State v. Ortiz, 93 A.3d 1128

Ortiz was convicted after a jury trial of tampering with a witness, criminal trespass in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit.
Ortiz argued that § 53a-151(a) does not reach attempts to prevent someone from speaking to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to prove the required intent to influence a witness.
The State contended that the broad definitions of 'witness' and 'official proceeding' cover attempts to deter someone from talking to police when an official proceeding is about to be instituted.
The court held that a jury may infer intent to influence a witness from an attempt to prevent an individual from giving a statement to the police, provided the defendant believes an official proceeding is impending and the witness would likely testify.
In this case, Ortiz went to Quinn’s home with a gun and threatened that her house would go up in smoke if she told the cops what she knew, indicating an intent to deter testimony and a belief that an official proceeding was forthcoming.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment, concluding the evidence supported the tampering conviction and clarifying the scope of § 53a-151(a).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 53a-151(a) cover attempts to prevent statements to the police?	Ortiz contends the statute requires conduct aimed at a witness in an official proceeding, not statements to police.	Ortiz maintains the statute omits broad coverage of police communications and should be construed narrowly.	Yes; jury may consider attempts to deter statements to police as evidence of intent to influence testimony.
Was there sufficient evidence Ortiz intended to induce Quinn not to testify or to withhold testimony?	Ortiz asserts no proof of belief that an official proceeding was pending and no intent to influence testimony.	State argues the threat and Ortiz’s conduct show intent and probable upcoming proceeding.	Yes; evidence supports intent and probable proceeding, sustaining the tampering conviction.

State v. Cavallo, 200 Conn. 664 (2000) (witness tampering intent may be inferred from conduct toward a potential witness)
State v. Pommer, 110 Conn. App. 608 (2008) (intent may be inferred from pre-proceeding conduct toward a witness)
State v. Higgins, 74 Conn. App. 473 (2003) (evidence of witness tampering premised on pre-proceeding conduct)
State v. Foreshaw, 214 Conn. 540 (1990) (proper interpretation of 'about to be instituted' phrase in related statute)
State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610 (2008) (statutory construction guiding interpretation of Connecticut penalties)