State v. Patterson, 2017 Ohio 8970

In August 2016 Chadwick Patterson met K.L. near a bus stop, led her into a park structure, and forced oral and vaginal sex; K.L. reported the attack and a rape kit produced mixed DNA consistent with Patterson.
Patterson was indicted for rape (R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) and/or (A)(2)) and two kidnapping counts, with repeat-violent-offender and sexually-violent-predator specifications; jury convicted on all counts and court imposed an aggregate 41-year sentence.
The State sought to admit evidence of a 2007 sexual-assault conviction involving a different victim (S.F.) as other-acts/modus operandi evidence; the trial court allowed testimony about the 2007 incident with limiting instructions.
Patterson's defense was consent; the case turned largely on credibility and whether K.L. was substantially impaired by mental condition.
The Fifth District majority found the 2007 evidence was not a proper modus operandi link, prejudicial under Evid. R. 404(B)/R.C. 2945.59 and Williams, and held its admission was an abuse of discretion; conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial. Judge Delaney dissented.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of 2007 sexual-assault evidence (other acts)	Evidence shows a scheme/plan/modus operandi that bears a "behavioral fingerprint" and is relevant to consent and identity	Prior act was different in key respects and was offered to show propensity; admission unfairly prejudiced jury on consent	Exclusion should have been ordered: trial court abused discretion; admission prejudicial and outweighed probative value (reversal/remand)
Sufficiency of evidence of rape (substantial impairment & force)	State: testimony from K.L., SANE, and officers, plus jailhouse statement, supported that K.L. was substantially impaired and was compelled by force/threat	Patterson: K.L. was not substantially impaired, encounter was consensual	Court: sufficient evidence to support convictions; sufficiency claim overruled (but remand ordered due to other-acts error)
Merger of counts for sentencing	State: counts reflect distinct conduct	Patterson: counts should merge where based on same conduct	Court merged rape with one kidnapping count but treated other kidnapping as separate; sentencing not disturbed on appeal (issue rendered moot by remand)
Admission of ankle-monitor evidence	State: monitor evidence helped locate suspect	Patterson: monitor/PRC status prejudicial	Court declined to address ankle-monitor claim on appeal (insufficiently argued)

State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521 (Ohio 2012) (three-part test for admissibility of other-acts evidence and guidance when prior acts show motive, plan, or grooming)
State v. Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277 (Ohio 1988) (Evid.R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 construed strictly; standard for other-acts admissibility is strict)
State v. Lowe, 69 Ohio St.3d 527 (Ohio 1994) (modus operandi as behavioral fingerprint limited to identity proof)
State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337 (Ohio 2012) (standard of review for admission of other-acts evidence: abuse of discretion)
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (Ohio 1983) (definition of abuse of discretion standard)
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (Ohio 1997) (distinguishing sufficiency and manifest-weight standards; retrial barred only if evidence legally insufficient)
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (Ohio 1991) (sufficiency test: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
State v. Zeh, 31 Ohio St.3d 99 (Ohio 1987) (definition of substantial impairment under rape statute)
State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66 (Ohio 1975) (other-acts admissible to show background or identity in limited circumstances)
State v. McKnight, 107 Ohio St.3d 101 (Ohio 2005) (discussion of behavioral fingerprint/modus operandi in sexual-offense context)