Lead Opinion
opinion of the court:
INTRODUCTION
T1 On certiorari, petitioner Andrew Le-Beau asks us to consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole following Mr. LeBeau's conviction for aggravated kidnapping pursuant to Utah Code section 76-5-802. Mr. LeBeau's conviction stems from a domestic dispute triggered by Mr. LeBeau's suspicion that his then-girlfriend, Stephanie, was engaged in an affair with another man. At trial, Mr. LeBeau was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal.
12 Mr. LeBeau unsuccessfully challenged his sentence of LWOP before the court of appeals. He now argues that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed the district court's imposition of LWOP because the district court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute. Because we conclude that the district court improperly applied the sentencing provisions of section 76-5-302 of the Utah Code, we reverse Mr. LeBeau's sentence of LWOP and remand for new sentencing.
BACKGROUND
T 3 In early 2009, Mr. LeBeau and Stephanie were living together, but they were experiencing trouble in their relationship. Stephanie had moved out of their shared home for a period of time before returning and, according to Mr. LeBeau, had been unfaithful during the relationship. Both Stephanie and Mr. LeBeau struggled with drug addiction. In early February, Stephanie moved out of the couple's shared bedroom but continued to live in the house.
T 4 The couple was acquainted with a man named Mark, from whom they occasionally purchased drugs. In February 2009, Mr. LeBeau began to suspect that Stephanie was having an affair with Mark. On February 28, 2009, Stephanie spent the afternoon and evening with Mark. Mr. LeBeau repeatedly called Stephanie and sent her text messages,
T5 As the argument escalated, Mr. Le-Beau forced Stephanie to accompany him to the garage, where he threatened to bind her with duct tape and continued to behave violently. Mr. LeBeau placed his dog in the back seat of Stephanie's car before forcing Stephanie to get into the front seat, telling her they were going for a "fast ride." Mr. LeBeau then got into the driver's seat and began to drive toward Mark's house.
T6 As Mr. LeBeau drove, he attracted the attention of Sergeant Marcelas Rapela of the Midvale Police Department. Sergeant Rape-la began to follow the couple's car, ultimately signaling Mr. LeBeau to stop with lights and siren. Stephanie testified that she repeatedly asked Mr. LeBeau to pull over. Rather than stopping, Mr. LeBeau continued toward Mark's house. Mr. LeBeau initially turned onto Mark's street heading in the wrong direction. While turning the car around, Mr. LeBeau nearly crashed into Sergeant Rape-la's patrol car and accelerated rapidly toward Mark's house.
T7 As the car accelerated, Stephanie opened the passenger door in an attempt to jump from the car. Officer David Wilson, who had arrived to assist Sergeant Rapela, observed Stephanie's foot dragging along the road as the car accelerated. As the car raced down Mark's street at approximately sixty miles per hour, it collided with Mark's box-style truck, which was parked at the end of the street.
8 Stephanie was thrown from the car on impact. Officer Wilson testified that he observed Stephanie's body ricochet off the passenger-side door as the collision occurred. Stephanie suffered extensive injuries, including a broken eye socket, fractured femur, fractured pelvis, broken arm, and shattered ankle. Mr. LeBeau's dog was also injured in the crash and required surgery. Mr. Le-Beau did not suffer any significant injuries.
T9 The State charged Mr. LeBeau with aggravated kidnapping based on the serious bodily injury Stephanie suffered, attempted murder, aggravated assault, failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, and cruelty to an animal. Mr. LeBeau pled guilty to failure to respond to an officer's signal and was convicted by a jury of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Though the State argued at trial that Mr. LeBeau intentionally crashed into Mark's truck in an attempt to kill Stephanie, Mr. LeBeau claimed the collision occurred while he was distracted trying to keep Stephanie from jumping out of the car. The jury acquitted Mr. LeBeau of attempted murder.
{10 At Mr. LeBeau's sentencing hearing, the court determined that the sentencing matrices created by the Utah Sentencing Commission were not applicable to Mr. Le-Beau's case because Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute created "a minimum mandatory type sentence." As a result of this determination, the court began with a presumptive sentence of LWOP and then proceeded to consider whether the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors warranted a reduction in Mr. LeBeau's sentence to one of the statutorily allowed lesser sentences. The court identified two aggravating factors on the record. First, it found that Mr. Le-Beau's continued refusal to accept responsibility for his actions was an aggravating factor. Second, the court expressed concern about the serious injuries Stephanie suffered as a result of Mr. LeBeau's conduct.
T 11 The court then considered, and rejected, several mitigating factors raised by Mr. LeBeau. First, Mr. LeBeau claimed to have acted under a strong provocation because he believed Stephanie was having an affair with Mark. The court rejected this mitigating factor, stating, "There was no evidence presented that [Stephanie] was having an affair. There was no evidence that she was involved in a sexual relationship." Second, Mr. Le-Beau claimed to have a good employment history and strong family ties, both of which indicate rehabilitative potential. The court rejected Mr. LeBeau's claim relating to his employment history, stating, "You were un
112 After weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the district court found that the aggravating cireumstances were "substantial" and the mitigating ciream-stances "almost non-existent." It then imposed LWOP for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, the most severe sentence allowed under Utah: Code section 76-5-302. The court also sentenced Mr. LeBeau to zero to five years for both the aggravated assault and failure-to-respond convictions. Finally, the court imposed a suspended sentence of 180 days for the eruelty-to-an-animal convietion and ordered Mr. LeBeau's lesser sentences to run consecutively with his LWOP sentence.
{13 Mr. LeBeau timely appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction. State v. Lebeau,
114 The court of appeals rejected Mr. LeBeau's arguments and upheld his LWOP sentence. Id. 137. The appeals court found that the district court "expressly considered all of [Mr. LeBeau's] mitigating evidence" and that Mr. LeBeau had "demonstrated no more than his disagreement with how the court weighed the mitigating factors." Id. 129. Additionally, the appeals court reasoned that Mr. LeBeau's LWOP sentence was the presumptive sentence prescribed by the Legislature and was, therefore, appropriate. Id. ¶¶ 34-36.
[ 15 We granted certiorari on the question of "[wlhether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of a sentence of life without parole pursuant to section 76-5-8028) of the Utah Code." We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code seetion 78A-3-102(8)(a).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
116 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Brake,
ANALYSIS
I. UTAH'S AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING STATUTE
T17 Mr. LeBeau was convicted of aggravated kidnapping pursuant to section 76-5-302 of the Utah Code. Section 76-5-302 defines aggravated kidnapping as a first degree felony and establishes a complex sentencing scheme that contemplates a range of possible sentences based on the seriousness of the offender's conduct. Mr. LeBeau was sentenced pursuant to subsection (8)(b), which establishes that aggravated kidnapping resulting in "serious bodily injury to another" is punishable by LWOP, "except as provided in Subsection ... (4)." Utax Cop® § 76-5-302(8)(b) (2008). Subsection (4), in turn, allows a sentencing court to impose an indefinite term of six, ten, or fifteen years to life if it finds that doing so would be "in the interests of justice."
1 18 The heart of Mr. LeBeau's challenge concerns the proper interpretation of subsee-tions (8)(b) and (4). Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court failed to adequately consider the "interests of justice" when sentencing him to LWOP. Though the court did consider whether Mr. LeBeau's sentence should be reduced, it did so by starting with a presumptive sentence of LWOP and then considering "the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" of the crime to determine if Mr. LeBeau's sentence should be reduced to one of the lesser terms allowed for in subsection (4). Though the district court did not expressly state its reasoning, it appears to have interpreted the Legislature's use of the phrase "interests of justice" as equivalent to the "aggravating and mitigating cireum-stances" recognized by the Utah Sentencing Commission as part of its sentencing guidelines. Mr. LeBeau asserts that this was in error because the Legislature's use of the phrase "interests of justice" requires consideration of factors beyond the aggravating and mitigating cireumstances of his particular crime. Specifically, Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court was required to consider (1) the severity of an LWOP sentence, (2) whether a sentence of LWOP was proportionate to the seriousness of Mr. LeBeau's crime, and (8) Mr. LeBeau's rehabilitative potential. Further, Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court erred when it rejected several of Mr. LeBeau's proposed mitigating
{19 Our task of reviewing Mr. LeBeau's sentence requires that we interpret section 76-5-302 of the Utah Code, which calls for the imposition of a sentence of LWOP unless the interests of justice dictate a lesser sentence. We note, first, that any error on the part of the district court in its interpretation of subsection (4)'s interests-of-justice language would be harmless if the district court were free to sentence Mr. LeBeau to LWOP without considering the interests of justice in the first instance. Thus, the threshold question is whether the district court was required to engage in an interests-of-justice analysis prior to sentencing Mr. LeBeau to LWOP under subsection (8)(b). Because we conclude that the court was so required, we then turn our attention to the proper meaning of "interests of justice" as used in subsection (4). Finally, we consider Mr. LeBeau's claim that the district court erred when it rejected several of his proposed mitigating factors.
II, THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT AN INTERESTS-OF-JUSTICE ANALYSIS PRIOR TO SENTENCING MR. LEBEAU TO LWOP
120 As with any question of statutory interpretation, our primary goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. State v. Watkins,
] 21 Subsection (8)(b) of Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute directs sentencing courts to impose a sentence of LWOP, "except as provided in Subsection ... (4)." Uran CopE § 76-5-802(8)(b) (2008). Subsection (4) allows the court to impose a lesser indefinite term if it finds that doing so would be "in the interests of justice." Id. § 76-5-8302(4). We read subsections (8) and (4) together as requiring an interests-of-justice analysis. First, the plain language of subsection (8)(b) directs the court to impose a sentence of LWOP "except as provided in Subsection ... (4)." Id. § 76-5-802(8)(b). Here, the word "except" is followed by a phrase that describes the particular manner or cireum-stance-as provided in subsection (4d)-in which a sentence of LWOP is not applicable. As such, subsection (8)(b) is best read as establishing a presumptive sentence of LWOP while also delineating the particular cireumstance in which LWOP would be inappropriate. It follows that, in order to determine whether LWOP would be inappropriate, a court must engage in the interests-of-justice analysis laid out in subsection (4). If courts were free to impose LWOP without first considering the interests of justice, the exception provided by the Legislature would be rendered meaningless. Thus, we read subsections (8)(b) and (4) together as requiring that sentencing courts consider the interests of justice to determine whether a lesser sentence is appropriate.
122 Reading Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute as a whole further supports this conclusion. The statute distinguishes three types of aggravated kidnapping: (1) aggravated kidnapping, (2) aggravated kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury, and (3) aggravated kidnapping committed by a defendant who has previously been convicted of a "grievous sexual offense." Id. § T6-5-302(8). It then establishes different sentences for each,. Id. For example, a defendant convicted of aggravated kidnapping may be sentenced to a sentence of fifteen years to life. Id. § 76-5-802(8)(a). In contrast, defendants who have been previously convicted
1 23 Further bolstering our conclusion that the Legislature intended to differentiate between different types of aggravated kidnapping, the Legislature directed that the maximum sentences for aggravated kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping resulting in serious bodily injury should be imposed "except as provided in Subsection ... (4)," which triggers the interests-of-justice analysis. See id. § 76-5-802(8)(a)-(b). But the Legislature specifically directed that defendants who have been previously convicted of grievous sexual offenses may not be sentenced to one of the lesser terms contained in subsection (4). Id. § 76-5-802(5). Thus, a sentencing court has no option but to impose a sentence of LWOP for these offenders. In contrast, defendants who cause substantial bodily injury are eligible for a lesser sentence if the sentencing court determines that such a reduction is in the interests of justice. Thus, the Legislature provided for the possibility of a reduced sentence for defendants sentenced under either subsection (8)(a) or (8)(b), but not for those sentenced under subsection (8)(c). This tri-level distinction makes clear the Legislature's judgment that not all aggravated kidnappings are the same and evidences the Legislature's intent to punish more "serious" kidnappings with harsher sentences.
1] 24 Were we to conclude that sentencing courts could impose the statutory presumptive sentence under subsections (8)(a) and (8)(b) without first considering the interests of justice, it would undermine the distinctions between the different types of aggravated kidnapping drawn by the Legislature. Though the language of subsection (4) is permissive, the statutory scheme makes clear that the Legislature did not intend to give sentencing courts a license to ignore this subsection altogether. Rather, reading subsections (8) and (4) together, we conclude that the Legislature intended sentencing courts to consider the interests of justice when sentencing defendants under subsections (8)(a) or (3)(b), but not under subsection (8)(c).
III. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE SECTION 76-5-802(4)
125 Having determined that the district court was required to engage in an-interests-of-justice analysis when sentencing Mr. LeBeau, we turn our attention to what is required for such an analysis. At sentencing, the court did consider whether a lesser indeterminate sentence was appropriate for Mr. LeBeau. In doing so, the court considered Mr. LeBeau's crime in light of the list of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances compiled by the Utah Sentencing Commission in its sentencing guidelines. Though the district court did not articulate its reasoning on the record, it appears that the court equated the weighing of these aggravating and mitigating cireumstances with an interests-of-justice analysis. Mr. LeBeau argues that this was in error and that an interests-of-justice analysis requires the court to consider factors other than the aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding a particular defendant and crime.
$26 We begin, as always, with the statutory text. Marion Emergy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship,
T27 The Legislature did not provide a statutory definition of "in the interests of justice." Accordingly, we look to other sources to derive the meaning of the phrase. See State v. Bagnes,
128 The phrase "in the interests of jus-. tice" appears in many other parts of the Utah Code, but is never specifically defined. See, eg., Utax Cope § 75-7-204(2)(b) (2013) (allowing Utah courts to entertain proceedings involving foreign trusts if "the interests of justice would be seriously impaired" by dismissal); id. § 78B-1-136 (establishing a witness's right "to be detained only so long as the interests of justice require"); id. § 77-8a-1(2)(d) (directing Utah courts to jointly try co-defendants unless the court finds that separate trials would be in "the interests of justice"); Uran R. Evip. 807(a)(d) (allowing courts to admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements if doing so is in "the interests of justice"); Utax R.App. P. 5(f) (directing that an appeal from an interlocutory order should ouly be granted if in the "interests of justice"). What quickly becomes clear is that the Legislature cannot have meant to use the phrase "in the interests of justice" in the same manner in all these different contexts.
129 The Legislature added the interests-of-justice language to Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute in 2007 as part of a sweeping revision of the penalties associated with sexual offenses and kidnapping. See 2007 Utah Laws 2060-78. The Legislature crafted a sentencing scheme substantially similar to that found in the aggravated kidnapping statute in at least eight other criminal statutes. See Utax Cop® §§ 76-4-102 (attempt), -204 (criminal solicitation); id. §§ 76-5-301.1 (child kidnapping), -402 (rape), 402.1 (rape of a child), 402.2 (object rape), -404 (forcible sexual abuse), -405 (aggravated sexual assault). Each of these statutes, except solicitation and attempt, governs crimes involving kidnapping and sexual assault. And in each case, the Legislature created a presumptive sentence and instructed sentencing courts to consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence. Our task, then, is to determine what the phrase means in the context of the sentencing scheme crafted by the Legislature in these related statutes.
A. Section 76-5-802(4)'s Interests-of-Justice Amalysis Is not Equivalent to Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
T 30 As an initial matter, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend the phrase "interests of justice" as a mere substitute for the weighing of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances recognized by the Sentencing
{31 The Utah Sentencing Commission is empowered to create sentencing guidelines designed to "increase equity in criminal sentencing." Urax Cope § 68M-7-404(8). To that end, the Sentencing Commission creates sentencing guidelines that include a nonex-haustive list of aggravating and mitigating cirenmstances that are used by courts in their sentencing decisions. See UTax ApuLt SEntENcinec anNp REuEass GuipELIn®s 13 (2009). The sentencing guidelines instruct courts to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating cireumstances of a particular crime holistically when sentencing offenders. Id. at 12. Had the Legislature intended courts to consider only the aggravating and mitigating cireumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission when sentencing defendants under Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute, it had the means and knowledge to so instruct. Instead, the Legislature directed courts to consider "the interests of justice."
¶ 32 More tellingly, prior to 2007, section 76-3-201(7)(e) of the Utah Code did instruct the courts to "consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated by the Sentencing Commission" when "determining a just sentence." Defendants convicted of aggravated kidnapping were sentenced to an indefinite term of six, ten, or fifteen years to life. Utax Cope § 76-5-302(8) (2006). The court was required to impose the middle-severity term of ten years to life, "unless there [were] cireumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime." Id. § 76-3-201(7)(a). Section 76-3-201(7)(e) then directed the court to consider the aggravating and mitigating cireum-stances recognized by the Utah Sentencing Commission. However, this sentencing scheme was removed from the Utah Code in the same revision that created the interests-of-justice sentencing scheme in the related kidnapping and sexual assault statutes.
T83 In Mr. LeBeau's case, the district court looked to the list of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances contained in the sentencing guidelines and no further. Because the Legislature replaced its previous aggravating-and-mitigating-cireumstances instruction with the new mandate to consider the interests of justice, we conclude that the district court's analysis was in error,. We now turn our attention to what a proper interests-of-justice analysis requires.
B. An Interests-of-Justice Amalysis Requires Consideration of Proportionality and the Defendant's Rehabilitative Potential
184 Though the Legislature did not specifically define "interests of justice" in the aggravated kidnapping statute, it has provided guidance elsewhere in the Utah Code. Section 76-1-106 of the Utah Code directs that Utah's criminal code "shall be construed according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of [slection 76-1-104." (Emphasis added). Section 76-1-104 sets forth four general goals of Utah's criminal code:
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitutes each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as eriminal.
(8) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition [of] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons aceused or convicted of offenses.
(Emphasis added.) '
T 35 The goals enumerated in section 76-1-104 relate to different aspects of the criminal code. For example, subsection (2) relates to the public definition of offenses. This necessarily incorporates ideas of fair notice and due process because a just eriminal code must adequately inform those subject to it of the behaviors that will expose them to erimi-nal liability. Subsection (4) addresses the treatment of individuals onee they are brought into the criminal justice system and recognizes the importance of fair treatment of those individuals.
136 But it is subsection (8) that relates most closely to sentencing. Subsection (8) articulates the legislative goal that sentencing be proportionate to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and recognizes that individual offenders have different potential for rehabilitation. Thus, reading sections 76-1-104 and 76-1-106 together, we must construe our criminal code in ways that "promote justice," including principles of proportionality and a recognition of the rehabilitative potential of individual defendants.
137 Keeping these basic principles in mind, we conclude that the Legislature's use of the phrase "interests of justice" necessarily requires the court to consider the proportionality of the defendant's sentence in relation to the severity of his offense. Additionally, it requires that sentencing judges appropriately weigh a defendant's potential for rehabilitation.
1. A Proportionality Analysis Requires the Court to Consider the Seriousness of the Defendant's Conduct When Compared to the Severity of His Sentence and the Sentences Imposed for Different Offenses
$38 "The principle that a punish ment should be proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence." Solem v. Helm,
1 39 It is important to note, first, that the Supreme Court's proportionality jurisprudence arose in a very different context than that with which we are now confronted. Typically, the Court was confronted with a challenge to the constitutionality of a legislatively enacted sentencing statute. See, eg., Weems,
€ 40 In Solem, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a South Dakota recidivism statute that imposed a sentence of LWOP on a defendant who had written a "no account" check for $100, a class 5 felony under South Dakota law.
%41 The Court enumerated three objective factors designed to guide its proportionality analysis: (1) the seriousness of the defendant's conduct in relation to the severity of the sentence imposed, (2) the severity of the sentence imposed in light of sentences imposed for other crimes in the same jurisdiction, and (8) the severity of the sentence imposed in relation to sentences imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id. at 290-92,
a. The seriousness of the defendant's conduct in relation to the severity of his sentence
T 42 First, sentencing courts should consider "the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty." Solem,
143 In general, nonviolent crimes should be viewed as less serious than violent crimes. Id. at 292-93,
' 44 The court may also consider the "absolute magnitude of the crime." Solem,
145 Another important consideration is the culpability of the offender. We generally agree with the notion that negligent conduct is less serious than intentional conduct. Solem,
"I 46 We emphasize that a court's consideration of this first factor should be guided by its objective assessment of the nature and circumstances of the defendant's crime in relation to the harshness of the penalty. The above discussion is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of factors because sentencing remains a highly fact-dependent endeay- or. And the Sentencing Commission's list of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances remain relevant for this factor. On remand, the sentencing court should consider the seriousness of Mr. LeBeau's conduct in light of the severe nature of a sentence of LWOP when determining whether the interests of justice warrant the imposition of one of subsection (4)'s lesser sentences.
b. Sentences imposed for other crimes in Utah
1 47 Second, sentencing courts should compare the sentence being imposed to the sentences imposed for other crimes in Utah. A key proposition underlying the proportionality principle is fairness. Defendants who commit more serious offenses should be punished more severely than those who commit less serious crimes. As part of a proportionality analysis, courts should consider the sentences imposed for more and less serious crimes in order to ensure that a particular defendant's sentence is not arbitrary.
148 For example, in Utah, a person who commits intentional murder is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by an indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. Utax Cop® § 76-5-208(8). In order for a defendant who commits a murder to be eligible for a sentence of LWOP, he must be convicted of aggravated murder as defined by section 76-5-202 of the Utah Code. Id. § 76-3-207.7. Aggravated murder requires that the defendant commit the crime under cireumstances that would justify such a severe sentence. Id. § 76-5-202(1). For example, a murder accompanied by the sexual abuse of a child or committed by the use of a weapon of mass destruction would qualify for aggravated murder. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(n)(@i), (2)(a). But absent the aggravating factors found in section 76-5-202, a defendant who commits first degree murder can expect a maximum sentence of life with the possibility of parole.
€49 Other crimes for which the Legislature has established LWOP as a possible sentence include a variety of sexual offenses, but only if the defendant is a repeat offender. For example, aggravated sexual assault, rape, and sodomy each carry a penalty of LWOP if the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense. Id. §§ 76-5-405(2), -402(8)(c), -403(4)(c). In the case of a child victim, the Legislature allows a sentence of LWOP for first-time offenders if the defendant causes serious bodily injury. Id. §§ 76-5-404.1(5)Gb), - 408.1(2)®)(i). When the Legislature established this sentencing scheme for sexual offenses, it signaled its judgment that sexual crimes, which intrude on the fundamental bodily integrity of the victim like no others short of murder, are serious enough to warrant a sentence of LWOP.
151 Having provided some guidance as to the proper proportionality analysis for the court on remand, we turn our attention to the second interests-of-justice factor in the Utah Code, the defendant's capacity for rehabilitation.
2. Proper Consideration of the Interests of Justice Includes Deference to the Role of the Board of Pardons and Parole
11 52 As noted above, one of the goals of the Utah Criminal Code is to promote justice through the imposition of penalties "which permit recognition [of] differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders." Urax CopE® § 76-1-104(8). The Board of Pardons and Parole (Board) has the power to "grant parole ... as provided by statute." Urax Const. art. VII, § 12(@)(a) We have previously recognized the important role the Board plays in Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. State v. Smith,
1 58 An important part of our reasoning in Smith centered on the Legislature's decision to grant the Board broad authority to determine what a particular defendant's maximum sentence should be. Id. The court of appeals concluded that the Legislature's decision to make LWOP the presumptive sentence for aggravated kidnapping "essentially countermanded, for this crime, Utah's long-standing sentencing philosophy of indeterminate sentencing." State v. Lebeau,
1] 54 Sentencing courts must consider all of the factors relevant to a defendant's rehabilitative potential, We have previously indicated that a defendant's age at the time of the commission of the crime is relevant. State v. Strunk,
T 55 In sum, sentencing courts should consider the proportionality of a sentence to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation when determining whether the interests of justice support a lesser sentence. The sentencing court in this case failed to properly consider the interests of justice when sentencing Mr. LeBeau. We therefore reverse and remand for a new sentencing. Because the sentencing court on remand will be required to consider the aggravating and mitigating cireumstances as part of its interests-of-justice analysis, and because Mr. LeBeau argued that the sentencing court previously erred in evaluating several of his proposed mitigating factors, we take this opportunity to provide guidance to the sentencing court on remand.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY EVALUATED MR. LEBEAUS PROPOSED MITIGATING FACTORS
156 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court erroneously rejected several of his proposed mitigating factors, including (1) his claim that he acted under strong provocation, (2) his relatively minor criminal history, (8) his employment history, and (4) his family ties. Because the district court will be required to assess these factors in its interests-of-justice analysis on remand, we take this opportunity to provide guidance as to the appropriate legal standards.
A. The District Court Applied the Incorrect Legal Standard when It Rejected Mr. LeBeaw's Claim that He Acted Under Provocation
T57 At sentencing, Mr. LeBeau argued that he acted under provocation the night he kidnapped Stephanie because he was upset at the thought that she was having an affair with another man. The district court rejected this claimed mitigating circumstance, stating, "There was no evidence presented that [Stephanie] was having an affair. There was no evidence that she was involved in a sexual relationship. You came to that conclusion, but I found no basis for that." Mr. LeBeau argues that he was not required to prove that Stephanie was actually engaged in a sexual relationship with Mark. Rather, it was enough that Mr. LeBeau believed Stephanie was having an affair and reacted in the heat of the moment because of that belief.
158 We agree with Mr. LeBeau that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard in its analysis of this mitigating factor. Though we have never expressly addressed the question in this context, we recently reiterated the proper legal standard to be applied in the context of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. See Ross v. State,
1 59 In this case, the district court rejected Mr. LeBeau's claim of provocation on the basis that Mr. LeBeau had not established that Stephanie was, in fact, having an affair. This had the effect of requiring Mr. LeBeau to overcome a much greater hurdle than our precedent requires. Mr. LeBeau was not required to demonstrate that Stephanie and Mark were actually having an affair, only that Mr. LeBeau reasonably believed they were. But the district court wholly disre~ garded Mr. LeBeau's subjective experience in its analysis. There is evidence in the record that Mr. LeBeau's actions on the night in question were driven by his genuine belief that Stephanie was having an affair with Mark. Shortly before the fateful night,
T 60 Stephanie's testimony paints the picture of a man acting, at least in part, out of jealousy and corroborates Mr. LeBeau's claim that he reacted emotionally on the night in question. Though this does not exeuse Mr. LeBeau's deplorable actions, his subjective emotional state was relevant to the mitigating factor of provocation. On remand, the sentencing court should examine Mr. LeBeau's actions in light of the proper legal standard to determine whether Mr. Le-Beau acted under provocation the night he kidnapped Stephanie.
B. The District Court Improperly Weighed Mr. LeBeaw's Criminal History
$61 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court improperly rejected his relatively minor criminal history as a mitigating factor. We agree. Mr. LeBeau's criminal history includes a single conviction from 1989 for first degree robbery, when Mr. LeBeau was a juvenile, and a conviction for possession of marijuana in 1998. The presentence report also showed that Mr. LeBeau had been arrest free since 2001.
T62 At sentencing, the district court rejected Mr. LeBeau's criminal history as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau had an outstanding warrant for his arrest in Alabama and was living under an assumed name at the time he kidnapped Stephanie. The court also noted Mr. LeBeau's admitted drug use as a reason to find Mr. LeBeau's criminal history nonmitigating. Though Mr. Le-Beau's history indicates that he was no angel, neither was he the type of hardened eriminal we normally associate with a sentence of LWOP.
T 63 Because the Legislature established a separate sentencing scheme for aggravated kidnapping, we agree with the district court judge that the sentencing guidelines established by the Utah Sentencing Commission are not strictly applicable to Mr. LeBeau's case. However, the sentencing guidelines were not rendered totally irrelevant. In particular, the eriminal history matrices still inform the inquiry into the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. The Sentencing Commission is charged with developing sentencing guidelines designed to "increase equity in criminal sentencing." Urax CopE § G3M-7-404(8) (20183). We do not conclude that the Legislature intended for sentencing courts to completely ignore the wisdom of the Sentencing Commission guidelines when it established the sentencing scheme for seetion 76-5-802 of the Utah Code, particularly in light of the Legislature's instruction to consider the interests of Justice.
€64 As Mr. LeBeau notes, his eriminal history scores relatively low on the general offender matrix.
C. The District Court Improperly Discounted Mr. LeBeaw's Employment History
$65 Mr. LeBeau argues that the district court failed to properly credit his employment history as a mitigating factor. The court refused to consider Mr. LeBeau's employment history as a mitigating factor because Mr. LeBeau was unemployed at the time he committed his crime. However, the presentence report makes clear that Mr. Le-Beau was employed as a painter by the same employer from May 2005, until he was laid off in December 2008, only two months prior to his arrest. Though a defendant's employment status at the time of his crime is certainly a relevant factor, it is not solely determinative. In light of the severe economic recession that gripped the country in 2008, which was particularly devastating in the construction sector, the fact that Mr. LeBeau was laid off and had yet to find new employment within a two-month period cannot fairly be held against him. The district court erred when it relied solely on the fact that Mr. LeBeau was unemployed at the time he committed his crime. On remand, the court should consider the reasons for Mr. LeBeau's unemployment and the totality of his employment history when determining whether his employment history should be considered a mitigating factor.
D. The District Court Improperly Discounted Mr. LeBeaw's Family Support
166 The district court refused to consider Mr. LeBeau's family support strue-ture as a mitigating factor because Mr. Le-Beau "hadn't seen [his] mother or [his] sister for years at the time they came to testify at trial." Again, while a defendant's physical contact with his family is relevant, it cannot be determinative. Mr. LeBeau's family all resides out of state. In large part due to the expense of travel, prolonged physical separation of family members is a reality for many today. But with technological innovations, families can remain in close contact, even when physically separated. For example, Mr. LeBeau's mother told the presentence investigator that she and Mr. LeBeau talked on the phone monthly during the time he was in Utah. Again, the district court's focus on only one aspect of a potential mitigating factor was in error. On remand, the sentencing court should consider the full extent of Mr. LeBeau's family support and whether that can be considered a mitigating factor.
CONCLUSION
T67 The court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of a sentence of LWOP under section 76-5-302 of the Utah Code. The district court erred when it considered only those aggravating and mitigating cireumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission instead of broadly considering the interests of justice as required by subsection 76-5-802(4). Though the district court is given broad discretion in sentencing decisions, that discretion must be exercised in light of the proper legal standards. Because the district court abused its discretion when sentencing Mr. LeBeau, we vacate Mr. LeBeau's sentence of LWOP and remand for further sentencing proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Prior to trial, Mr. LeBeau also pled guilty to failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop.
. The district court did consider other mitigating factors not presently before us. The court credited Mr. LeBeau with two mitigating factors: (1) that Mr. LeBeau's imprisonment would work a hardship on Mr. LeBeau's dependents, and (2) that all of Mr. LeBeau's convictions arose from a single criminal episode. The court also rejected Mr. LeBeau's claim that his imprisonment would compromise his ability to make restitution, finding that the likelihood that Mr. LeBeau would ever be able to make restitution was remote.
. The relevant subsections of Utah's aggravated kidnapping statute provide:
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of:
(a) except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), (3)(c), or (4), not less than 15 years and which may be for life;
(b) except as provided in Subsection (3)(c) or (4), life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that during the course of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping the defendant caused serious bodily injury to another; or
(c) life without parole, if the trier of fact finds that at the time of the commission of the aggravated kidnapping, the defendant was previously convicted of a grievous sexual offense.
(4) If, when imposing a sentence under Subsection (3)(a) or (b), a court finds that a lesser term than the term described in Subsection (3)(a) or (b) is in the interests of justice and states the reasons for this finding on the record, the court may impose a term of imprison ment of not less than:
(a) for purposes of Subsection (3)(b), 15 years and which may be for life; or
(b) for purposes of Subsection (3)(a) or (b):
(i) 10 years and which may be for life; or
(i) six years and which may be for life.
Urax Cope § 76-5-302(3)-(4).
. Mr. LeBeau argues that an interests-of-justice analysis requires courts to consider the totality of the circumstances. Though we agree that the Legislature's use of the phrase "interests of justice" requires consideration of factors beyond the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime, we conclude that the statute requires a more focused analysis than Mr. LeBeau's proposed totality-of-the-circumstances test.
. As discussed below, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to a particular crime are certainly relevant to the court's interests-of-justice analysis. Infra 1942, 46. But aggravating and mitigating circumstances are simply one facet of the proper analysis.
. Utah's capital sentencing scheme continues to direct that juries must consider the "totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Urag Cope § 76-3-207(5)(b). Section 76-3-207(4) presents a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered.
. The presentence investigator also scored Mr. LeBeau's criminal history on the sex offender matrix. It is unclear why this matrix was used because Mr. LeBeau was not convicted of a sex offense and there were no sexual overtones to the kidnapping he committed. Nevertheless, that matrix recommends that a defendant with Mr. LeBeau's criminal history be sentenced to fifteen years to life, with a recommended sentence of twenty-one years.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I 68 Utah law has long committed a range of sentencing decisions to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The statute at issue here, Utah Code section 76-5-302(8), appears to me to fall squarely within this discretionary sentencing regime. It does so by leaving the question of whether to impose a sentence of life without parole for aggravated kidnapping to the trial judge's assessment of the "interests of justice."
T 69 The majority turns that discretionary standard on its head. Instead of deferring to the historically broad discretion conferred on trial judges, the court interprets the "interests of justice" standard to require a sentencing judge to carefully consider specific factors that the court deems relevant to an assessment of the "proportionality" of a sentence and to the defendant's "potential for
I
170 In Utah as elsewhere, our law has long recognized a wide berth of discretion for judges exercising the important duty of imposing a criminal sentence.
T 71 With a few limited exceptions, the law has also long deferred to the trial judge's discretion in identifying the range of offense-based and offender-based considerations relevant to the ultimate decision as to where to fix the sentence within a statutory range.
T72 Our Utah system of "indeterminate" sentencing cireumseribes the trial judge's discretion to some degree. It does so by generally prescribing indeterminate sentencing ranges for various categories of offenses, with the ultimate amount of time served being decided not by the sentencing judge at the outset but by the parole board in subsequent hearings.
173 But that does not mean that our judges do not exercise discretion. First, not all sentencing decisions are subject to the indeterminate sentencing regime, as this case illustrates. See Urax Copr § 76-5-302(3) (leaving it to the judge to decide whether to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for the crime of aggravated kidnapping). Second, even as to offenses that are subject to indeterminate sentences, the judge still is faced with discretionary judgments-e.g., whether to place a defendant on probation and/or suspend a prison sentence, whether to order that sentences on multiple offenses be served concurrently or consecutively, and whether to enter a convietion for a lower category of offense under Utah Code section 76-3402. See Uran Cope § 76-3-402(1) (authorizing sentencing court to enter a "judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense" upon determination that it would be "unduly harsh" to enter conviction at charged level); id. § 76-3-402(2) (authorizing court to "enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense" if it "suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on probation" and determines that it is in the "interests of justice" and the defendant is successfully discharged from probation and meets other conditions).
T 74 The process for exercising this discretion is regulated by statute and by rule. Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(7), "[alt the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence." (Emphasis added.) This provision also requires that such "testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant." Id. Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 is to the same general effect. It
€75 The point of these provisions is straightforward: Both the defense and the prosecution have the opportunity to make a presentation as to any considerations or information they deem relevant to sentencing; and the judge then exercises his broad discretion to impose a sentence based on the considerations he deems most salient.
T76 We have applied these standards in upholding the exercise of the discretion of a trial judge in making the decision whether to suspend a sentence on condition of probation. See State v. Killpack,
T 78 We have also identified another limitation on sentencing in cases where such discretion is exercised in a manner interfering with the authority afforded to the Board of Pardons and Parole by statute and by the Utah Constitution. See Urax Const, art. VII, § 12 (recognizing authority of board to "grant parole ... in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to regulations as provided by statute"); Uran Copm § 76-3-401 (allowing multiple sentences to be imposed consecutively if the judge considers, among other factors, the "rehabilitative needs of the defendant"). Thus, in State v. Strunk,
T79 Courts in other jurisdictions have identified additional factors that may not be considered at sentencing without running afoul of the constitution
180 The breadth of this sentencing discretion is not without controversy. The flip-side of broad discretion is the potential for inconsistency. And that potential has generated a number of responses to the traditional regime of discretionary sentencing described above. One well-known response is the invocation of "sentencirig guideline" schemes aimed at replacing the individual judge's discretion with a formulaic sentencing system adopted pursuant to sentencing reform initiatives.
{81 Other responses to the traditional system of discretionary sentencing have come in the form of constitutional challenges in the courts. First was a challenge under the Eighth Amendment to the imposition of the death penalty, based on the allegation that discretionary sentencing as applied to the imposition of the death penalty led to arbitrary decision-making, perhaps leading to racial imbalances in the imposition of this sentence. That challenge culminated in the Supreme Court's per curiam decision in Furman v. Georgia,
T82 The second main conétitutional challenge to discretionary sentencing came in
1 83 The Solem standard, however, is not a generally applicable limitation on sentencing discretion. It is a constitutional standard, which is properly invoked only upon the assertion of an Eighth Amendment challenge to a given sentence.
II
T 84 This history provides the background necessary for our interpretation of the sentencing discretion prescribed in Utah Code section 76-5-302(8). The statute is part and parcel of a longstanding system of discretionary sentencing. Section 76-5-302(8) seems to me to preserve that discretion. It does so by directing the judge to impose the sentence he deems consistent with his sense of the "interests of justice."
1 85 The hazy terms of the statute seem to me to emphasize the breadth of the judge's discretion in sentencing. As used in our sentencing scheme and elsewhere, this phrase appears to be little more than a reinforcement of the court's broad discretion to impose a sentence that it deems appropriate in light of the relevant circumstances as perceived by the judge.
1 86 Most often, the notion of "interests of justice" is used to impart discretion for a judge to depart downward from a presumptive statutory sentence for a particular crime.
I 87 I find no room in the statutory authority to impose a sentence "in the interests of justice" for the complex, detailed sentencing standards prescribed by the majority. Granted, the legislature does not always use "the phrase ... in the same manner in all the[ ] different contexts" in which it appears in our code. Supra 128. But to me that only reinforces the understanding of this phrase as a general placeholder for a principle of broad judicial discretion-discretion that may be exercised in different ways in different contexts, but that is broad and not easily subject to reversal on appeal.
€88 I agree that the current version of section 76-5-302(8) is not the equivalent of the now-repealed instruction to courts to impose a sentence for aggravated kidnapping based on a consideration of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances identified by the Utah Sentencing Commission. See supra €32 (citing Urax Coprm § 76-5-302 (2007). But I would not draw that inference from the mere fact of amendment of the old scheme-much less from the fact that the legislature "had the means and knowledge" to require consideration of aggravating and mitigating cireumstances if it intended to do so. Supra 11 31-82. After all, the mere fact of a legislative amendment tells us little or nothing about the reason for amendment-which could either be an intent to abandon the old scheme in favor of a different one, or simply a desire to reword the statute in equivalent or synonymous terms.
89 The majority presumes that any rejection of the old mitigation-aggravation construct must have been a preference for something even more restrictive. Thus, after announcing its conclusion that the statute is not "equivalent to the previous aggravating-and-mitigating cireumstances language," the court assumes that the existing statutory standard must necessarily be more restrictive than the one it replaced. Supre 182. And it then proceeds to develop such a standard from the general "goals" stated in our criminal code and from Eighth Amendment easelaw on proportionality in sentencing (under Solem v. Helm ).
1 90 I find no basis for such a standard in section 76-5-302(@8). Black's Law Dictionary defines "justice" as "[the fair and proper administration of laws." Brack's Law DicTIONARY 942 (Oth ed.2009). Thus, the statutory direction to the court to impose the sentence it deems to be in the "interests of justice" is a straightforward reiteration of the judge's duty to decide what seems most "fair and proper." That cannot properly be construed to require the court to follow the
I 91 Instead, the terminology of the statute is a straightforward reiteration of the longstanding principle of broad sentencing discretion. Our opinion in State v. Russell,
T 92 I would accordingly read the terms of the governing statute as a straightforward reiteration of the longstanding discretion afforded to the sentencing judge. And I would not deem those terms to be overridden by the "general purposes" articulated in the pre-ambular provisions of the criminal code. Su-pro 134. None of these purposes identify, much less attempt to define, the meaning of "interests of justice" in sentencing or even in our criminal law.
T93 As the majority notes, section 76-1-106 does make a general reference to "justice" (though not "interests of justice"). Su-pro I 34. But even that term is used only to prescribe a rather fuzzy canon of construction of the code-to direct the courts to construe it "according to the fair import of [its] terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and general purposes of [slection 76-1-104." Supra 134. This general canon seems to me to have little or nothing to do with the question presented here-of the meaning of "interests of justice" in a sentencing statute.
¶ 94 The majority cites this provision as a basis for importing an analysis of the principles of proportionality and rehabilitation, since the third of the four general purposes identified in section 104 encompasses the prescription of "penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders." Urax Copm § 76-1-104. In light of this general reference to these principles, the court reads the "interests of justice" consideration in section 76-5-302(8) to require an individualized assessment of proportionality and rehabilitative potential in each case prior to the imposition of a sentence under this statute.
£95 I cannot agree with this approach. The general purposes cited by the majority are purposes of the criminal code-not of trial judges exercising discretion in sentencing. «Thus, the general purposes invoked by the court have no apparent connection to our interpretation of the "interests of justice" consideration in sentencing under section 76-5-302(8). That phrase, again, is a reinforcement of the judge's broad sentencing discretion. And the longstanding tradition of such discretion runs clearly contrary to the detailed review for proportionality and rehabilitative potential prescribed by the court.
¶ 96 The court's standard turns the above-recounted history on its head. Traditionally, the principal limits on the judge's discretion in sentencing have been constitutional in nature. Thus, except where limited by the Eighth Amendment, principles of due process, or otherwise, our law has long left it up to the judge to determine the considerations that seem most salient to him and to impose an appropriate sentence in light of those considerations. The court's decision today inverts this inquiry. In a regime governed
T 97 This will surely come as a shock to the district judge in this case, who could not possibly have imagined being reversed for not engaging an Eighth Amendment analysis of proportionality in a case where no one had ever invoked the Eighth Amendment. And I suppose it will even come as a shock to counsel for LeBeau, who are being granted broad license to challenge the presumptive sentence endorsed by the legislature on grounds they never advanced in the proceedings below and thus have not preserved.
III
98 For the above reasons, I1 would interpret the terms of section 76-5-802(8) to preserve the traditional, broad sentencing discretion long afforded to trial judges in Utah. Thus, I would note that before imposing a sentence in this case, the district judge was required by statute to "receive any testimony, evidence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence." UTaAK Cone § 77-18-1(7). But beyond that, and except as foreclosed by the limitations of the Utah and United States Constitution, I would hold that the sentencing decision under seetion 76-5-302(8) was committed to the broad discretion of the judge to identify the considerations that he deemed appropriate in imposing a sentence that he deemed consonant with the "interests of justice." And I would affirm on that basis, as I see nothing in this record to suggest that he abused his sound discretion in imposing the sentence he selected.
T 99 I can understand a degree of discomfort with the sentence imposed on LeBeau. From what I can tell on the face of the cold record before us on this appeal, I suspect I may not have imposed the sentence that was handed down in this case. But sentences in Utah are not imposed on the basis of cold records. They are imposed by trial judges, who are informed by a wealth of understanding and firsthand experience that appellate judges lack. That is why our law affords those judges such broad discretion, and why we limit our review on appeal for the rare abuse of discretion.
€100 I can also appreciate a degree of discomfort with the discretionary sentencing scheme that we have adopted in Utah. As I noted above, and as proponents of sentencing reform have been advocating for decades, the downside of discretion is the potential for arbitrariness.
. See State v. McGee,
. See, eg., State v. Sanwick,
. See, eg., Apprendi v. New Jersey,
. See Gerrard,
. See Padilla v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole,
. State v. Sweat,
. State v. Killpack,
. See State v. Lipsky,
. Gerrard,
. See also Baine v. Beckstead,
. See Klein, supra note 2, at 693 & n. 4 (indicating that in the traditional scheme of discretionary sentencing, there are "no standards to assist or confine the judge in making his determination;" listing as limited exceptions the following: "(1) a sentence imposed using constitutional criteria, such as race or political viewpoint, Wayte v. United States,
, United States v. Kaba,
. Id.; see also United States v. Borrero-Isaza,
. United States v. Maples,
. See Klein, supra note 2, at 699 ("The indeterminate sentencing model began to unravel in the
. See generally Mistretta v. United States,
. See eg., Freed, supra note 16, at 1690 (criticizing the United States Sentencing commission and its guidelines as "more complex, inflexible, and severe than those devised by any other jurisdiction" (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1686-87 (noting that soon after their enactment and implementation, the federal guidelines "provoked dismay and evasion in the federal courts and the bar" due to "a powerful sense that the guidelines dictate unjust sentences in too many cases," and that "[mJany judges [] conform[ed] to the guidelines with a deep sense of distress" due to their broad and rigid requirements); Kare Sriru & Joss A. CasranEs, Fear or Jupainc: Sentence GuipeLinEs In tHE Feperar Courts (1998) (arguing that the most profound deficiency of the federal sentencing guidelines is that they are unexplained, and therefore lawless, and calling for a return of sentencing discretion to federal judges without "bureaucratic" rules).
. In any event, the continuing viability of the Solem standard of proportionality is an open question in cases not involving the death penalty. In Harmelin v. Michigan,
. See Urax Cope § 76-4-204(2) (conferring discretion on sentencing judge to impose lesser sentence for crimes of solicitation if the court finds that a lesser term is "in the interests of justice" and states the reasons for this finding on the record); id. § 76-5-301.1 (providing for downward departure in the "interests of justice" in child kidnapping cases); id. § 76-5-402(4) (rape); id. § 76-4-102(2) (murder); id. § 76-4-102(3)(); id. § 76-3-203.2(5) (use of dangerous weapon in offenses committed on or about school premises).
. See Ura Cope § 78B-1-136 (establishing witness's right "to be detained only so long as the interests of justice require"); id. § 77-8a-1(2)(d) (requiring joint trial of co-defendants unless separate trials would be "in the interests of justice").
. See Rahofy v. Steadman,
. See In re Estate of Hannifin,
. Sentencing law in other jurisdictions confirms the understanding of consideration of the interests of "justice" as a reference to broad sentencing discretion. See United States v. Steiner,
. The majority's approach has no logical stopping point. If it is taken seriously and extended to its logical limits, today's decision may eventually be understood to require proportionality review of every sentence imposed in the courts of the State of Utah, since the "interests of justice" are at least presumptively relevant to alf sentencing decisions. And even if the court's approach is limited to sentences imposed under statutes expressly calling for consideration of the "interests of justice," the impact of today's decision still will be sweeping, as that phrase is employed in a wide range of statutes cited above. Supra 120, notes 19 & 20. That sweeping extension would be troubling, as it would represent a broad judicial overhaul of the discretionary sentencing regime that our law has long adopted.
. See Paul H. Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decision-maker to the Decision Nature, 105 Couum. L.Rev. 1124, 1136 (2005) ("[Bloth judges and juries are properly excluded as decisionmakers because of the disparity problem: To rely on either is to allow offenders brought before different decision-makers to be subject to different punishment rules.").