2018 Ohio 579
Ohio Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Ramadii Parker pleaded guilty in 2016 to: failure to comply with police (R.C. 2921.331), attempted felonious assault (amended), and drug trafficking (amended) arising from two separate 2006 incidents.
- The trial court initially sentenced Parker to a mandatory 2-year term for trafficking, 1 year for failure to comply, and 9 months for attempted felonious assault, and stated it would run the two case terms concurrently.
- The state argued R.C. 2921.331(D) mandates that any prison term for failure to comply be served consecutively to any other prison term, and the court—"in an abundance of caution"—ordered all three sentences to run consecutively for a 45-month total.
- Parker appealed, arguing (1) the court misinterpreted R.C. 2921.331(D) and therefore failed to make statutory findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) when imposing consecutive sentences, and (2) alternatively, his plea was not knowingly made because the court failed to inform him of the maximum possible sentence in violation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2).
- The court of appeals held R.C. 2921.331(D) requires only that the failure-to-comply prison term run consecutive to other prison terms, not that all other sentences be consecutive to each other; because the trial court relied on a mandatory-consecutive interpretation it did not make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings for the other consecutive terms, rendering those portions of the sentence contrary to law.
- Court reversed and remanded for resentencing as to the non-mandatory consecutive terms; the Crim.R. 11 plea challenge was deemed moot. A dissent would have vacated the plea because the trial court misstated that no driver’s license suspension applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2921.331(D) mandates that all prison terms be run consecutively when one conviction is failure to comply | R. Ct. (state): statute requires any prison term for failure to comply to be served consecutively to any other prison term, effectively forcing all counts to run consecutively | Parker: statute requires only that the failure-to-comply term run consecutive to other terms; it does not mandate other non-failure terms be consecutive to each other | Held: R.C. 2921.331(D) requires the failure-to-comply term be consecutive to other prison terms, but does not mandate that all other sentences be consecutive to one another (agreeing with Parker) |
| Whether trial court satisfied R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences on non-mandatory counts | State: consecutive service was required by R.C. 2921.331(D) so C(4) findings were unnecessary | Parker: because D did not mandate all consecutive sentences, the court needed to make C(4) findings to impose consecutive terms for the other counts | Held: Because the court misread R.C. 2921.331(D) and imposed consecutive sentences for non-mandatory counts without R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings, those portions of the sentence are contrary to law and remand for resentencing is required |
| Whether Parker’s guilty plea was made knowingly and intelligently under Crim.R. 11(C)(2) (maximum penalty disclosure) | State: not argued as primary on appeal (court treated as moot after remand) | Parker (alternative): trial court failed to inform him of the maximum possible sentence, rendering plea defective | Held: alternative Crim.R. 11 claim is moot because case remanded for resentencing; court did not decide plea validity on merits |
| Whether trial court’s inaccurate statement that no license suspension applied invalidated the plea | State: not raised below; not the primary basis of this appeal | Dissent: affirmative misinformation that no license suspension applied prejudiced plea; plea should be vacated | Held: majority declined sua sponte review of plea/license issue and found it would not change outcome; dissent would vacate plea for misinformation regarding mandatory lifetime suspension |
Key Cases Cited
- Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 125 Ohio St.3d 358 (Ohio 2010) (statutory-interpretation principles; review de novo)
- Hudson v. Petrosurance, Inc., 127 Ohio St.3d 54 (Ohio 2010) (legislative intent governs statutory construction)
- Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122 (Ohio 2008) (first rule of statutory construction: apply plain language if clear)
- Lancaster Colony Corp. v. Limbach, 37 Ohio St.3d 198 (Ohio 1988) (statutory-construction methodology)
- Fischer v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 92 (Ohio 2010) (remedy for void sentence is resentencing)
- Bonnell v. Ohio, 140 Ohio St.3d 209 (Ohio 2014) (trial court must state R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings on the record and in the judgment entry)
- Engle v. Ohio, 74 Ohio St.3d 525 (Ohio 1996) (Crim.R. 11 ensures plea voluntariness; court must explain consequences)
- Veney v. Ohio, 120 Ohio St.3d 176 (Ohio 2008) (substantial compliance standard for nonconstitutional Crim.R. 11 rights)