opinion of the Court:
11 Jаmes Eric Verde was convicted of sexual abuse of a child. At trial, the court admitted evidence of two prior uncharged sexual assaults by Verde. On appeal to the court of appeals, Verde challenged the admis
I
[ 2 In 2005, Verde was charged with sexually abusing NH., a twelve-year-old boy. The charge was based on an incident that occurred in the summer of 20083, when Verde allegedly put his hand down N.H.'s pants and fondled his genitalia. Verde pled not guilty.
3 Priоr to trial, the State filed a motion in limine, asking the trial court to allow testimony from three men who claimed that Verde had sexually assaulted them when they were eighteen years old. The State contended that the testimony was admissible under rule 404(b) for the non-character purposes of demonstrating Verde's "knowledge, intent, plan, modus operandi and/or absence of mistake or accident." Verde challenged the admissibility of the evidence on the ground that it was not relevant to any controverted issues in a manner untethered to his character. The trial court granted the State's motion as to two of the witnesses, concluding that the evidence was admissible to prove Verde's specific intent. The court noted that the evidence could also be admitted to prove "a pattern of behavior," and that Verde "prepared and planned to meet minor males with a motive of enticing them into sexual relationships."
14 At trial, NH. testified that he met Verde in the fall of 2001 when Verde moved into N.H.'s neighborhood. According to N.H., Verde took him to a carnival on the day they met, and the two spent extensive time together thereafter-with NH. playing video games or basketball at Verde's home, riding Verde's ATVs, or working in Verde's yard for pay.
T5 N.H. further testified that Verde sexually abused him in the summer of 2008 when he was at Verde's home. According to N.H.'s testimony, Verde sat by N.H. on the couch and put "his hand down [N.H.'s] pants" and "touched [his] penis and testicles." N.H. said that he told Verde to stop, and that Verde said something like "don't be cool" and then moved to a chair. In December 2004, N.H. reported these events to his mother.
T6 The State also presented evidence at trial that Verde had engaged in sexual misconduct with two eighteen-year-old males in 2002 and 2004.
T7 J.T.S. testified that he went to Verde's home that evening. When J.T.S. realized that Verde was not interested in purchasing the car, J.T.S. attempted to leave. Verde then pulled on J.T.S.s leg and refused to let him go. According to J.T.S., Verde then rubbed J.T.S.'s leg, unbuttoned his jeans, and groped his genitals. J.T.S. testified that he tried to stop Verde "many times," but that he responded with force, frightening J.T.S. He immediately reported the incident to the police and his parents, but no charges were filed.
18 M.A. testified to a similar incident. According to M.A., he met Verde at the gym in 2002 when he was eighteen years old. Verde allegedly approached M.A. and invited him home, where Verde groped M.A.'s groin "close enough to his genitals to arouse him." MH. terminated this encounter and later
T9 After the State presented its case, Verde testified on his own behalf, denying that he ever sat next to N.H. on the couch or touched N.H. in a sexual manner. Verde presented witnesses who testified about N.H.'s lack of credibility, one saying that N.H. "pathologically lief{d]." Verde also testified that he never had any sexual contact with M.A. or J.T.S.
T 10 The jury found Verde guilty, and he appealed. In the court of appeals, Verde pressed his argument that the evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct should not have been admitted because it served no purpose other than to show that Verde's conduct conformed to a propensity to commit sexual crimes. State v. Verde,
1 11 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the 404(b) evidence was admissible to establish Verde's specific intent, or alternatively, to rebut Verde's theory that NH. fabricated his story. Id. 918, 19 n. 6. Although Verde never actually disputed intent, the court of appeals deemed the evidence admissible to establish Verde's specific intent, a required element of sexual abuse of a child, regardless of the nature of the case or Verde's defenses. Id. 118. The court based this holding on the so-called "not guilty rule," under which intent is per se controverted once a defendant pleads not guilty to a specific-intent crime. Id. In light of this holding, the court of appeals did not address the State's alternative argument that the trial court properly admitted the bad acts evidence for the additional purpose of proving Verde's pattern of conduct, preparation, or plan of enticing and exploiting teenage males. Yet the court did recognize "at least one additional ground for admitting the prior bad acts evidence." Id. 119 n. 6. Because Verde claimed that N.H. invented the alleged misconduct "after not being paid for catching a stray cat," the court held that prior bad acts evidence was admissible to rebut Verde's defense of fabrication. Id.
112 Judge McHugh concurred, opining that the "not guilty rule" should not be used as a substitute for a meaningful inquiry into the actual purpose and relevance of evidence offered under rulе 404(b). Id. 138 (McHugh, J., concurring). In Judge McHugh's view, the mere fact that "a defendant pleads not guilty should not excuse the State from identifying the precise link between the bad acts evidence and a contested issue in the trial." Id. 144. Judge McHugh also acknowledged that under current court of appeals precedent, see State v. Bradley,
118 Our review of the court of appeals decision on certiorari is de novo. State v. Levin,
II
T 14 Our analysis must begin with the text of the governing rules of evidence. The principal rule in play here is 404(b), which states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,*678 plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Urax R. Evip. 404(b) (2005).
115 Under this rule, the admissibility of prior misconduct evidence depends on its avowed purpose. When such evidence is offered to suggest action in conformity with a person's alleged bad character, it is inadmissible under the rule. When past misconduct evidence is offered for any other purpose, on the other hand, it is admissible. The rule lists examples of proper purposes-to establish motive, opportunity, intent, ete.-but the list is illustrative and not exclusive. So long as the evidence is not aimed at suggesting action in conformity with bad character, it is admissible under rule 404(b).
16 That much is clear. The difficulty in applying this simple rule, however, springs from the fact that evidence of prior bad acts often will yield dual inferences-and thus betray both a permissible purpose and an improper one. Thus, evidence of a person's past misconduct may plausibly be aimed at establishing motive or intent, but that same evidence may realistically be expected to convey a simultaneous inference that the person behaved improperly in the past and might be likely to do so again in the future. That's what makes many rule 404(b) questions so difficult: Evidence of prior misconduct often presents a jury with both a proper and an improper inference, and it won't always be easy for the court to differentiate the two inferences or to limit the impact of the evidence to the purpose permitted under the rule.
117 Yet the language and structure of rule 404(b) require the court to make such distinctions. Fidelity to the rule requires a threshold determination of whether proffered evidence of prior misconduct is aimed at proper or improper purposes. See State v. Nelson-Waggoner,
Thus, when prior misconduct evidence is presented under rule 404(b), the court should carefully consider whether it is genuinely being offered for a proper, non-character purpose, or whether it might actually be aimed at sustaining an improper inference of action in conformity with a person's bad character. And even if the evidence may sustain both proper and improper inferences under rule 404(b), the court should balance the two against each other under rule 403, excluding the bad acts evidence if its tendency to sustain a proper inference is outweighed by its propensity for an improper inference or for jury confusion about its real purpose. Such weighing is essential to preserve the integrity of rule 404(b). Without it, evidence of past misconduct could routinely be allowed to sustain an inference of action in conformity with bad character-so long as the proponent of the evidence could proffer a plausible companion inference that does not contravene the rule.
119 A district court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b) is entitled to some deference. But such a decision can withstand our review only if the evidence falls within the bounds marked by the legal standards set forth in the rules of evidence. And the question in this case is whether the
' 20 The State seeks to defend the admissibility of the 404(b) evidence offered in Verde's trial on three grounds: (a) that it was offered to establish Verde's specific intent, (b) that it demonstrated his plan to engage in criminal activity, and (c) that it was presented to rebut Verde's charge of fabrication. We reject the first two grounds and accordingly reverse and remand for a new trial, as these were the grounds on which the evidence was admitted at trial. As to the third ground, we acknowledge that evidence of Verde's prior misconduct could potentially be admitted to rebut a charge of fabrication, but decline to affirm оn that basis in the absence of any indication in the record that the district court was asked to conduct the careful weighing required to sustain the admission of such evidence in a case like this one. Thus, on this issue, we leave it to the district court on remand to decide on the admissibility of evidence of Verde's prior misconduct under the "doctrine of chances" as explained below.
A
{21 The first ground put forward by the State for admitting evidence of Verde's past misconduct is its alleged relevance to his state of mind in committing the specific intent crime of child sex abuse. This ground was embraced by the district court and affirmed by the court of appeals, which concluded that a not-guilty plea necessarily puts the question of intent at issue, opening the door to "evidence of other offenses to establish the element of intent even if the defendant has not contested his or her mental state." State v. Verde,
122 We find the premises of the not-guilty rule unpersuasive and accordingly reject it as a principle of Utah law. A not-guilty plea technically puts every element of a crime at issue. But the technical relevance of evidence of a defendant's intent is not enough to justify the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts purportedly aimed at establishing intent under rule 404(b).
123 Either way, the admissibility of prior misconduct evidence cannot be sustained under rule 404(b) on the mere basis of a defendant's not-guilty plea. As Judge McHugh noted in her concurring opinion below, the "not guilty rule" is an undisciplined substitute for careful analysis under rule 404(b).
124 We accordingly repudiate it. Instead of relying reflexively on the broad implications of a not-guilty plea, courts in Utah should evaluate the true purpose of evidence of past misconduct, determining at the threshold whether the evidence is presented for a proper purpose, or only for the purpose of suggesting an improper inference of action in conformity with alleged bad character. And even if the court finds both legitimate and improper purposes for such evidence, the court should still weigh the proper and improper uses of 404(b) evidence and exclude it under rule 4083 where the terms of that rule so require. Applying these standards, we conclude that the evidence of Verde's prior misconduct was not properly admissible to establish his specific intent-despite the fact that his not-guilty plea technically put his intent at issue.
1 25 First, we find it difficult to characterize the true purpose of the 404(b) evidence introduced at trial as permissibly aimed at establishing Verde's intent. Aside from his not guilty plea, Verde did not contest intent at trial. Seе id. % 17-18. Instead, his primary defense was that he never touched N.H.'s genitalia and that N.H. fabricated his testimony of that actus reus. Id. In fact, Verde offered to stipulate to his intent in his response to the State's motion in limine, asserting that "if the jury concludes that the touching of N.H. occurred, defendant is willing to stipulate that the defendant did it with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person." And, as even the State admits, intent is inferable from proof that Verde groped N.H.'s genitalia. In these cireumstances, it's hard to imagine a jury that would conclude that Verde committed the actus reus but with an innocent intent.
T26 Where intent is uncontested and readily inferable from other evidence, 404(b) evidence is largely tangential and duplica-tive.
127 The State resists this conсlusion on the ground that Verde made no "enforceable" stipulation of intent and could have reneged on his pretrial offer. But it was the State that refused Verde's offer to formally stipulate intent, and at oral argument in this court the State could identify no legitimate reason for rejecting that offer. That failure is telling. It reinforces the conclusion that the prosecution's true purpose in offering evidence of Verde's prior misconduct was to invite the jury to make the kind of character inference that is proscribed under rule 404(b).
128 In so concluding, we do not imply that the prosecution bears an obligation to accept a defendant's offer to stipulate.
129 Sometimes, however, the evidence in question has no legitimate narrative value, as in cases where it is not plausibly linked to any charged conduct. That will often be the case for evidence of prior misconduct. Such evidence may be worse than immaterial to a legitimate narrative. It may risk creating an alternative, illegitimate narrative-that the defendant has a reprehensible character, that he probably acted in conformity with it, and that he should be punished for his immoral character in any event.
T 30 Absent any legitimate explanation for the prosecution's rejection of the defendant's offer to stipulate, we view this rejection to reinforce the conclusion that the prosecution's purpose was not to tell a legitimate narrative to the jury but instead to present an improper one. So, while the state was free to reject Verde's offer to stipulate, it was not free to distance itself from the probative implications of that decision, which in our view thoroughly undermine the State's position on appeal.
131 Second, even if the past misconduct evidence in this case could plausibly be deemed to have been aimed at a legitimate purpose under rule 404(b), it would still fail under the balancing framework required under rule 403. Specifically, and for all the reasons detailed above, we conclude that any legitimate tendency the 404(b) evidence had to tell a narrative of Verde's specific intent was minimal at best. And we likewise conclude that any such legitimate purpose is far outwеighed by the obvious, illegitimate one of suggesting action in conformity with bad character.
1 32 We accordingly conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Verde's prior misconduct to establish his specific intent. That evidence was not plausibly aimed at a proper purpose, and in any event any such proper purpose was outweighed by an illegitimate effect.
B
183 The second ground put forward by the State for admitting evidence of Verde's prior bad acts is its alleged relevance in demonstrating his "plan" to "entice teenage males to be his friends with the motive of exploiting their trust for his sexual gratification."
134 Under the classic formulation of the rule, prior misconduct evidence can demonstrate a "plan" only where the defendant's "preconceived plan ... encompasses all of the acts" in an overarching design. Davin P. LEonarp, THE New WicmorE: A TrEatiss on EvipENCE: EvineEncE or Otesr Misconpucr AND EvENts § 9.4.2 (2009). This standard requires that
all the erimes-both charged and uncharged-are the product of some prior, conscious resolve in the accused's mind. The accused formulates a single, overall grand design that encompasses both the charged and uncharged offenses. That design is overarching; all the crimes are integral components or portions of the*682 same plan. Each crime is a step or stage in the execution of the plan. Each is a means to achieving the same goal.9
35 This type of plan evidence is admissible because it is based on the permissible inference that, regardless of character, a person who has formulated a plan is more likely to carry out the elеments of the plan. Id. § 9.1.
36 We adopted this approach in State v. Featherson,
'I 37 In so holding, we cited favorably People v. Tassell,
1 38 Tassell was subsequently overruled by Ewoldt,
1139 The State heralds the Ewoldt rule as the more liberal or modern view and invites us to adopt it.
1 40 Under the Utah standard adopted in Featherson and further clarified and confirmed here, the evidence of Verde's prior misconduct was not relevant to establish a "plan" to commit similar crimes, and its admissibility accordingly cannot be affirmed on that basis. There is no suggestion of a prior, conscious resolve on Verde's part to formulate an overarching grand design encompassing both the charged and uncharged offenses. In fact, the "victims" of Verde's past encounters were not even minors like NH. was. They were adults when Verde is alleged to have sexually assaulted them. And of course an attempt to entice an adult into a sexual relationship is hardly equivalent to the sexual enticement of a child. The age difference is highly significant, It undermines any suggestion of a plan by Verde to engage in the criminal conduct he is accused of here.
T41 While the evidence of Verde's prior misconduct only weakly suggests a plan, it would strongly suggest to the jury the likelihood that Verde may have acted in conformity with the bad character implied by his prior acts.
I 42 Under Ewoldt, evidence that a defendant had committed three D.U.Ls on the same road (perhaps even in the same car, with the same type of alcohol, on the same day of the week) presumably could be offered to prove the defendant had a plan to drive while intoxicated. And evidence that a defendant frequently possessed controlled substances could be offered to prove a plan to use illegal drugs. The undue prejudice inherent in proof of this sort of general plan will nearly always outweigh any legitimate prоbative value, and we accordingly repudiate it.
143 In support of its contrary view, the State cites rule 404(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as an example of the "liberal or modern" rule set forth in Ewoldt. That provision, as the State notes, expressly endorses the admission of evidence of certain prior bad acts similar to the erime in question-those involving "acts of child molestation" in a "case in which a defendant is accused of child molestation." Utax R. Evin. 404(c)(1). That provision, however, only undermines the State's position. It does so by confirming that any liberalizing trend toward greater admissibility of prior bad acts evidence may be accomplished through express amendments to our rules of evidence, see FED. R.EvID. 418, 414, 415, an avenue that counsels against the distortion of the otherwise general rule against propensity inferences under rule 404(b). We accordingly adhere to the rule embraced by this court in Feather-son,
C
144 Lastly, the State contends that its 404(b) evidence was admissible to prove that Verde committed the actus reus in question by rebutting Verde's theory that N.H. fabricated his testimony of the sexual assault. The fabrication question was an issue at trial.
1 45 In defending the admissibility of the prior misconduct evidence on this basis, the State reasons that "while it may be plausible that one victim might fabricate such charges, it is highly unlikely that three [victims] would independently fabricate" similar accounts of unwanted sexual contact. In response, Verde argues that uncharged misconduct evidence offered to rebut a claim of fabrication is inadmissible because it "qualifies as evidence of propensity."
T46 As a threshold matter, we acknowledge the theoretical possibility that evidence of prior misconduct could be admitted under rule 404(b) to establish commission of a criminal actus reus by rebutting a charge of fabrication. Because this argument was not presented by the State in Verde's trial, however, we reject it as a ground for affirmance. To provide guidance for the parties on remand and to explain our basis for reversing the court of appeals, we clarify the legal standards that govern in this area.
147 In some cireumstances, evidence of prior misconduct can be relevant under the so-called "doctrine of chances." This doctrine defines cireumstances where prior bad acts can properly be used to rebut a charge of fabrication. It is a theory of logical relevance that "rests on the objective improbability of the same rare misfortune befalling one individual over and over."
48 One court explained the thinking behind this theory as follows:
[SJuppose you lose your horse; you find it in the possession of A.; he asserts that he took the horse by mistake; but you find that about the same time he took horses belonging to several others; would not the fact that he took others about the same time be proper evidence to be considered in determining whether the particular taking was or not by mistake? The chances of mistake decrease in proportion as the alleged mistakes increase."17
A parallel explanation has been offered in terms more directly applicable here:
When one person claims rape, the unusual and abnormal element of lying by the complaining witness may be present. But when two (or more) persons tell similar stories, the chances are reduced that both are lying or that one is telling the truth and the other is coincidentally telling a similar false story.18
{49 This reasoning starts with the low baseline probability that a man would take a horse by mistake or that an innocent person would be falsely accused of sexual assault- or, to cite additional examples from actual cases, that a child would die in her sleep
150 Propensity inferences do not pollute this type of probability reasoning. "The question for the jury is not whether the defendant is the type of person" who, for example, "sets incendiary fires or murders his relatives. The question is whether it is objectively likely that so many fires or deaths could be attributable to natural cases. It is that objective unlikelihood that tends to prove human agency, causation, and design."
-_ evidence of prior similar tragedies or accusations;
- an intermediate inference that the chance of multiple similar occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable; and
- a conclusion that one or some of the occurrences were not accidents or false accusations.25
151 Under this pattern, prior misconduct evidence may tend to prove that the defendant more likely played a role in the events at issue than that the events occurred coincidentally.
152 Many courts, in Utah and elsewhere, have employed this "doctrine of chances" reasoning to analyze the relevance of uncharged misconduct evidence when a defense of fabrication has been raised. In State v. Bradley, for example, our court of appeals reasoned that evidence of a prior, independent allegation of sexual assault decreased the probability that the charged sexual assault was fabricated, as the defendant claimed.
54 The court of appeals in this case affirmed the admissibility of evidence of Verde's prior misconduct on an alternative ground resting on a vague notion of this doctrine of chances. Without denominating the doctrine as such or elaborating on its elements, the court of appeals held that the evidence was admissible to rebut Verde's charge of fabrication. Verde,
155 We find the grounds put forward by the State and adopted by the court of appeals insufficient on the current record to affirm the admissibility of evidence of Verde's prior misconduct. A charge of fabrication is insufficient by itself to open the door to evidence of any and all prior bad acts. As with other questions arising under rule 404(b), care and precision are necessary to distinguish permissible and impermissible uses of evidence of prior bad acts, and to limit the factfinder's use of the evidence to the uses allowed by rule.
156 We accordingly reverse the court of appeals' decision on this issue and in so doing offer some clarifying limitations on the use of evidence to rebut a charge of fabrication to guide the parties and the district court on remand. The relevant limitations are found in the prevailing ease law on the doctrine of chances, which we adopt and explain in the paragraphs that follow.
{57 Under the doctrine of chances, evidence offered to prоve actus reus must not be admitted absent satisfaction of four foundational requirements,
158 Second, similarity: "Fach uncharged incident must be roughly similar to the charged crime."
[The more similar, detailed, and distine-tive the various accusations, the greater is the likelihood that they are not the result of independent imaginative invention. It is less likely that two accusers would independently manufacture similar stories that are detailed and unusual than that they would coincidentally tell the same commonplace lie.31
159 Any prescription of a threshold of similarity for admitting similar accusations evidence is inevitably imprecise.
160 Third, independence: Where the prior uncharged conduct is an accusation of sexual assault, each accusation must be independent of the others. This is because "the probative value of similar accusations evidence rests on the improbability of chance repetition of the same event."
T61 Fourth, frequency: The defendant must have been accused of the crime or suffered an unusual loss "more frequently than the typical person endures such losses accidentally."
1 62 Because the trial court is in a superior position to make an initial exercise of discretion to conduct the weighing called for under rules 404(b) and 408, we remand this case for a new trial. At the retrial of this matter, if the state chooses to pursue this theory, the district court should use the standards we have articulated to decide whether evidence of Verde's uncharged sexual assaults may be presented to the jury. Thus, the district court will have to weigh carefully the materiality of and the similarities and the differences between Mr. Verde's alleged advances to and sexual abuse of a twelve-year-old child and the alleged unwanted advances to and touching of two adults. And it will have to consider the independence and the frequency of such alleged acts. Though we have articulated standards to help the parties engage in these discussions on remand, we do so without opining on the admissibility of the prose-eution's prior misconduct evidence under the "doctrine of chances." We also emphasize that our opinion is not at all aimed at influencing the district court or at expressing a view on the ultimate viability of this theory on remand.
TH
T 63 We conclude that the court of appeals erred in affirming the admissibility of evidence of Verde's uncharged misconduct offered to prove his specific criminal intent, which was not a legitimately disputed issue at trial. We likewise hold that the State's evidence was not admissible to prove that
Notes
. The State also sought to elicit testimony from a fourth alleged victim, D.J. But the court concluded that the probative value of D.J.'s duplicative testimony was substantially outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice and was thus inadmissible under rule 403.
. We quote the version of our evidentiary rules in effect when Verde was tried. Though 2011 amendments altered the language of some rules-including rules 403 and 404-these changes were intended only "to make [the rules] more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules." Seе R. Evin. 404(b) 2011 advisory committee note. So our analysis here presumably will hold under the newly amended rules, although our discussion is addressed on its face to the rules as they stood at the time of trial.
. See Tanberg v. Sholtis,
. State v. Verde,
. Id. % 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
. See State v. Shickles,
. See State v. Florez,
. The State also alludes vaguely to the notions that Verde's past misconduct might demonstrate "preparation" for or a "pattern" of the activity he is charged with in this case, but neither of those rubrics fit this case. Evidence of "preparation" would indicate steps to facilitate the commission of the crime at issue in the trial, as where a defendant is shown to have stolen a cutting torch that is used in a subsequent burglary. See Lewis v. United States,
. Miguel A. Mendez & Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court's About-Face on the Plan Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct, 28 Lov, L.A. L.Rev. 473, 480-81 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
. See also 22 CmartBs Aran Waricut, Et ac., Frperat Practice Anp Proceoure: Evipence § 5244 (Ist ed.) (''The justification for admitting evidence of other crimes to prove a plan is that this involves no inference as to the defendant's character; instead his conduct is said to be caused by his conscious commitment to a course of conduct of which the charged crime is only a part." (footnote omitted)).
. The State also asserts that we adopted this more "modern" view in State v. Nelson-Waggoner,
. Davin P. Leowarp, Txs New Wigmore A Treatise on Evipence: Evipence or Misconpuct anp Smittar Events § 9.2.2 (2009).
. See Mendez & Imwinkelried, supra 134 n. 9, at 501-03 (discussing the "(intolerable [risks [plosed by the Ewoldt [tJest").
. See id. at 501 ("'Under Ewoldt the inference that the accused committed the charged and uncharged offenses as part of one plan is so weak as to be unacceptably speculative.... In contrast, a showing of common features is highly probative of the accused's disposition to engage in the type of criminal conduct with which he is charged.").
. Id. at 500.
. Mark Cammack, Using the Doctrine of Chances to Prove Actus reus in Child Abuse and Acquaintance Rape: People v. Ewoldt Revisited, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 355, 388 (1996).
. United States v. Russell,
. People v. Balcom,
. See United States v. Woods,
. See the English "Brides in the Bath" case, Rеx v. Smith, 11 Crim.App. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915).
. 1 Enwarp J. UncHaroeep Miscon-puct Evipence § 4:01 (rev. ed. 2004).
. See Leonam», supra 139 n. 12, § 7.3.2 (discussing Wigmore's classic example of a hunter "mistakenly" shooting toward a hunting partner multiple times).
. Or, as one court put it: "The man who wins the lottery once is envied; the one who wins it twice is investigated." United States v. York,
. 1 Imwinketriep, supra 149 n. 21, § 4:01.
. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. Rick. L. Rev. 419, 436 (2006).
. See id. at 436-39 (examining the doctrine's non-character rationale and refuting arguments that character inferences and implicit improbability reasoning both ultimately require a jury to use a "defendant's subjective character as a predictor of conduct").
. See, eg., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris,
. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition, 51 Oxo St. LJ. 575, 588-92 (1990); Cammack, supra ¶ 47 n. 16, at 404; see also Everett,
. Imwinkelried, supra ¶ 57 n. 28, at 592.
. Id. at 595.
. Cammack, supra % 47 n. 16, at 404.
. Id. at 405.
. Id. at 405-06.
. Imwinkelried, supra 1 57 n. 28, at 590.
. Cammack, supra 147 n. 16, at 402; see also id. at 397-04 (explaining the "product rule" used in calculating probabilities and the necessity of independent events for purposes of the product rule).
. See Imwinkelried, supra 1 57 n. 28, at 590.
. Cammack, supra T 47 n. 16, at 396-97.