State v. CuttlerState v. Cuttler
Justice HIMONAS, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 The State charged the defendant, James Cuttler, with vaginally raping and orally and anally sodomizing his then seven-year-old daughter. To bolster its case, the State sоught to introduce evidence pursuant to
¶ 2 Because the district court abused its discretion in two ways, we reverse. First, the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring that the evidence of prior abuse “overcome” the “factors set forth in State v. Shickles[,] 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988),” in order to satisfy
¶ 3 Second, the district court also abused its discretion in how it assessed the similarities between the evidence of prior abuse and the current alleged abuse, as well as the potential prejudice from, and time gap since, the evidence of prior abuse. As we explain below, and by way of exаmple, under the district court‘s analysis the State would effectively be precluded from ever introducing proof that a grandfather charged with sexually molesting a granddaughter had previously sexually molested his daughters in the same manner and when they were the same age as the granddaughter. See infra ¶ 29. We will not handcuff the prosecution from
BACKGROUND
¶ 4 K.C. was seven years old when she went to “her teacher and school principal” and told them that Cuttler, her father, had been sexually molesting her “for the last month.” In subsequent interviews at the Utah County Children‘s Justice Center, K.C. alleged that when she goes to Cuttler‘s “house on the weekends” to visit him, “he locks the door ... [and] takes off his pants” and her pants and puts his penis, which he nicknamed “his dolly,” in her “mouth,” “butt hole,” and “pee pee.”
¶ 5 According to K.C., whenever she would “play” with Cuttler‘s penis, it would get “stiff” and “hard” and would “stand[] straight up.” K.C. also told the interviewer at the Children‘s Justice Center that sometimes “a puky liquid” would come out of his рenis. She also described in detail for the interviewer where and how the alleged abuse took place. Finally, K.C. reported that Cuttler would tell her that if she ever told anyone about the abuse, “then they‘ll take—, then they call the police and take me [Cuttler] away” and the only reminders of him that she would have would be the “things he‘s given me [K.C.] and pictures.”
¶ 6 K.C.‘s allegations bear a considerable similarity to the sexual abuse Cuttler inflicted on his daughters J.C. and W.C. years earlier in Hurleyville, New York. It is undisputed that in 1984 Cuttler grabbed J.C., who was nine to ten years old at the time, “by the nap[e] of the neck” and made her perform oral sex on him.2 Afterwards, he twisted her arm behind her back and “inserted [his] penis in her rectum.” Cuttler inflicted the same sexual abuse on W.C. in 1985 when W.C. was eight years old. Cuttler told the detective investigating his abuse back then that he also believed he had inserted his penis into the girls’ vaginas. He further admitted that he had been sexually molesting at least J.C.—and perhaps both girls—for “more than a year.” Cuttler referred to his penis by a nickname during this time period, too.
¶ 7 Based on K.C.‘s report, the State charged Cuttler with two counts of rape of a child, two counts of sodomy upon a child, and two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, all first-degree felonies. While he was being held in jail, Cuttler was allegedly recorded telling K.C. “that he was at the jail house, ‘where you put me ... by talking to the police,’ and further told her that she won‘t ever see him again, ... and that ‘I told you to be quiet and not to talk about it.‘” And Cuttler later allegedly told K.C. that he did not “understand why you would tell that.”
¶ 8 Early on in this case, the State lodged a Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 404(c). The notice asserted that Cuttler had “sexually abused his biological daughters, W.C. and J.C., on an ongoing basis at their home in Hurleyville, New York[,] on and before January 6, 1985.” The district court refused to admit the proffered evidence under
¶ 9 In response to the district court‘s decision, the State filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which we granted as to two issues. However, only the first issue presently concerns us. See infra ¶ 14. It asks, “Did the trial court apply the correct legal standard when weighing the probative value of
¶ 10 Prior to briefing, we handed down our decision in State v. Lucero, making plain that it is the language of
¶ 11 We have jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal under
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12 We afford district courts “a great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence” and will not overturn an evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, ¶ 14, 17 P.3d 1110. But whether the district “court applied the proper legal standard” in assessing the admissibility of thаt evidence is a question of law that we review for correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 19, 100 P.3d 1177. And the admission or exclusion of evidence under the wrong legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. Robinson v. Taylor, 2015 UT 69, ¶¶ 8-21, 356 P.3d 1230; State v. Larkin, 443 S.W.3d 751, 807 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2013) (“We will find that a trial court abused its discretion in admitting or excluding evidence ... when the trial court applied incorrect legal standards....“). A trial court also abuses its discretion under
ANALYSIS
¶ 13 The State argues that the district court should have аdmitted “the prior child molestation evidence” under both
¶ 14 We are of the opinion that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the prior molestation evidence under
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE OF CUTTLER‘S PRIOR SEXUAL ABUSE UNDER RULE 403
¶ 15 To be clear, the issue before us is not whether the evidence that Cuttler sexually abused his daughters in 1984 and 1985 is admissible under
¶ 16 It is the State‘s position that the district court “applied an incorrect legal standard in weighing the probative value of the
¶ 17 We agree. First, the district court employed an incorrect legal standard and, аs a result, misapplied
¶ 18 With respect to the first assigned error—the use of the wrong legal standard—
¶ 19 Again, this is not to say that the Shickles factors, taken individually, have no place in a
¶ 20 Finally, it is inappropriate for a district court to ever consider whether evidence will lead a jury to “overmastering hostility.” The language of
¶ 21 Here, the district court relied exclusively on the Shickles factors when determining the admissibility of the previous child molestation evidence under
¶ 22 With rеspect to the second assigned error—the misapplication of the Shickles factors—we note several ways in which the district court improperly assessed the Shickles factors in determining whether the previous child molestation evidence was “substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.”
¶ 23 First, the district court, pursuant to Shickles, considered the similarities between how Cuttler sexually abused J.C. and W.C. and the present allegations regarding K.C. The district court concluded that “the similarities between the cases are no more than arise in most, if not all, child sex abuse cases.” Given the record on this matter, this conclusion is not reasonable.
¶ 24 It is evident that K.C.‘s account of her abuse is considerably similar to the abuse suffered by J.C. and W.C. Furthermore, these similarities are not just attributable to the similarities observed among “most, if not all, child sex abuse cases” as the district court suggested. The unique similarities between the cases include: (1) the father-daughter relationship between Cuttler and J.C., W.C., and K.C.; (2) the gender and ages (nine, еight, and seven years, respectively) of the daughters; (3) Cuttler‘s alleged “oral sodomy, anal rape, and vaginal penetration” of each of the girls; (4) the prolonged time period over which the molestation occurred; and (5) Cuttler‘s use of a nickname for his penis. Moreover, the only difference considered by the district court—that Cuttler‘s abuse of J.C. and W.C. involved the use of force—was given too much weight and could have been attributed to the most recent victim being a compliant child. Thus, the force described in J.C.‘s and W.C.‘s abuse is not significant enough to outweigh the significant similarities between the incidents.8
¶ 25 Other courts have found sufficient similarities to permit admission of such evidence in similar circumstances. In United States v. Mann, 193 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 1999), the circuit court permitted evidence of a previous child molestation offense under
(1) [the victims were] all defendant‘s great nieces; (2) all three of the girls lived on or regularly came within close physical proximity to defendant‘s property during the time of the alleged abuse; (3) defendant allegedly began to abuse each of the girls when they were approximately the same age; and (4) defendant allegedly had vaginal intercourse with each child.
Id. at 1174. As such, the evidence of the previous child sex abuse was admitted at thе defendant‘s trial. Likewise, we are of the opinion that the evidence of Cuttler‘s prior sexual abuse of J.C. and W.C. should have been admitted in K.C.‘s trial, and it was unreasonable for the district court to rule that such evidence was not similar enough to meet the standard under
¶ 26 Second, the district court seemed to improperly suggest that because the previous child molestation evidence was “permissible solely for propensity purposes,” this was a factor that weighed against its need. However,
¶ 27 Third, the district court‘s application of the concern that “a jury, upon hearing evidence of a prior conviction for child sex abuse, might have the tendency to base their verdict on an improper and emotional basis” in the
¶ 28 Finally, the district court expressed “great concern” over the twenty-seven-year time gap between the events occurring in 1984 and 1985 and the alleged abuse that took place in 2012. The district court believed that the time gap “present[ed] a strong argument against admitting the ... evidence.” However, this concern is unreasonable given the facts of Cuttler‘s abuse. Cuttler exhibited a propensity to abuse his daughters when they reached prepubescent age. After Cuttler pled guilty to the child sex abuse committed in 1984 and 1985, he spent nine years in prison. He fathered K.C. in 2005 and began abusing her in 2012 when she was seven, only a year younger than W.C. when W.C. was abused. As the Florida Supreme Court correctly noted, “the oppor
¶ 29 To demonstrate this point, we use an example of a grandfather charged with sexually molesting a granddaughter and who had previously sexually molested his daughters in the same manner when they were the same age as the granddaughter. The opportunity for the grandfather to perpetuate abuse in a similar familial relationship and age context would not arise until twenty or thirty years after his initial abuse of the daughters. If the prosecution were not allowed to bring in evidence of the prior abuse simply because of the long period of time between the incidents, then
¶ 30 In conclusion, the district court‘s misapplication of the above factors was unreasonable and we reverse.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31 The district court‘s exclusive reliance on the Shickles factors represents an application of the wrong legal standard and thus is reversible error. The court‘s rigid application of the Shickles factors represents the same concern we had in Lucero over courts not heeding the actual language of
Notes
State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988) (quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (3d ed. 1984)).the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.