, Mr.
In his dissent to an right has a defendant, much as as society, out that per- that, a also Id., He observed impartial jury. at 535. soft” “too being for a not be son could excluded basis without a court would then penalty, the death on “I wrote, heAs hard.” was “too excluding someone who for juror defendant on a criminal foisting of dream would not scruples religious he had conscientious who admitted con- any person inflicting sentence against not he example, for juror who (a claims, of murder victed for an eye of ‘an admonition literally to the Biblical adheres I cannot believe added). Id., (emphasis at 536 eye’).” who would juror of a excusal question would the Court To dis- for reasons. oath those same challenged not take the “such because here, Court as does the this possibility, miss only engage ante, 49, is not indeed,” be few jurors will point miss the but speculation, also unsupportable one is not question argument. Black’s Justice Mr. consistency. logical parity, but statistical read I not do Appeals, of Criminal Like the Texas constitutionality upon any doubt casting Ann. Penal Code required Tex. the oath Free- (1978); 581 State, 2d S. Hughes 563 W. See (1974). 556 State, Burns v. (1977); State, 2d S. 556 W. man v. 2dW. State, 542 S. (1977); Boulware W. 2d court judgment affirm I therefore (1976). below.