State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63

Background

Joshua Martin convicted by jury of four counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child for incidents involving two adoptive sisters; sentenced to an aggregate 30 years to life (15-to-life on each count, one count consecutive).
Defense theory: victims were inconsistent and were coached/manipulated by their adoptive mother, Stephanie; sought to prove Stephanie had a history of inducing false accusations and had poor truthfulness reputation.
State presented a Children’s Justice Center forensic interviewer (Chelsea Smith) as an expert to explain why child victims sometimes give incomplete or evolving disclosures and to describe common behavioral responses to abuse.
District court admitted Smith’s general testimony (but excluded a second interviewer as cumulative) and excluded several proffered instances of Stephanie’s prior false accusations as unduly prejudicial, allowing only some testimony that Stephanie manipulated other daughters.
At sentencing the court acknowledged mitigating factors (no criminal record, work history) but relied on multiple victims/occurrences, refusal to accept responsibility, and risk to community to impose the requested sentence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Martin)	Held
Admissibility of expert testimony on child memory/disclosures	Expert testimony helps jurors understand why children give multiple/incomplete disclosures and varied behaviors	Testimony exceeded expert’s scope, invaded jury province, was misleading/prejudicial, and improperly bolstered victims	Court: No abuse of discretion. Most objections were unpreserved; expert’s testimony was within scope and helpful; caution urged but admission upheld.
Expert bolstering victims’ credibility	Expert did not opine on veracity; general testimony does not impermissibly bolster	Expert on cross-exam said children “seemed credible”; this improperly opined on truthfulness	Court: Improper comment was struck and curative instruction given; defense waived further relief by not seeking more.
Exclusion of evidence of Stephanie’s prior false accusations	Excluding weak, attenuated, time‑consuming evidence avoided confusion and mini-trials; admitted sufficiently probative reputation/manipulation evidence	Evidence of multiple prior false accusations was highly probative (doctrine of chances) and necessary to show motive/propensity to induce false allegations	Court: No abuse of discretion. District court applied Rule 403 balancing (not relying on disapproved Shickles factor) and permissibly excluded those episodes as confusing, cumulative, and weak. Confrontation/presentation rights not violated.
Sentencing — LeBeau proportionality and weighing factors	Sentence appropriate given multiple victims/occurrences, lack of remorse, community risk; court considered aggravating/mitigating factors	Court failed to perform full LeBeau comparison to more and less serious offenses, double‑counted child element, over-weighted aggravators, and abused discretion	Court: Most LeBeau complaint waived for lack of objection; no abuse of discretion in weighing factors or sentencing given case facts; court did not double‑count position of trust.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) (articulated multi-factor 403 test later partially disapproved)
State v. Cuttler, 367 P.3d 981 (Utah 2015) (rule 403 analysis and disapproval of ‘‘overmastering hostility’’ factor)
LeBeau v. State, 337 P.3d 254 (Utah 2014) (interests-of-justice proportionality framework for sentencing comparisons)
State v. Verde, 296 P.3d 673 (Utah 2012) (discussing "doctrine of chances" for prior improbable occurrences)
State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480 (Utah 1989) (expert may not opine on a child’s truthfulness)
State v. Killpack, 191 P.3d 17 (Utah 2008) (abuse of discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
State v. Hollen, 44 P.3d 794 (Utah 2002) (standard for expert testimony admissibility)
State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994) (expert testimony on victim symptoms may be admissible with limits)
Patterson v. Patterson, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah 2011) (preservation and waiver principles for appellate relief)