440 P.3d 136
Wash.2019Background
- Fire at David Morgan's home; his ex-wife Brenda severely injured; both transported to hospitals with clothing removed by staff.
- Firefighters and medics observed blood and gasoline odors on clothing; hospital staff placed Morgan's clothing in plastic bags and left them on a counter.
- Officer Breault was sent to Morgan's hospital room to obtain information and was later instructed by a supervisor to collect Morgan's clothing; Breault seized the bagged clothing and a utility knife with dried blood nearby.
- Morgan was charged with attempted murder, first-degree arson, and assault and moved to suppress the clothing seizure; trial court denied suppression (found exigent circumstances), Court of Appeals reversed.
- Supreme Court held exigent circumstances were not established but concluded the seizure was lawful under the plain view doctrine, rejecting inadvertence as a required separate element.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless seizure of clothing | State: contamination risk and evidentiary loss justified immediate seizure | Morgan: officers showed no urgency; clothing sat hours on counter so no exigency | No — State failed to prove exigent circumstances by clear and convincing evidence |
| Whether plain view doctrine authorized seizure of bagged hospital clothing | State: officers lawfully present and could reasonably conclude clothing was evidentiary from surrounding facts | Morgan: seizing officer did not personally observe incriminating signs (smell/visible blood) and lacked immediate probable cause | Yes — seizure lawful under plain view; inadvertence not a separate required element |
| Whether inadvertence is a distinct element of plain view | State: plain view applies without requiring inadvertence | Morgan: plain view requires the seizing officer to have immediately perceived incriminating nature (includes inadvertence) | Inadvertence is not a separate requirement; it is common but not necessary |
| Whether collective or communicated officer knowledge can support plain view seizure | State: supervisor’s knowledge and context justified Breault’s seizure | Morgan: seizing officer must personally have immediate awareness of incriminating nature; cannot rely on uncommunicated third‑party observations | Court permitted reliance on surrounding circumstances (including supervisor direction) so long as seizure was not pretextual and incriminating nature was immediately apparent under context |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343 (discussing warrant requirement and exceptions under article I, § 7)
- City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260 (constitutional authority of law principle)
- State v. Garvin, 166 Wash.2d 242 (State must prove warrant exception by clear and convincing evidence)
- State v. Baird, 187 Wash.2d 210 (exigent‑circumstances standard requires compelling need and impracticality of obtaining warrant)
- Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (inadvertence common but not necessary for plain‑view seizures)
- State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d 390 (plain view elements articulated)
- State v. Kull, 155 Wash.2d 80 (prior Washington articulation including inadvertence language)
- State v. Hudson, 124 Wash.2d 107 (when objects are "immediately apparent" under plain view)
- Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (limits on manipulating items to establish probable cause under plain view)
- Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (warrant requirement and exceptions; caution against ends‑justify‑means seizures)
