Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Thе proposition of law presented by the appellants is as follows: “An asbestos claim subject to H.B. 292 may not be severed from non-asbestоs claims arising from the same lawsuit and involving the same indivisible jury.”
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Appеllees Jack E. Riedel, Danny R. Six, and Josephine Weldy (collectively, “Riedel”) separately brought suit against appellants Consolidated Rail Corporation, American Premier Underwriters, Inc., and Norfolk Southern Rahway Company (collectively “Consolidated Rah”), alleging various ocсupational-disease claims under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, Section 51 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code (“FELA”) and the Locomotive Inspection Act, Section 20701 et seq., Title 49, U.S.Code. Because the complaints included claims for asbestosis based on occupational exposurе to asbestos, they were assigned to the court’s separate asbestos docket, a special docket in the Cuyahoga County Commоn Pleas Court designed to manage the court’s heavy caseload of asbestos claims.
{¶ 3} Consolidated Rail moved for an administrative dismissal, аlleging that Riedel had fahed to make the preliminary prima facie showing required by R.C.
{¶ 4} On appeal, Consolidated Rail argued that the trial court erred in (1) ruling that the administrative-dismissal provisions оf R.C. 2307.93 do not apply to the non-asbestos claims and (2) severing the non-asbestos claims for trial. Consolidated Rail asserted that the court should have administratively dismissed all the claims pursuant to R.C. 2307.93(C).
{¶ 5} The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, stating, “The administrative dismissal provisiоn is limited to the asbestos-related claims that are specified in R.C. 2307.92.” Riedel v. Consol. Rail Corp., 8th Dist. Nos. 91237, 91238, and 91239,
Analysis
{¶ 6} Because this case “requires the interpretation of statutory authority, which is a questiоn of law, our review is de novo.” State v. Consilio,
{¶ 7} R.C. 2307.93(A)(1) provides that a “plaintiff in any tort action who alleges an asbestos claim shall file * * * prima-facie evidence of the exposed person’s physical impairment that meets the minimum requirements specified in [R.C. 2307.92(B), (C), or (D)].” R.C. 2307.92(B), (C), and (D) set forth the minimum requirements of a prima facie showing in claims alleging injury related to exposure to asbestos. This provision plainly indicates that the General Assembly intended to require all asbestos-claim рlaintiffs, irrespective of the action in which the claims are filed, to provide prima facie evidence of physical impairment related to asbestos in order to avoid dismissal. This provision clearly cannot apply to claims of injury due to exposure to other toxic substances, such as the claims by Riedel of injury due to diesel exhaust.
{¶ 9} The statutory scheme that addresses asbestos claims, R.C. 2307.91 through 2307.98, is replete with the terms “tort action,” “asbestos claim,” and “claim.” As far as we can determine, there are no instances in which the General Assembly, in referring to a “claim,” clearly intended to encompass the entire tort action. We agree with the court of appeals that if the General Assembly had intended R.C. 2307.93(C) to administratively dismiss an entire tort action, it would have used the term “tort action” instead of the more limited “claim.”
{¶ 10} A claim thаt has been administratively dismissed may be reinstated only when the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing as to the asbestos claim. R.C. 2907.93(C). Based on Consolidated Rail’s interpretation of “claim” as encompassing the entire “tort action,” non-asbestos claims paired with an asbеstos claim would remain unresolved, possibly forever, unless the plaintiff could make a prima facie showing as to the asbestos claim. We сonsider that result unreasonable or absurd. Accordingly, it is our duty to construe the statute to avoid this result. R.C. 1.47(C); State ex rel. Cooper v. Savord (1950),
{¶ 11} We conclude that the administrative-dismissal prоvision of R.C. 2307.93(C) applies only to asbestos claims, even when the tort action in which the claim is brought includes non-asbestos claims. We also cоnclude that when a tort action includes an asbestos claim that is administratively dismissed, non-asbestos claims can be severed from the asbestos claim and proceed to trial. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court in this case properly severed the non-asbestos сlaims from the asbestos claims. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. “H.B. 292” refers to 2004 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, which enacted R.C. 2307.91 et seq., Ohio’s asbestos-claims legislation.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
{¶ 12} I concur. However, I write separately to address the argument of appellants and amicus curiae that severing non-asbestos claims would overburden the asbestos docket and undermine judicial economy. They contend that litigating non-asbestos claims on the already overloaded asbestos docket would thwart the purpose of H.B. 292, which was intendеd to expedite asbestos cases.
{¶ 13} The adjudication of the non-asbestos claims is a matter best decided at the local level. Once the non-asbestos claims have been severed from the asbestos claims, the local court should determine whether the non-asbestоs claims may be adjudicated on the asbestos docket or should be transferred to the court’s general docket. I believe that this is a mattеr of docket control that is best left to court administration at the local level.